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VJl.- ABBREVIATIONS.
INTRODUCTION
^° The Purpose' of This Study
1. International commercial arbitration is today the preferred method of
settling disputes arising out of international commerce^ The reasons for
this preference are varied. Generally, national courts do not have the
confidence of the international business community; they are identified
x<rith the economic, legal and political systems of the countries in which they
are situated^ By contrast, the .international arbitration tribunal, with all
its inconsistencies and uncertainties, is the businessman's court: it exists
to resolve disputes between, and in accordance with the needs of, the
participants of international commerce.
2. ...One major advantage of arbitration is the absence of rigid, predetermined •
choice of law rules.. In the-words of one American commentator:
"The desirability of arbitration among businessmen is enhanced
by unpredictable conflicts of laws rules,
Unpredictable conflict of laws rules? Are there any conflict of laws rules
specifically appropriate to international commercial arbitration? ^'Jhat are
they? Where are they to'be found? Do they always apply or do they vary
from case to case?
3. It is obvious, whatever the nature of the dispute, the rights, duties
and obligations of the parties can only be resolved on the basis of some
yardstick or measuring standard. Several standards are available to
international arbitrators.
The simplest solution is to apply the law of a given State. The relevant
-••••- I" - J.1..I "I•-Ki
rules are here comparatively easy to ascertain and will ensure the certainty
and stability often considered essential for the development,of international
commerce. On the other hand, a national law may be irrelevant to the dispute
or inappropriate to regulate the transaction or arrangement in issue.
000002 ;
, . without applying a particular nati'onal law, arbitrators may in certain
circumstances resort to a general.or common legal standard (e.g. similar
provisions in several or'at least the conflicting national laws). This ^
however necessitates an initial investigation as to the substance of the"
various national>legal provisions. '
Arbitrators could also apply some non-national system of law. The rules
of such standard would be found in relevant international conventions5; codes
of practice, etc., or in general commercial practice. Whilst neutral, a
non-nat'ional legal standard, even where it exists, will often be irrelevant
or remote from the dispute.
Alternative to a legal standard is the application of an extra-legal
yardstick i.e. discretionary rules and criteria based on common sense,' justice,
fairness and morality. The major attraction of these discretionary rules and
criteria is their adaptability to the particular needs and circtimstan'ces of
each individual case. On the other hand, as the content and^make-up of these
yardsticks are indeterminate, their effect varies depending on the attitude
of the arbitrators.
.4. How should an 'international arbitrator determine the particular legal
or extra-legal standard to apply in a given case? A national court has its
own forum conflict of laws rules which direct the judge to the system of law
to be applied. The international arbitration tribunal however has no
forum law and no forum conflict of laws rules. As an anational, sui iuris
institution, apart and independent from the control of every sovereign State,
It is not subject to any national conflict of laws system. The rules'of
some permanent arbitration institutions do contain certain choice of law
provisions; other institutions, particularly those attached to the Gh^bers
of Commerce in the socialist countries, ..consider themselves bound to the
conflict of laws system of the country in which they are situate. In 'the
main however, the. international arbitrator is alone, without any specifically
relevant choice of law or yardstick rules to which he can refer.
, 0-0 00 0 I
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5. This problem is, not new; it has been the subject of extensive debate-
, and discussion'Various authors^ some with practical experience in arbitration.
- • I
coming from different backgrounds and within different contexts have advocated
solutions to. the conflict problems which daily confront arbitrants and
arbitrators . • Several private and public international organisations have
• - 9considered the matter: they too have proposed various solutions . Finally,
the major international arbitration conventions, whilst not specifically
concerned with the question of the law applicable, -have directly or indirectly
. made provision for the resolution of conflict of laws problems^.
6o In this .study we shall look to see ypw in practic^arbitrators actually
determine the legal or extra-legal yardsticks applicable. • Do they apply
they make a direct choice of the yardstick
appropriate or mere preferable to the dispute before
them? To what extent do they consider and follow the various- solutions
advocated by the writers or proposed by the international organisations or
conventions? - •
Within the confines of "international commercial arbitration" the-
purpose of this study is three fold. First, to determine the method by which
arbitrators determine the applicable law and/or extra-legal yardstick.
Second, to determine the legal rules and/or extra-legal yardsticks actually
applied by the arbitrators . Third, to determine the extent to which
arbitral practice converges with and separates from the theory.
2. The Scope of this Study
7. The increasing use of the term "international commercial arbitration"
— — — —
has not brought with it any generally accepted meaning^. For this reason it
is necessary to state what will be understood by the term in this study.
We shall follow a particularly liberal definition based on the subject-
matter of the arbitration. Consequently,, irrespective of the law governing
,00000 4 I
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the procedure, we shall use the term "international commercial arbitration"
to refer to any arbitration arising out'of a transaction or relationship
2
which directly.or indirectly affects international commerce (i.e. commercial
' -3
,,operations extending beyond the.territory of one single State ). Primarily
this definition covers all.commercial contracts where the parties are'
nationals of, or domiciled or carrying on business in different countries,
regardless of where the contract was'concluded, where it is to be performed,
4
or where the subject-matter is situated . Less obvious, but equally inter
national for our purposes, are contracts where the parties are national of,
domiciled or carrying on business in the same country, but the goods are to
be delivered or the contract performed in some other country.'^
^ • • •
..S-r The foregoing, definition will naturally exclude consideration of certain
formsof arbitration. Most obvious will be awards made in r.espect of disputes
between sovereign States or State organs, such av/ards being based on public
international law and rarely involving questions of commercial law^.
Similarly the decisions of the mixed arbitral commissions fall outside the
2
scope of this study .
9. Included within our terms of reference will be five main kinds of
commercial arbitration. Firstly, arbitration awards rendered between parties -
physical or legal persons - from market economy countries (e.g. the EEC member
Statesj USA, Japan). Secondly, awards between parties from the vjestern
developed world and the third world (i.e. Africa, Asia). Thirdly, arbitration
awards arising out of 'ieast-west" trade (i.e. between parties from countries
J
of market and planned economies). Fourthly, awards in respect of inter-CMEA
trade (i.e. between parties from countries members of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance). Fifthly, awards arising from commercial transactions
where one party is a subject of international law (i.e.' a State, State agency
or an international organisation).
ooonns. •;
Method of Study ' ' . • ' •
10. The form of this study will ,be double pronged; every problem confronted
will be considered from both the - theoretical and the practical viewpoint.
Within our theoretical survey, we will trace the various solutions
proposed by the writers and in the resolutions, projects and draft laws
developed by the concerned public and private international organisations.
' Equally, we will look to see what, if any, relevant provisions are to'be found
in the rules of the better known permanent arbitration institutions and in
the major international arbitration conventions. 'l^hilst we shall endeavour
to state and explain the consequences ensuing from the adoption of these
ideas, there will be no attempt to support or take issue with any particular
. view.
11. Most previous studies have been limited to theoretical discussion with
yery few actual awards. This is due to the privacy and confidentiality still
believed in many circles to be fundamental to arbitration. We have been
fortunate to have gained access to a large number of awards.
Hence the m.ajor part of this study will be an in depth review of these
decided arbitration awards and an analysis of how arbitrators actually
determine the applicable legal or non-legal yardstick. The awards
considered are of four kinds. Firstly, the awards of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) most of which have never before been published.
Secondly, awards of the arbitration tribunals in the east-European^ socialist
countries, many of which have already been published. Thirdly, other
institutional axrards,. some of which have been previously published. Finally •
ad hoc awards; again some of which are well known and have been extensively
discussed, others which are here presented for the first time^..
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4. ; The-Plan of Study
12. The substance of this study is divided into two parts, Hov^everj in a
I preliminary part it is intended to consider certain fundamental questions
' " ' ' ' ' '
affecting international arbitration. Initially we shall distinguish;the ,
different levels, and forms of arbitration. Then we will look at one,of- the "
most contentious subjects in international commercial arbitration; . the
juridical character of arbitration. In theory at least, it is the juridical
character of arbitration which holds the key to the conflict of laws problem.
«
13. Part one will consider the right and power of the parties to determine
themselves the legal or non-legal yardstick to ]3e applied by the arbitrators.
Despite the objactions levelled against party autonomy within the confines
of national law, there are few who would today question its pre-eminence within
the; institution of international arbitration. What is not so clear is the
extent and the effect of that autonomy. The two main aspects of autonomy,
\ , • •
express and implied^ choice, will be considered separately.
14. Part two deals with the vacuiun situation where the parties do not indicate
what law or other yardstick is to be applied. Initially we will consider
the conventional methods advocated for resolving a conflict of law, i.e. the
.application of a system of private international law. We will deal"separately
with the national and non-national systems of the conflict of laws which can
/'
be applied in international commercial arbitration.
Then we shall consider the alternative solution; the direct application
by the arbitrators of the governing law or non-legal standard. Here we will
look in particular at the application of the lex mercatoria and the exercise
t
of extra-legal yardsticks in international commercial arbitration.
Finally, we will investigate the practical limitations imposed on
arbitrators by national and international public policy (ordre public).
PRELIMINARY PART _ ' ' . • "
CHAPTER I. ^ TliE MEANIMG, NATIONALITY AND FORMS OF ARBITRATION ;
The Meaning of Arbitration • - ,
15. Have you everj in the course of an argument or'discussion, suggested
asking a third and neutral person to say' who was right? Did you expressly
or impliedly agree or intend that the third person's answer V70uld be accepted
as putting an end to the dispute or argument? If so, you were suggesting
arbitration - albeit of the very roughest kind^.
Arbitration is an institution more easily identified than defined. Most
attempts to define arbitration have been or can easily be criticised. ^
Nevertheless it is useful to look at a few definitions which have been put
forward. _ : '
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes arbitration as:-
"The settlement of a question at issue by one to whom the parties
agree to refer their claims in order to obtain an.equitable decision"^.
The American Arbitration Association defined arbitration as "the reference of
\ o
a dispute to one or more impartial persons for final and binding determination" .
Both of these definitions are incomplete: they ignore the private character
of arbitration and the judicial responsibility of the arbitrators.
I
More instructive definitions can be found in the major arbitration texts.
For example, an English handbook states:
"An arbitration is the reference of a dispute or difference between
not less than two persons for determination after hearing both sides
in a judicial manner by another person or persons, other than a '
court of competent jurisdiction"^^ '
In similar vein, Jean Robert in his renowned treatise on arbitration writes:
' "On entend par arbitrage 1'institution d'une justice privee grace'a
. laquelle les litiges sont soustraits aux juridictions de droit commun,
i pour etre resolu par des individus revetus, pour la. circonstance,'de la
\mission de les juger"5.
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16. To propose a further definition here would be superfluous and most likely
fail to take account pf•every aspect of arbitration^o Rather it, willj be
• • • • ' ' .2 •
. useful to identify the major characteristics of arbitration ,
• • , • i ••
\ 3 ,4
n Firstly, arbitration is a method by which any dispute can be settled .
^^Seeondly^- the dispute is resolved by a third and neutral person or persons
(the arbitrator (s)) specifically authorised, ij Thirdlythe arbitrator.Cs) are
empowered to act by virtue of the authority vested in them by the parties'
submission to arbitration'^, ''j Fourthlyy the arbitrator(s) are expected to
determine the dispute in a judicial way; this does not necessarily mean
strictly in accordance with the law, but rather by giving equal opportunity
to the parties to put their case, and by x>reighing the evidence put forv/ard by
the parties in support of their respective claims. 6jFifthly, arbitration is a
private system of adjudication; it is the parties themselves, and not the
State, who control the powers and duties of the arbitrator (s) . Sixthiy.i the
solution or decision of the arbitrators (the award) is final and conclusive
and puts an end to the parties' dispute. Seventhly, the award of the arbitrators
binds the parties by virtue of their implied undertaking when agreeing, to
arbitration that they will accept and voluntarily give effect to the arbitrators'
decision. ?^Eighthly, the arbitration proceedings and award are totally,
independent of the State: the ordinary courts will only interfere^ - and then
strictly within the confines of its lex fori - to give efficacity to the
' ' ' •
.arbitration agreement, to regulate the arbitration proceedings or to give effect
to the axjard where it has not voluntarily been,carried out by the parties.
17. Generally these characteristics are equally appropriate to all types of
arbitration: commercial, industrial, labour and professional; both on the
domestic and the international level. On the domestic plain,, most countries
have some legal provisions for the regulation of arbitration in general^. Such '
provisions define the right of parties to submit to arbitration, provide the
rules for the conduct of arbitration and specify what matters may be submitted
to arbitration. Some countries further have specific legislation relating
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to particular tjj-pes of arbitratimi (e„g. labour arbitration) or requiring
disputes of a certain kind to be resolved exclusively by arbitration (i.e.
' 7 .
statutory arbitration)'., ' •
,B.. The Nationality of Arbitration '
1. , Domestic Arbitration
18. Most arbitrations have the nationality of a particular State. The
nationality of an arbitration may be important for, three reasons.- Firstly,
it identifies the l^x arbitri, the law regulating the arbitration. This is
the law which regulates the arbitration proceedings and which determines what
subject-matters may be considered by the arbitrators^. Secondly, it identifies
• 2the national co_urt in which the arbitration is domestic . This court has
jurisdiction to supervise, and if necessary intervene in, the arbitration
3proceedings . Thirdly, it identifies the procedure to be followed for the
recognition and enforcement of the award. A domestic award (i.e. an award
which has the; same nationality as the enforcing court) is often more easily
4 K g
enforceable than a foreign award .
19. The determination of nationality is not always straightforward^. Where •
all the factors of the arbitration (i.e. the subject-matter of the dispute,
the nationality and/or domicile of the parties and the arbitrators, the
applicable law, the place of arbitration) are connected with the same State,
2there can be little argument .
Even where all the connecting factors do not converge in one single
jurisdiction, an arbitration will still invariably have a nationality^.'
However, the more diverse the connecting factors, the more artificial the',
nationality. The arbitration may be totally domestic but for one element,
e.g. the place of arbitration'^ . Alternatively, the arbitration may have
connections with several jurisdictions, but no preponderant connection^.
. , U U U U 1 U " . • i • , •
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20. Does nationality depend on the lex arbitri? Or on the State in which
the arbitration actually takes place? Or on the place with x^hich the ~ '
arbitration is most closely connected? What where these are in conflict?
The lex arbitri itself may be unclear. The place of arbitration may be
irrelevant or fortuitous or several^.
The solution is to be found in the law of each State. Every national
law defines itself what it considers domestic (i.e. having its nationality).
This may of course result in more than one State extending its nationality
over a particular arbitration and claiming the right to control and supervise
the proceedings. -• By corollary, an award considered by the national law of
State A as having the nationality of State B, may not be considered "domestic" by
the law of State B itself".
2. _ International Arbitration
21. Whatever the particular nationality ascribed in individual cases, many
international commercial arbitrations may in fact be more accurately described
as international, non-national or multi-national. For example, an
arbitration may have been transposed onto a special international organisational
plain by virtue of some public international law agreement. Or by virtue of
the structure and' procedure chosen the arbitration may have no real connection
with any' national, jurisdiction. Or simply, by virtue of a diversity of
facts, the arbitration may have important and substantial connections with
several States but no preponderant connection with any one State. We shall
consider each of these in turn.-
a) Arbitration; International by its (Xyganisation''
22. There are certain situations where sovereign States have recognised
arbitration as an appropriate method for resolving disputes arising between
nationals of their respective countries out of essentially private agreements.
Such recognition is made in an international convention which gives it the
support of .public international law. Thus every State party to the relevant
•' . . UUUU i i • ,. , ; ,
conventions is bound not only to recognise arbitration as the appropriate®'
.forum to deal with specific disputes but also to facilitate, the recognition -
and enforcement'of awards made in respect of such disputes.
The most obvious exanple of this type of situation arises out of the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States made in I^hingtqn DC in 19,64^» Under this •
Conventions contracting States - created the International Centre for the
Settlement of. Investment Disputes (ICSID). Subject to the agreement of the
... 2parties, the Centre has exclus^ive iurisdiction to enquire into "any legal
dispute arising directly out of an^investinent, between a Contracting State
(or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated
to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State" . .
' The Contracting States undertook to "recognise an award rendered pursuant to
this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by
that award within its territories as if it were a final judgement of a court
4
of that State The party seeking the enforcement or recognition of the
award need only furnish to the enforcing court "a copy of the award certified
by the Secretary-General"^ of the ICSID,
23. Similar international law obligations have been accepted by those States
party to the International Conventions concerning the Carriage of Passengers
1 • 9and Luggage by Rail (CIV) and concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM),
-The CIV aimed to create a body of rules capable of regulating the rights and
obligations of both railway corporations (or enterprises) and railway users
in respect of carriage of passengers and luggage from one legal jurisdiction •
to another. The Convention in'particular spelt out the principle and the
extent of the liability of the railways in respect of "death, injury or bodily
3 l\damage" and for the loss of luggage due to the fault of the railway and/or
its employees. The CIM aims to regulate the obligations of railways land the
rights of persons sending goods by rail from one country to another^. : The
Convention also provides when and to what extent^ the railway organisation
; •, 000012 ! - • ;
Xi7ill be liable for loss or damage to goods consigned by rail for delivery
in another country,, , • , V .
. . - . g '
Both the CIV and CIM Conventions entitle parties to take any disputes
to arbitration in preference to national courts of law. Articles 61 (5) of
bath Conventions'provide:
"Ax^ard made by arbitration tribunals against transport undertakings
or users shall become enforceable in each of the Contracting States
as soon as the formalities required by the .State in which enforcement
is to take place have been complied with." !
Under this provision States party to these Conventions accepted the public
international law obligation to recognise and give effect to any. arbitration
award made' with respect to claims arising out of the death of or injury to a
passenger, or damage or loss to luggage or goods in circumstances covered by
these two"Conventions subject to formal proof of the award actually being
produced to the enforcing,court.
24. A third international convention of this type, though somewhat more
limited in its scope, is the Convention on the Settlement by Arbitration of
Civil Law Disputes Resulting from Economic, Scientific and Technical
Cooperation^. This Convention, made by member States of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance ^5 aimed to exclude the jurisdiction of all
3 .
national courts of law in respect of disputes "arising from contracts of
purchase, ... specialisation and cooperation of producj:ion5__car.ry;in,g_ojit
building industrial arid construction industry works, on assembling, pi^jecting,
prospecting, scientific research, designing and exploratory development,,
transport-dispatching and other services, as well as other civil law cases
•arising in the course of economic, scientific and technical cooperation of
• Artthe countries-parties to the Convention . The contracts referred to are
naturally those between organisations or enterprises which have their main
place of business in different countries party to this .Convention'^ . .Rather
the Convention preferred all such disputes to "be subject to arbitration
proceedings at the Chamber of Commerce in the country of the respondent or.
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subject to agreement of the parties concerned, in a third counti^y-party to
the present Convention"^. V
To facilitate the recognition and enforcement of awards made pursuant
to this Convention, the CMEA States undertook to give effect to such awards
as if they \<reve (domestic court judgments. , Thus the Convention-provided^:
"The awards shall be recognised without further proceedings and shall-
be subject to enforcement in any country party to the Convention in .
the same order as entering into force judgments of the courts of law
of the country concerned"•.
b.) Arbitration: International by its structure or procedure/
• . • •
25. Perhaps the largest proportion of international commercial arbitrations
are conducted outside both national and legal boundaries. They are totally
•2detached from every national system of law and are independent of the State
in which they are held . The proceedings are consequently governed by and
in accordance with international' or at least non-national arbitration rules.
This Fouchard described in the following terms:
un arbitrage detache de tous les cadres etatiques, soumis a tous
egards a des normes et a des autorites veritablement Internationalesj
c'est-a-direj bien que toutes ces expressions soient quelque peu
barbares supra-nationales, extra-nationales, ou mieux, a-nationales"^.
Such arbitrations may be either under the auspices of a permanent arbitration
institution^, or ad hoc,^ under some internationally accepted arbitration
code adopted for the purposes by the parties or the arbitrators.
26. The parties may submit to arbitration at-the international Chamber of
Commerce in which case the rules of that institution rather than those of
the place of arbitration would be followed. Similarly with the other
international or non-national arbitration tribunals and the institutions
attached to the special trade associations (e.g. the Feed and Grain
Association, the International Federation of the Seed Trade, the International
Wool Textile Organisation). Alternatively, the parties might submit to
another established tribunal, which, while ostensibly a national institution
(e.g. the American Arbitration Association, the London Court of Arbitration,
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the Maritime Arbitration Court at Le Havre), was established primarily to .
deal with disputes arising out of' international commerce. All these
institutions have rules according to which they become seized, the
arbitra.tors are appointed j" the proceedings are conducted and the award is
laade. These rules are non-natipnal: they belong to the arbitration
institution concerned-and not to the local State.
27» The parties could also choose for their dispute to be dealt with by
arbitration ad hoc under some internationally developed arbitration code^.
Such code may be contained in an international convention e.g. the European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 19615 which makes' provision
for the regulation of - every aspect of an arbitration, including the appointment
of arbitratorss the procedure to be followed, the conflict o'f laws rules to
2be applied and the recognition and enforcement of the award. Alternatively,
several arbitration codes have been developed by United Nations agencies.
In 1956 the UN Economic Commissions for Europe (UNECE) and for Asia and the
Far East (UNECAFE) developed rules for arbitration. Both sets of rules make
provision for most aspects of arbitration including the appointment and
removal of arbitrators, the procedure to be followed, the conflict of laws
• 3rules to be applied , and the making of the award. More recently, in 1976,
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted
rules for optional use in ad hoc arbitration^. These rules were greatly
/'
influenced by and developed from the earlier sets of rules, and provide a
comprehensive code to govern an ad hoc arbitration'^.
These arbitration rules are international or at least non-national, in , •
that they do not pertain to any one national legal system^. However, all
having been developed under the auspices of some international agency, most
countries will have directly or indirectly participated in their development.
What is particularly important is that these rules apply only when expressly
chosen by the parties.
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c) Arbitration: Interliat1ona1by. its(f^ts,
28. Irrespective of its organisation, structure or procedure, an arbitration
may be termed international by virtue of its connection with more' than one
jurisdiction . This may be so even where the.arbitration is organised and
conducted under the national laxsr of a particiilar country, provided there is
some connection, however small, with a second jurisdiction. In the words
of Fouchard:
"... il suffit qu'un aspect, qu'un element du litige ou de I'arbitrage,
element materiel ou juridique, touche a un pays different de celui
auquel se rattache le reste de I'affaire, pour qu'il y ait arbitrage
' ^ international".-
It follows that an otherwise"domestic contract could, because' of an agreement
to go to arbitration in some other, country, result in that arbitration being
. 3
international . . ' '
So an arbitration will be international, even though it may have the
nationality and be subject to the law of some sovereign State. It is the
"geographique ou economique"'^ factors of the arbitration, far more than the
nationality or law applicable which determine whether a particular arbitration
is domestic or international^.
C. The Forms of Arbitration
29. There are two main forms of arbitration available to the participants
of international commerce; institutional arbitration and ad hoc arbitration.
We shall consider the- major characteristics of both.
.1, Institutional Arbitration
30. The rapid increase'in the number of institutions and organisations
providing permanent arbitration facilities is a relatively modern development^,
These institutions have been created by private businessmen, commercial.
commodity and professional organisations, governments, inter-government
agencies and international bodies. Their arbitration functions are variously
- UUUUi H _ I - •
-incidental to3 part of, or their main function.
These institutions can conveniently be divided into various categories. '
, 1.1 ,1 , , , L. • I I i-i"-——^
We will distinguish between a) international institutional arbitration,
and b) national institiitional arbitration.
• . International institutional arbitration
31o Certain arbitration institutions have been created primarily to provide
an arbitration service to participants in international commerce coming from
4
different political, economic and legal systems. These are international or
non-national institutions: they were established by interested governments
and/or organisations and/or individuals from different countries; they owe
no allegiance to any one sovereign State and are responsible only to
international commerce in general and to those who submit to their jurisdiction
in-particular. "
That their administrative headquarters and secretariats are situated
in one particular country may be a matter of political or commercial
convenience, geographic accessibility or mere coincidence. It does not
signify any major connection between the institution and the host State;
however it is resident in that country by courtesy of the sovereign and in
consequence must respect the local imperative laws and standards of public
policy (ordre public) at least- with respect to those activities directly '
affecting the country in question,
/
32. Among the so-called "international" arbitration institutions it is
necessary to distinguish between those which are truly international i.e.
. . y
subjects of public international law (i)' and those institutions which are
international by virtue of their organisation, membership and role in inter
national commerce. In the latter category we shall consider separately the
Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ii), those
institutions, organised world—wide, which offer a specialised service for
specific commodities or industries (iii) and the regional and bi-lateral
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institutions offering general or specialised arbitration services (iv)
(i) Public International Law Arbitration Institutions
33o The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
the brain-child of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
was created in 1965 by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dispute
between States and Nationals of other States. In the early 1960s it was
considered necessary to encourage investment-in the recently independent third
world whose need for foreign capital was obvious but whose political
instability did much to discourage prospective investors. There had already
been examples of volatile governments nationalising and confiscating foreign
omed property. The governments of most developing countries recognised
foreign capital investment as vital to the development of their economies^.
"The need for international'cooperation, for economic development and the
role of private international investment" inspired the creation of an
internationally acceptable forum, capable of regulating disputes arising
between States and nationals of other States in respect of moneys invested or
I
property owned by the latter in the territory of and subsequently confiscated
3by the former . The ICSID is such an. institution, which under the Convention
is empowered to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration. The
conditions under and the rules according to which the ICSID acts are contained
4 .in the Convention , including express provisions for the appointment and
removal of arbitrators, the powers, functions and duties of the arbitration
tribunal and, most important of all, the undertaking of• all States party to
the Convention to recognise and enforce an ICSID award as if it was a domestic
judgement^.
/ »
34. The ICSID is different to all other permanent arbitration institutions
in that it is the creation of sovereign States by means of an international
convention, rather than the creation of private businessmen or business
organisations. As such the ICSID is a public international institution, a
UUUUl^i !
subject of public international law,^. However, as the disputes which come
before it for arbitration involve/one privates non-government party5 the
arbitration is'not a pure public international arbitration; rather it'falls
somewhere between public and private'international arbitration. It has for
this reason been'variously described as quasi-international or semi-^international
2 ' ' •
arbitration «
International Railway Transport Arbitration^
35. Not- so elaborately developed is the arbitration service created by the
2 . • .CIM and CIV Conventions 1961 . These conventions set up a Central Office
for International Railway Transport in Berne, Switzerland, vjith responsibility
to organise arbitration tribunals to hear disputes arising out of the carriage
3 . .
of goods, passengers and luggage «. The arbitrants may be Contracting States,
national railway corporations, carriers, passengers or consignors^. Although
the Central Office maintains a list of arbitrators^, the parties may nominate
one each, but must agree on a sole or the third arbitrator; they are also
free to decide themselves the place of arbitration^, •Should the parties fail
to agree the Central Office may request the President of the Swiss Federal
Tribunal to make the necessary appointment, and fix the place of arbitration^.
As already seen awards made by such arbitration tribunals are easily
enforceable in States party to the Conventions,
(ii) The International Ch^ber of Commerce (ICC)
36. The ICC was created in 1919 "to promote international trade and cooperation,
to strengthen the role of Private'Enterprise, and to improve the conditions
for international business" . To this end the ICC'"works to encourage
understanding between businessmen and business organisations throughout the
world", and it "provides its members and business in general with practical
,..2
. services
The ICC was created as and rem.ains an international private organisation:
it has members in over 80 countries around the world; it works and cooperates
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with sovereign States, inter-governmental organisations and public international
and private commercial organisations to achieve its aims: it maintains
national committees in many countries but remains free from political
allegiance; and it 'is financed'by the contributions of its members. Although
the ICC has its headquarters in Paris5j)it is not ,a French institution: in
fact during the Nazi occupation of France the ICC nominally xjas moved to
3 •Geneva, Switzerland „
37. One of the services provided by the ICC is an arbitration and conciliation
. • - I- ,1- ,
service. The Court of Arbitration was created in 1924 and has since become
the most important and significant tribunal for disputes arising out of
international commerce. It is today the only arbitration institution "qui
offre ses bons offices non seulement aux milieux economiques et aux gouvernements
• sans aucune restrictions d'ordre national ou tefritorialj mais aussi et surtout
quelle que soit la nature et I'objet des litiges que lui sont soumis"^.
38. Since its creation, the ICC Court of Arbitration' has gained an iminense
experience of and expertise in all types of commercial disputes; both general
and specialised^, and between parties from similar and different economic,
political and legal regimes. The ICC arbitration proceedings are conducted
2in accordance-with the ICC Rules of Arbitration - the most recent of which
3 . ~
were adopted on 1 June 1975 ; the administrative needs of the Court of
Arbitration are regulated by a secretariat which is resident at the ICC head- .
. . 4 •quarters in Pans .
39. The actual "place of arbitration"^ depends on the volition of the parties;
where the parties are not agreed, it will be fixed by the ICC . In theory the
place of arbitration could be anywhere in the world. In practice however
the ICC fix the arbitration in a place which is accessible to both the parties
and the arbitrators, which is geographically convenient for witnesses and the
presentation of evidence, X'/hich is legally favourable to both arbitration
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proceedings and the enforcement of .the arbitration awards (i.e. a country which
is party to the major international arbitration conventions)s which is
politically acceptable to both parties5 and which has the basic requirements
(i.e. hotel accommodations j.ocal experts, telephone and telex services,
translators, etci) necessary for the conduct of arbitration proceedings.-
Naturally for their administrati.ve convenience the ICC secretariat favours
'arbitration in Paris.
.40. The. international character of. the ICC is blurred only by the cool
relations which exist between th.e ICC and the socialist, countries. It is not-
surprising that an institution created in 1919 "to strengthen the role of
Private Enterprise" should have found itself in conflict with the. nascent
socialist Soviet State dedicated to destroying private enterprise and
capitalism. The USSR was consequently not invited to parti-cipate as a member
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or even as an observer in the work of the ICC. Since then, many more countries
have adopted the socialist ideology; and relations between the ICC and the
socialist countries have thawed. Nevertheless of the" Chambers of Commerce '
in the socialist countries, only the Yugoslav Federal Economic Chamber has
become a member of the ICC. The socialist countries do however participate
in certain ICC activities (e.g. the drafting of uniform laws), and enterprises
from those countries have submitted to the arbitrament of the ICC. To date
(1976), howeverj the ICC has still never been seized of an arbitration
/'
involving enterprises from the USSR or the Peoples Republic of China^.
(iii) International Specialist Institutions . '
41, Institutions have been created for the purpose of facilitating inter
national trade in and to establish internationally acceptable standards for
specific industries or trades. Among other services, these institutions
provide a specialist arbitration service in respect of xjhich they are, by
virtue of experience and special interest, particularly well suited to administer
In the main however they are concerned V7ith quality or technical standard
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arbitration for which they keep panels of appropriately qualified arbitrators
and experts. That they have their seat or permanent headquarters in a
particular country is due to historical or other reasons^ but does not reflect
any lien between the- institution and the host State.
42. There are three international institutions providing a, specialist
arbitration service.
The International Reclamation Bureau (Bureau International de la
Recuperation (BIR)) created in 1948 is concerned with disputes arising with
respect to secondary raw products (ferrous scrap, non-ferrous metals, textiles,
paper-stock). Although the BIR headquarters are in Paris, arbitration
proceedings take place in the country determined by the Court' of Arbitration
unless the parties have agreed in advance upon the place of arbitration^,•
"• International Federation of the Seed Trade (Federation Internationale
2du Commerce des Semences (FIS)), with its seat in Holland, has rules to
regulate arbitration proceedings between their members. These rules provide
that proceedings shall take place under the control of" the member association
in the seller's country'^ or in the country nominated by the General-Secretary
of the FIS^. •
The International Wool Textile Organisation, which has its headquarters
in Bradford (•[!&) , makes similar provision and empowers the national committee
in the country of the seller or processor abroad to arrange and preside over
/•
the arbitration .
(iv) Regional Arbitration Institutions
43. Some institutions providing an arbitration service are_established "on
a regional or a geographic basis. These institutions relate, to commerce
generally or to specific commodities. They conduct their activities from
a non-national or transnational platform: they are neither exclusively
attached nor are their activities restricted to the territory of any one^
sovereign State. On the,otherhand, they are not truly XTOrld-wide institutions;
\J \J [J i) C d. .
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their services.are only available in respect of disputes arising out of
commercial relations between persons carrying on business in or commercial
transactions relating to the particular predetermined region or territory
with which the institution is concerned. The "regions" pr territory may cover
more than one continent (e.g. the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission), areas within a continent (e.g. Arbitral Chamber of the European
Union for the Hops Trade), the territory of several (e.g.,Scandinavian
' /•
Arbitration Board for Hides ..and Skins; the International Court of Arbitration
for Marine and Inland Navigation at Gdynia^ (Czechoslovakia,. GDR, Poland), or
merely two sovereign States (Franco-German Arbitration Chamber for the Fruit
and Vegetable Trade; Dutch-German Chamber of Commerce),
44. The "place of arbitration" under the auspices of a regional institution
depends upon the rules and the character of the particular institution. So
e.g. arbitration proceedings under the rules of the Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission (lACAC) "shall be held at the locality designated by
the lACAC, if the parties have not indicated another place in their agreement"^.
The actual place will be at the accredited national section in the country
. 2 •designated . Similarly, the arbitration tribunal of the German-Dutch Chamber
of Commerce has its seat in The Hague, Dlisseldorf, Frankfurt-am-Main, Hamburg,
Munich or Stuttgart; in each particular case the actual decision is to be
3made by the Chamber of Commerce its'elf . On the other hand, arbitration
proceedings of the Franco-German Arbitration Chamber for the Fruit and
Vegetable Trade are always in the country of the defendant i.e. Strasbourg in
France; Mannheim in the Federal Republic of Germany'^ . The Arbitral Chamber
of the European Union for the Hops Trade has its siege in Strasbourg, but
hearings can be held in any other city subject to the authority of the President
of the Union^.
' ' ' " . '
^^ National instituf-ional arbitration
45. In most countries there is at least one institution offering an
arbitration service.. This .institution may be a national; provincial or city
chamber of commerces ^ professional, trade or commodity institution established
primarily to conduct and administer arbitration proceedings..
• It is the national characteristic of these institutions which is of
importance. Does national indicate .that the institution was created by the
/
Statej is an "organ or department of the State-aMis subject to the control of
the government of the time? Or is it only indicative of the fact that the
institution is nationally organised, was established by nationals of the
country to which nominally it belongs, but remains a private, non-governmental
institution, independent of the State and free from government interference,
or pressure? The structure and organisation of these national institutions
differs in the market economy countries (i) .and in the socialist countries
(ii). We shall consider the two systems separately.
(i) Market Economy Countries \
46. In market economy countries the commercial institutions providing an
arbitration service and the independent arbitration tribunals have been created
by private businessmen and busi.ness organisations. In the case of specialist
institutions they have been established by those involved in the particular
business, industry, profession or trade. The institutions exist quite
independently of the State:- they are private institutions, created, organised,
administered and financed by their members or those for whose benefit they
exist. The charter of the institution, the rules which regulate their daily
affairs and the rules which they'follow in arbitration proceedings .are drafted'
and adopted by the membership of the institution. The State is generally
impervious to the existence of such institutions; subject to the law of the
land, the State does not interfere in their daily affairs. To the extent
that they contribute to the healthy commercial' life of the nation, their
arbitration facilities receive at least the tacit support and encouragement
nnori2 4 ;
of the State. - .
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47» The arbitration services of these national institutions are aimed
equally at domestic and international trade^„- Some national institutions
have achieved ,a particularly/ wide experience and respected reputation in'
international commercial disputes. For example, arbitration centres well
qualified for international trade disputes generallj'-. include: the American
Arbitration Association, la Chambre Arbitrale de Paris, the Indiaii Council of
t
Arbitration, the Italian Arbitration Association, the Japan Commercial
Arbitration.Association, the London Court of Arbitration, and the arbitration •
tribunals attached to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Amsterdam,
Brussels, Frankfurt-anr-Main and Zurich; for "east-west" trade disputes, the
arbitration tribunals of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and the Vienna
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Experienced specialist institutions are
variously situated; e.g. for coffee - the Antwerp Arbitration and Conciliation
Chamber for the Coffee Trade; the Bremen Coffee Trade.Association; for
cotton - Bradford Chamber of Commerce; Chambre Arbitrale des Cot'ons du Havre;
Japan Cotton Trader's Association; for leather and hides - Antwerp Arbitration
and Conciliation Chamber for Leather and Hides; for shipping - Chamber
Arbitrale Maritime de Paris; Gotenberg Chamber of Commerce; The Japan
Shipping Exchange; the London Maritime Arbitration Association; for wool -
2
the British Wool Federation .
Proceedings under the auspices of one of these national institutions are '
conducted in accordance with the arbitration rules of the institution seized.
The hearings take place at the institution's, head office or at some other
chosen venue: this will however invariably be within the territory of the
3
city or country to which the institution belongs .
48. Prima facie, national arbitration institutions are subject to their
national lai^^. In practice however, the law of the country in which they are
situated will only be looked to to supplement the arbitration rules of the
y u u u I- ' '
tribunal seized. When seized of a, dispute X'jitli multi-national dimensions,
the tribunal takes on a non-national character; its connection with a
particular city or country pales into insignificance. There are still
many who consider the national arbitration tribunal is obliged to .respect
and apply the procedual and private international lav7 rules of the place where
it conducts its activities^. Howeverthis is neither the unanimously favoured
... 2
view nor, as will be seen, the one followed in practice .
• Socialist .Countries.
49. In the socialist countries, tribunals have been established to provide
I
an arbitration service for disputes arising out of trade with foreign
countries^. The longest established tribunal is the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Commission (FTAC) in Moscow which is the proto-type upon which
all..the other socialist countries have built when establishing their arbitration
tribunals. It is important to see the circumstances out of which the socialist
arbitration tribunals were born.
50. The first years of the existence of the Soviet Union witnessed an intense
hostility between the "capitalist" world and the USSR. The former were most
anxious to throttle the nascent socialist State. The Soviet Union were '•
politically and commercially shunned; what commercial relations there were,
were on terms dictated by the western partner. This invariably resulted in
a provision for arbitration in the xrest^. The awards which ensued were,
from the Soviet stand point, "dictees par des considerations que ne
correspondaient pas aux interets du developments des rapports commerciaux"
and were "en violation des droitsi et interets, des organismes sovietiques"^.
f
In the mood prevailing in the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet Union considered
it very unlikely that any Soviet foreign trade corporation could obtain a.
"fair" hearing in tribunals situated in countries determined to engineer its
demise. Acknowledging that foreign businessmen would not accept that the
national courts of the Soviet Union deal with disputes arising out .of inter-
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national conmiercial contracts, the. Soviets created in June 1932 the FTAC.
This organisation wasto be a nonTGovernmental agency, organised within but ^
independent of the All Union Chamber of Commerce of the USSR. The Charter'
of the FTAC declared its character and purpose to be (respectively) "a public
organisation formed in order to further the development and strengthen the
economic relations between.the USSR and foreign countries".
51. Today every socialist country has an arbitration tribunal attached to and
' , 1
administered by its national Chamber of Commerce . The Chamber of Commerce
is an auxiliary institution with responsibility to promote and facilitate
•commercial relations with foreign businessmen. T-Jhilst the Chambers of
I ' 1 .
Commerce in socialist countries are not State institutions, they are equally
.... 2 .
not private institutions , They were created by the State, are subject to
the-supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and carry out their functions
in accordance with national policy; senior officials are appointed by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade. Their responsibilities encompass not only
activities similar to those of western Chambers of Commerce, but also certain'
delicate tasks which for political reasons cannot be dealt with through normal
3 '
channels . • , • '
The "most important single function"^ of the Chamber of Commerce is the
provision of an arbitration service. Whilst the Chamber of Commerce does
not interfere in" the daily running of the arbitration tribunal they are closely,
connected. They are invariably situated in the same building and many senior
officials hold posts in both the arbitration tribunal and the Chamber of
Commerce. The Chamber retains ultimate control and responsibility for the
arbitration tribunal. Hence the rules according to which the tribunal
conducts itself and the panel of arbitra;tors must be approved by the Praesidium
of the Chamber of Commerce^.
52. There•are also six specialist arbitration -tribunals. Four relate to
maritime arbitration; the Maritime Arbitration Commission in Moscow, .the
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Maritime Arbitration Commission in Peking, the Maritime Arbitration Committee
in Hanoi and the most. prestigious-, the International Court of Arbitration for
MariLne and Inland Navigation in Gdynia, in Poland, , Also in Gdynia there are
arbitration tribunals atta;ched to the Gdynia Wool Federation and the Gdynia
Cotton Associatidn„ The internal workings of these institutions are also
controlled through the central organs of the State.
53. An arbitration under the auspices of these various socialist institutions
are always held in the country where'the tribunals have their seat.
Proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of the institution,
the procedural rules and private international law of the country to which'
the tribunal belongs.' Indeed, in the socialist countries procedural rules
have been developed especially for use in, and private international law is
developed (to the extent relevant to international commerce) by the arbitration
tribunals.
54.- This strong connection between the arbitration institutions and the State
has led to allegations that the arbitration tribunals in the socialist
countries are not independent, but are national courts falling within the
State's national hierarchy of courts. In a sense as understood in the xi'est,
these tribunals are national courts and do appear to be very akin to government
•controlled institutions^. Whereas in the market economy countries arbitration
tribunals are the creation of businessmen and/or commercial organisations to
provide themselves with a service, in the planned economy countries the
arbitration institution is set up by the .State to provide State enterprises
(or persons authorised by the State) with the necessary services should
disputes arise in relation to the State's foreign trade.
55. This ultimate control has resulted in allegations that socialist
arbitration tribunals are partial to socialist corporations. This view born
out of the socialist cold-war diatribe promising to "smash the capitalist
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monopolies", found support in the behaviour of the Soviet FTAC in the nov;
infamous Soviet-Israel Oil Arbitration 1958^. That dispute arose out of
the refusal by the Soviet Governraent to grant an export, licence in respect
of oil meant for Israel. The refusal was a political act of the Soviet
Governments in retaliation for the Israeli Suez campaign of 1956, T^hen the
,Israeli purchaser claimed damages from the Soviet exporting enterprise, the
FTAC made a very short and cursory award after an equally cursory hearing.
Reports followed the award that the Israeli's had be.en denied an opportunity
to put their case, the decision had been dictated by the Soviet government
'or the arbitrators had decided their award in advance. It was further
reported that a Soviet professor who had been instructed by the Israeli's
had been allowed to give evidence against the Israeli party. This award
caused a furore in the west, amongst both lav/yers and businessmen, and did
more to undermine the reputation of socialist arbitration than any other fact.
2This award was widely and roundly condeimed in the west . Much of the
confidence which the FTAC had slox^ly and painstakingly built up was demolished
in one full-swoop. But whatever the true story "one swallow does hot herald'
the spring". There have been very few other allegations.about Soviet
arbitration; there have been even less concerning the other socialist
countries. , Several writers are even of the opinion that despite the undoubted
control which the socialist States have over their arbitration tribunals, they
do not interfere with the arbitrators and are particularly anxious not only to
3be impartial but also to be seen to be impartial . Indeed some commentators
have argued that if anything, socialist arbitration tribunals are biased in
4favour of a western party . To prove their impartiality the•socialist .
tribunals generally publish their awards^ - albeit a few years after being
made - 4 small booklets containi.ng 148 selected awards have been published
by the Soviet FTAC^ - a practice which is generally opposed in the x^est.
Today the Soviet-Israel Oil Arbitration is- considered an isolated and
unfortunate award; it can no longer be relied on to prove anything.
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The -domain ^of arbitration in the socialist, couutries
56. Socialist arbitration tribunals are- not competent to hear disputes
arising out of domestic commerce '^. Their activities are reserved for
foreign trade disputes. Howeverj their role differs depending on whether
the-disputes arise out of inter-QEA trade or trade with non-CMEA countries,
Inter-CMEA Trade
57. ..The eastern European socialist countries (with the exception of Yugoslavia)
established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1949^o The
purpose of CMEA is to coordinate whenever possible the economic, commercial
and industrial policies of the member States. To facilitate trade between
enterprises from the various member Statesj CJIEA aims to develop common
practices and systems. To this, end three sets of general conditions have
been adopted. General Conditions of Delivery of Goods between Organisations
• . . 2
of the Member Countries of CMEA 1968 (amended from 1958 original) ; General
Conditions for Technical Serv.icing of Machinery;, Equipment and other Items 1973
(amended from 1962 original); and General Conditions of Assembly and
Provision of Other Technical Services in Connection with the Delivery of
3Machinery and Equipment 1973 (amended from 1962 original) . All these
conditions provide that disputes arising out of contracts which they govern •
must be dealt with "in an arbitration tribunal established for such disputes
in the country of the defendant or, by agreement of the parties, in a. third
member country of the CMEA"^. Arbitration is consequently the only method
by which disputes between enterprises from CMEA countries can be determined^.
Similarly the Convention on Settlement by Arbitration of Civil Law
Disputes Resulting from Economic Scientific and Technical Cooperation 1972
provides that any dispute which arises out of a commercial relationship aimed
at one of the foregoing forms of co-operation m.ust be'submitted to "arbitration
proceedings with the exclusion of the above disputes from jurisdiction of
the courts of law" (article I "(1)). The arbitration tribunals with
jurisdiction are "the Chamber of Commerce in the country of the respondent">
0 00030
or, subject to agreement of the parties concerned in a third country'party
to the Convention (article II (1))^. •
58. It is not possible to equate totally inter-GMEA arbitration with
international arbitration generally. The purpose of arbitration in inter-
CMEA,trade is different from western arbitration. It has been described by
one commentator in the following way: • ' ^
i
. "While commercial arbitration in the west would tend to strike a
balance between formal and substantive justice, in the socialist
countries it was designed with different aims in view. The nature
of commercial adjxidication in the socialist commonwealth is virtually
influenced by the fact that it is in the hands of experts dravm from
the ranks of the bureaucracy, who are charged with economic
administration. To them, all operations are primarily assessed in
the context of the economic plan. It is quite natural that in this
milieu there should be a tendencj'' to uphold regulations and
instructions of higher authorities and to enforce the formal rule
of law, rather than to seek a solution in terms of business practices.
Furthermore, socialist commercia;i arbitration tends to establish firm
rules of procedure as guidelines for those members of the economic
bureaucracy in charge of foreign tra;de operations"^.
East-We St Trade
59. The role of the socialist arbitration tribunals in east-west trade is
equally important. Arbitration is the only acceptable method of. resolving
commercial disputes between parties from different economic and political
backgrounds: national courts are understandably quite unacceptable for such
disputes. The extent to which socialist countries favour arbitration can
be seen from the willingness of socialist foreign trade enterprises to submit
t^ arbitration both in their own countries and elsewhere, and from ^he wilHng
participation of the socialist States in the.-variQus.....efforts-to..^dev.e.lop- an
i^emational arbitration law. All arbitration in respect of east-west and
international trade generally takes place in the socialist countries under
the auspices of the local arbitration tribunals. •
, , : OOUU:^!
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50." Tor the purposes of this study, inter-CMEA arbitration is only of limited
interestj the general conditions^ providixig uniform contract terms and, where
1
they are insufficient, a choice of law provision'^. However, in all other
arbitration there is indeed a valuable source, of material, though as will be
seen, socialist arbitration tribunals almost always apply the private
• 2 -international law rules of the countrjr to which they belong „
Ad Hoc Arbitration
61o Many businessmen are naturally wary of all institutional arbitration
tribunals, Wliether national or international, general or specialised^
institutional tribunals are easily presumed to have an inherent bias towards
those responsible for their creation and their continued existence. The
institution's rules of procedure, whilst facilitating the method of appointing
arbitrators, may restrict the choice of arbitrators to a predetermined panel
selected by those who control, the tribunal - of whom none may be capable of
dealing with a specific type of case. Again those rules, whilst ensuring
certainty in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings may be too formal and
inflexible to cover every type of arbitration e.g. by requiring hearings to
be held at a fixed and definite venue.
6^. An alternative to institutional arbitration is ad hoc arbitration^. Here
the arbitrants not only agree to submit their disputes to arbitration, but
also retain for themselves complete control of every aspect of the procedure
to be ^^followedo The arbitrants' decide th^^method of appointing, the
jurisdiction and the powers^of the_ arbitrators. Where the arbitration has
its seat depends on the arbitrants; this may he the place expressly selected
or where the arbitrator (or third arbitrator) is domiciled or has his permanent
residence. The arbitrants decide the arbitration procedure to be followed:
they may select the rules of some national or non-national procedural code^
or may even decide for themselves the exact rules to be followed by the
arbitrators. In ad hoc arbitration, the arbitrators* authority derives
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from the parties; this authority ceases x^hen either the award is made or it
is expressly revoked by the parties.
• On the other handp this very non-nationality is also the source of much
confusionjand uncertaintj;.. If the parties are unable to agree on some
question they may be left to their remedies in the normal courts. Furthermore
having no secretariat the arbitrator (or third arbitrator) must himself act
as administrator and secretary; fixing both the time and place of the hearings,
finding the necessary accommodations communicating with the parties, etc„
This can be both inconvenient and unfair. Nevertheless, ad hoc is a popular
form of arbitration particularly appropriate for disputes where one party is
a sovereign.State, arising out of the "oil trade", and in respect of east-west
trade.
CHAPTER II THE JURIDICAL NATURE OF ARBITRATION -
63. UTiat is the legal nature of arbitration? As a private, non-national
system of dispute settlement, is it subject to legal, regulation? If so, to what
legal order: a national law (which), an international law or a mixture of the two?
Or is arbitration,as the creation of the parties, subject only to their regulation?
This question has for long been the subject of debate and argument amongst
academic witers. They argue that, in theory at least, the attitude of national
legal systems to arbitration proceedings (e.g. whether to uphold arbitration
agreements, to assist with the appointment and removal of arbitrators).and the
award (i.e. whether to enforce the axv^ard or not), depends on the legal character
^of arbitration.^ Furthermore, this question allegedly holds the key to the
legal or non-legal yardsticlcs available to arbitrators in international trade
disputes and the method by which the applicable yardstick is to be determined.
No one viev/point has received universal support in theory or practice. It will
be convenient to consider the major theories xjhich have been advocated and the
effect they would have if adopted. No attempt will be made to support any
particular viewpoint. As will be seen when considering the decided ax^ards,
there is some support' for '11 the theories.
6A \ Four theories have been suggested with respect to the juridical nature of
arbitration. Three have been around for many years; the fourth was developed
only in 1965. As long ago as 1937, Alfred Bernard wrote synthesising the
three older theories in the following terms:
"... d'apres le premier, - qui dissocie le compromis de la sentence
. - celle-ci doit ttre assimilee aux jugements rendus par les juridictions
ordinaires; d'apres le deuxi&ne - qui considere le compromis et la
sentence comme les deux phases d'une m&ne convention: la convention
d'arbitrage - la sentence a un caractSre contractuel et ne peut &tre
assimilee -'aux jugements; fe troisilme - que I'on peut considerer comm.e
intermediare - subordonne 1'assimilation de la sentence arbitrale au
jugement de la juridiction ordinaire a son exequatur prealable".^
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These three viewpoints are today respectively known as the jurisdictional^
the contractual and the mixed or" hybrid theories. The fourth theory suggests
arbitration to be an autonomous institution. We shall consider each of these
I
theories in turn. ' _ .
A. 'Slie "Juri-gdictiohal' Theory
65 , The jurisdictional theory recognises the power of the State to control
and regulate all arbitrations- which take place within its- jurisdiction. VRiilst
recognising that an arbitration has its origin in the parties agreement^ the
jurisdictional theory maintains that the act of adjuducation by the arbitrators,
the validity of the arbitration agreement, the powers of the arbitrators and
the enforcement of the arbitration award, all rely for their authority on the
law of the enforcing State. Thus, unless some national law recognised as
applicable entitles the parties to submit to arbitration, empowers the
arbitrators to hear and determine the issues involved in the dispute,- and
enforces the decisions of the arbitrators, the arbitration is meaningless and
ineffective. Such authority and effect, if and when given by the law of the
enforcing forum, is a concession and not a right.
66 . Adjudication.IS a sovereign function normally exercised by national
courts established by the State especially for that purpose. Parties can
QHly. .ubmit to arbitration to the extent expressly allowed or impliedly accepted
by. the., law of the place of arbitration,^ Equally, an arbitrator has no '
authority to act without a "d^le '^gation de souverainet^"^ by the State in v.hich '
he, proposes to act,. In the absence of such delegated authority the award will be
devoid of validity and effect. As s-tated by one .author
I'etat seul a le privilege de rendre la justice, que des lors,
si'la loi autorisa les parties a recourir a I'arbitrage, cette institution
. na saurait etre I'exercise d^une lonction publique, qu'il faut done en
conclure logrquement que la sentence arbitrale est un jugement, au meme •
titre. que, les decisions rendues par les magistrats de I'etat".^
Xu follov7s- that the arbitrator, like the judge, draws, his power and authority
froiu the local law. Hence, an arbitrator is frequently considered to closely
resemble a judge. Both are obliged "... de decider suivant le droit ou suivant
leur cons-cience, c'est-a-dire, ... de juger";^ both must respect and uphold
the fundamental principles- of the local law.^ The only difference between
judge and arbitrator is that the former derives his nomination and authority
directly from the sovereign,- whilst the latter derives his authority from the
sovereign but his nomination is a matter for the parties.^
67 . Since the power and authority of an arbitrator closely resembles that
of a judge, it is natural that the axvrard should be treated in the' same way'
and granted the same effect as an ordinary court judgment.'' These effects depend
upon the law of the enforcing court.
An axrard (like a judgment) is not self-executing. If not voluntarily given
effect to by the parties it will have to be enforced by the courts. Per se
an award is xrorthless; its value depends upon it being enforceable. If the
award is not voluntarily performed, the party in whose favour it was made
must apply to the local courts for enforcement in the same way as with an
...
ordinary court judgment. Thus Niboyet argued that in reality ansaward/ ,
"... n'est encore qu'un projet de sentence,,et elle ne devient une
sentence complete que lorsque I'autorite judici^re du pays ou elle
est intervenue se I'est en quelque sorte appropriee, par la voie de
1'exequatur national. Get exequatur lui donne le sceau d'une oeuvre
judiciaire pr^par^e par des arbitres, mais que la justice s'annexe
en definitive"2.
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68; •, The effect of this theory is to allow arbitrators no greater freedom
in the application of substantive law than judges have. It puts the emphasis
on legal certainty and requires that an award conform to the law of the State in
which made. Arbitrators v7ould consequently have to apply the conflict rules of
the State in which they are sitting and would be little better off than an
ordinary court. "As stated by Madame Rubellin-Devichi:
I .
"... la forme des actes accomplis par les arbitres, devrait 4^tre soumise a
la lex fori, c'est-a-dire a la loi du-.lieu oh ils "operent" car les regies
auxquelles ils obeissent pour-rendre la sentence sont des regies de procedure
proprement dites" .
The jurisdictional theory in practice can most clearly be seen in the attitude
to arbitration.in the socialist countries. Their arbitration institutions are
attached to the' national chambers of commerce and retain a close connection with
the State. Arbitration is the officially favoured system for resolving inter-
national trade disputes. Nevertheless, in disputes arising both out of inters
CMEA trade and international trade generally, the socialist tribunals of eastern
Europe are generally considered to be bound to "their' oxm" procedural and
.private international lax^ rules.
• 8. The Contractual Theory
69-^. A second group of writers submit that arbitration has a contractual
1 • . ... ~
charact^. ' It has its origins in and depends for its continuity on the parties
agreement. The parties themselves determine the system of arbitration
(institutional - which one? or ad hoc), directly or indirectly choose the
arbitrators to hear their dispute, select the time and place of the arbitration
2 —proceedings and regulate the procedure to be followed. Furthermore the parties
undertake to accept the arbitrators^ award as having binding contractual force
and to voluntarily give effect to it. Niboyet comprehensively described this
theory as it relates to the award in the following terms:
il U U li 3
Les sentences arbitralesj ont une nature contractuelle, puisque les
arBitres tiennant leur pouvoir non de la loi ou de I'autorite judiciaire,
mais^de la convention des parties (clause compromissiore, compromis),
L'arbitre statue comme les parties auraient pu, par convention, le faire
elles-memes; elles donnent aux arbitres un veritable mandat de statuer a
leur place. La sentence est done impregn^s de caractere contractual, et
des lois, qu'elle apparait comme ^tant I'oeuvre des parties, elle doit
produire, ^comme toute convention, ,ses effets de plein droit et posse''der
,I'autorite de la chose jugee".3
70. The protagonists of this theory deny the influence of the State on arbitration.
They argue that the very essence of arbitration is that it is"created by the
will and consent of the parties".^ The parties voluntarily agree to contract,
they voluntarily agree to submit any dispute arising out of their contract
to arbitration, they voluntarily agree, in advance, to accept and carry out
the award of the arbitrator. In the xrords of one ivnriter:
i "arbitration is wholly voluntary in character. The contract of xjhich the
arbitration clause is a part is a voluntary agreement. No law requires
the parties to make such a contract, nor does it give one party power to
impose it on another. When such an arbitration'agreement is made part of
the principal contract, the parties voluntarily forego established rights
in favour of what they deem to be the greater advantages of arbitration".^
Or as Dr.Domke said, "the express intent of both parties to enter into the
O
arbitration agreement is essential to its existence".
-71. Both aspects of the arbitration, the agreement and the award, it is argued,
manifest this contractual character of arbitration.
The origin of every arbitration agreement is a contract and consequently
the binding force of the arbitration agreement comes fr"om "pacta sunt servanda'
as well as other ordinary contracts without any State authorisation".^ The
State has no influence or effect on an international arbitration, the entire
agreement being based on the parties' agreement. "C'est du consentment du
parties, non pas I'autorite publique, que 1'arbitre,tient ses pouvoirs",^
The arbitration award is enforceable by the courts as a contract. Authorised
by both parties to make an award to settle their dispute the arbitrator is in. a
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xray an agent of both parties; his ax^ard is hence binding on them as an agreement
made on their behalf by "their agent(s)". Thus the parties are obliged to
voluntarily carry out the arbitrator's award, which otherx^ise can be enforced by
the courts, not as recognising and enforcing the'judgement of another court, but
4
as an unexecuted contract.
From this point of viexj State legislation has very little influence:on the
arbitration agreement or the ax^ard. Both are contracts; as x-fith all contracts
the parties are free,• xjithin the limits allowed by the law, to determine the
conditions of their relations including to submit future or existing disputes
to arbitration. National arbitration laws are only to supplement and fill
lacunae in the parties' agreement as to the arbitration proceedings and to
provide a code capable of regulating the conduct of an arbitration.^
,72;. The contractualists do accept the fact that national law can have some
influence on the arbitration proceedings and the award. A national court will
naturally not enforce an agreement to arbitrate in respect of a subject-matter
reserved by the lex fori for their exclusive jurisdiction.^ Equally a court
*
will not enforce an ax^rard x^hich violates its public policy or where it appears
the arbitrators failed tc.-irespect the fundamental notions of natural justice
(i.e., giving both parties equal opportunity to put and argue their case).
However this is nox^here near as wide as the powers of revision, amendment and
reformation claimed by Laine. Nevertheless
"... c'est du compromis que la sentence tient toute sa substance, se
basant, en d'autres termes, sur ce que le compromis et la sentence ne
sont que les deux phases d'une meme convention: la convention d'arbitrage,
ces auteurs deduisent que la sentence arbitrale a comme le compromis,
le caractere de contrat".
Hence the arbitration-proceedings and'the award comprise only "un ensemble
d'actes contractuels prive".
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73. The contractual JzhMry of arbitration recognises the parties as haying
unlimited autonomy _in_chogsing the lawJ:o govern their jelat^^ Thus an
arbitrator faced with a choice of law problem will resolve'it initially by
recourse," directment ou ihdirectment, de la volonte des parties, exprimee
soit dans la convention d'arbitrage, soit meme seulement dans le contrat ,
'principal', a propos duquel surgit le litige sotlmis aux arbitres".^ In the
-absence of a choice of law by the arbitrators, the applicable law "... seraient
toujours celles du droit materiel regissant la procedure d*arbitrage et
eventuellement le contract litigieux, lui-meme determine par le recours au
principe de 1'autonomie". This theory, sees arbitration as an "instrument of
3 " • • •free enterprise'' capable where necessary of responding to the specific
requirements of the community of international merchants.
C...-""The Mixed or Hybrid Theory.
74. _ It is clear to any onlooker that neither the jurisdictionalists nor the
contractualists are totally correct. Arbitration requires and depends upon
elements from both of these two vieiv^points. The agreement to submit to
arbitration, the form of arbitration and the regulation of the proceedings
are within the exclusive control of the parties; the legal effect of their
agreement and the enforceable character of the award depends on the attitude
taken by the law of the court seized. It is not surprising that a co^rise
theory claiming arbitration t_9 have a mixed^or hybrid^„char„ap,tex,_sh,ou
developed.^
75 - The theory was developed in detail by Professor Sauger-Hall in his masterly
report to the Institut de Droit International in 1952.^ He argued that
arbitration could not be beyond.every legal system: there had to be some law
which could determine the validity of the submission to arbitration and the ' -
enforceability of the award. Equally he realistically acknox^rledged that an
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arbitration has its origins in a private contract, and who are to be the arbitrators
and the rules to govern the arbitration procedure depend primarily on the
parties agreement. Thus he maintained the. contractual and jurisdictional
2
elements of arbitration to be "indissolublement meles". He consequently
defined arbitration as
"une institution juridique mixte, sui generis, qui tient de la
convention par sa genese et du droit de procedure pas ses effets
juridictionnels".^
On the recommendation of Professor Sauser-Hall this theory was impliedly
adopted by the Institut de Droit International in the resolution adopted in
4
Amsterdam in 1957.
76. Despite their apparently diametrically opposing views, the jurisdictional
and the contractual theories can be reconciled if one accepts that the character
of arbitration "conforme a la realite, \ savoir de droit priv^ et de droit de
procedure a la fois",^ Arbitration contains elements of both private and
public law; it has procedural and contractual features. The agreement to
" arbitrate is a contract and must be treated as such, its validity being
determined by the criteria applicable to contracts. The arbitration proceedings
however must be subject to some national law.
This situation le'd Jean:-Robert to poignantly term arbitration an "institution
2juridictionelle libre" : "libre" because the existence and autiiority of the
arbitration tribunal depends on the volition of the parties; but" "jurisdictionelle"
because the arbitration procedure is subject to the law of the place where the
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arbitration has its seat ,(le siege du tribunal arbitral"). Equally with respect
to the enforceability of the arbitration award: enforcement^ though in the
discretion of the enforcing court, is generally a formality; however the
S
discretion to refuse enforcement may be exercised where the award is contrary
to the public policy of the forum, where the arbitrators have ignored the
fundamental principles of natural justice or where the subject-matter of the
arbitration falls ."•ci?ithinthe exclusive jurisdiction of the national court.
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77 . . Ths effect of the hybrid or mixed theory of'arbitration is to,acknowledge
the strong, though not overwhelming; connection between the arbitration and the
place where the tribunal has its seat ("le siege d'arbitrage"); The arbitration
proceedings are to be regulated in accordance with the parties' agreement,
• at least to the extent .allox^ed by the law of the "siege d'arbitrage". The . \
arbitrator must find a happy medium between the parties'wishes and the law oj.
the place of arbitration. As for the law to govern the substance of the
dispute, arbitrators must respect and apply the laxj chosen by the parties to
the extent allowed by the private international law rules of the "siege d*arbitrage ,
In the absence of any express choice the arbitrators will resort directly to the
private international law rules of the "siege d'arbitrage" to determine the
applicable law.
. The Autonomous Theory. \
The most recently developed theory, that arbitration has' an autonomous
character, is that of Madame Rubellin-Devichi.^ She argued that the character
of arbitration can realistically only be determined by looking at its use and
purpose. In this light arbitration could not be classified as a purely ;
contractual or jurisdictional institution; equally it could not be termed an
"institution mixte". Madame Rubellin-Devichi stated:
"La question est alors de savoir si 1'arbitrage ne depasse pas ses deux
' composantes pour constituer une institution autonome, dont la nature ne
devrait pas etre difinie par r&erence au contrat ou a la juridictioni--, et
dont le regime juridique se justifierait a la fois par le but poursuivi et
par les garanties necessaires aux parties qui ne cherchent pas la solution
de leur differend aupres de la justice officielle".^
By contrast to the three conventional theories the autonomous theory viev7S
arbitration from a different angle. For the three older theories the question
is where arbitration fits within the existing structure of the national and
international legal .systems, and how and to what extent the law restricts the
right to submit to and conduct arbitration proceedings the autonomous•theory
looks to arbitration per se, what it does, what it aims to do, how and wny it
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functions in the way it does; the relevant laws have developed to help and
facilitate the smooth working of arbitration.
79\ Madame Ruhellin-Devichi rejected'the contractual and the jurisdictional
theories of arbitration as they did not correspond with reality. Furthermore
the '^- were in direct contradiction with one another. The courts whilst anxious
to uphold the arbitration agreement are jealous of their authority and hostile
towards private judges. Equally, the great advantage of arbitration is not
the enforcability of the award, but rather the speed and flexibility of the
proceedings. Thus she held the two'.notions to be' "an t'inomiques" and incapable
"s'affronter sans subir une alteration profonde, et au demeurant si inextricablement
melees en I'espece qu'elles en deviennent indissociables"Equally the hybrid
• . 2
theory was rejected as too indefinate and too in^recise. Each of these
vie^'Tpoihts advocates certain restrictions on arbitration, so hampering its growth
and negativing the many advantages which induce businessmen to prefer
arbitration to national courts of law.
STO- . Arbitration has developed because businessmen have found it a convenient
and appropriate method by which to resolve their disputes. Consequently
it is the businessmen themselves v/ho, through .pragma;tic experimentation, have been
responsible for the development of arbitration. Yet they have done it outside
and irrespective of the law; indeed the law has, in large measure, followed
existing practice. So for example, autonomy of the parties in determining
the law to govern both substance and procedure in arbitration is based not .
on the contractual or jurisdictional character of arbitration but on the
practical "necessit^s de 1'institution".^ Equally both arbitration agreements
and awards are enforceable, not as contracts nor as a concession -
S
, o.n the part of the enforcing sovereign State, but as an essential requirement
for the smooth functioning of international commercial relations. The private
arbitration institutions were created and established as viable dispute
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settlement centres before ttie various multi-lateiral international arbitration
2
conventions were concluded. Thus, Madame Rubellin-Devichi concluded:
"La nature particuliere de 1'institution se raanifeste ici avec force;
seul un regime original, lib^re" de la notion de contrat comme de c^lle
de 'juridictf^n, perSettrait de concilier la rapidite necessaire ainsi
que les garanties que les parties sent en droit d'exiger".^
•si. The effect of recognising arbitration as an autonomous institution,
is to acknowledge the denationalisation of arbitration as a reality and
unlimited party,autonomy as the controlling force in arbitration. This
extends to questions of applicable law and also to matters of procedure and
form. With respect to the law to govern questions of substance the parties
are free to choose for themselves the system of law to be applied. The
community of merchants is a "milieu international"^ sufficient for developing
its o\TO law,^ and international arbitration, as the forum which normally
determines their disputes, has an important role in developing the laws to
apply to international commercial relations. This absolute autonomy is, in
Madame Rubellin-Devichi's 'opinion, the means by which arbitration will attain
a truly "supra-national" character in which the international commercial' law
" - • 4 • • •• "-•• : " - • " • " •
. can be directly applied.
Thus' in an arbitration, parties are entitled to select to govern their
relations, a national system of law, or the law of international commerce,
the customs and usages of the trade concerned (the lex mercatoria) or even the
general principles of equity. In the absence of an express choice of law .
by the parties the autonomist theory excuses arbitrators from resorting to
the traditional conflict rules of the "siege d'arbitrage" or of the place of
domicile or permanent residence of the arbitrators. Rather the aroitrators
may either apply the conflict of laws rule which in the circumstances of the
5particular case they consider appropriate, or they can resort directly to
some international law or standard relevant to the dispute.^
(:•
• DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
82. As a generality it is traditionally considered that both a national court
and an arbitration tribunal faced with having to determine the question of the
applicable law can, only do so b3'' applying conflict of laws rules. ^-Jhilst
national courts are considered bound to apply their own conflict of laws rules,
most previous discussion on this subject has considered which conflict of laws
system should be applied in international arbitration where arbitrators have no
national or forum private international law. This discussion has centred around
whether a national or a non-national conflict of laws system should be applied
by the arbitrators. We too' shall partake of this discussion. However,initially
we shall consider the effect of a choice of law or extra-legal yardstick by the
parties. It is submitted and will be shown that the principle of party autonomy
has attained universal acceptance. Equally the right of parties to select the
standard to govern their relations is recognised by the emerging law of international
commerce. In consequence, a national law or extra-legal standard chosen by the
parties must be applied by the arbitrators; there is no need to show that such
choice is authorised or justified by some system of conflict of laws.
83. Our discussion-will be divided into two parts: Part I, the determination
of the applicable law by the parties; and Part II, the determination of the
applicable law by the arbitrators.
PART ONE
DETERMINATION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW - BY THE PARTIES
84. Within the domestic scene parties to a contract bind themselves to
carry out their obligations as agreed. The binding character of the terms
of the contract is given by the law. The parties are obliged to perform
the obligations undertaken on pain of the penalties provided for by the
contract itself or implied by law. However, the law aims only to provide
the framework within which the contract can be regulated where in itself
it is not sufficiently explicit or where outside factors so require.
In the international arena the problem is similar, only one is faced with the
question of what law governs the contract. The alternative to the courts or
arbitrators determining the applicable law by some artificial presumption is to
allow (even encourage) parties to do so themselves and hence relieve the courts
and arbitrators of the problem. Hence, despite the opposition of some writers,
Martin Wolff argued:
"Just as the parties are permitted to create rights and duties
between themselves as they please, and thus to 'make law for
themselves', so it is for them to determine the law governing
their contract."^ ^ — —• »—• - -
This method of avoiding the conflict of laws problem is commended above all by
logic and simplicity.
85, The determination by the parties of the applicable law is knoxTO as(^"party
autonomy"."^ Party autonomy is generally considered to have two forms. Firstly
there"Is the autonomy which is clearly expressed by the parties either in the
written contract, or alternatively, before the court or arbitrators. Secondly,
there is implied autonomy: that is where through words or acts the parties
clearly manifest their intention and expectation that a particular law govern
their relations. 'Though traditionally treated as a subject apart, it will be
convenient here to consider the right of contracting parties to choose an
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extra-legal standard to be applied by the arbitrators as an extension to the
doctrine of party autonomy.
We shall consider first the effect of and the recognition to be given to the
law or other standard expressly chosen by the parties. Then we shall look at
the meaning of "implied choice" and the effect that is given to it.
CHAPTER I EXPRESS CHOICE
86./ It is today an every day fact of commercial life that many international
contracts do contain an express choice of law. Indeed it is sometimes suggested
that a lawyer who fails to ensure that a contract contains a clear choice of
law fails his client^. This practice came about as it was found to be a
convenient and simple method to ensure the avoidance of the application of some
law unfavourable to the contract^. The simplicity of allowing parties by their
express choice to relieve the courts and arbitrators of having to determine the
applicable law was clearly captured by Schmitthoff when he said:
"The determination of the proper law of the contract will not
involve any difficulty if the parties have been wise enough to
record expressly which legal system is to apply to their agreement.
Whether the practice of stating which law is to govern the contract was a result
of or itself induced the acceptance of party autonomy in the various national
private international law systems is unclear : it is a little reminiscent of the
proverbial chicken and egg situation. What is clear is that today most national
conflict of laws systems do provide that where parties to a contract xjith multi
national contacts expressly provide for a particular law (or body of rules or
equitable principles) to govern their contract, that choice is to be respected
and upheld. As long ago as 1945 Ernest Rabel stated categorically: '
"The practice allowing parties to determine the law applicable^
to their contractual relations,... for centuries has-been applied
by courts throughout the world with slight dissent.
The doctrine of party autonomy has attained an even greater acceptance in the
international and transnational arena than on the national plain. The slight
dissent" which Rabel talked of has been almost inaudible. Autonomy has been
adopted in all the international conventions dealing with contracts^ or
arbitration^ and there are indeed fev; vjho today still question its validity.
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Before looking at its acceptance in principle and extent by international
arbitrators, we shall look at the meanings development, objections and advantages
of party autonomy.
A. THEORY
1. The Meaning of Party Autonomy
87. In 1927 Niboyet claimed that "la theorie de I'autonomie de la volonte
est actuellement la plus difficile de tout le droit international prive."^
It is perhaps a sign of the passing of time that today party autonomy is
one of the most straight forward and simple aspects of private international
law. . '
The definition given by Niboyet in that 1927 study still remains good.
He said:
''On entend couramment par autonomie de„ l.a..y,oJ.onte le pouyoir. des
parties de choisir la loi competente ^ ^lati&re de contrats."^
Under the doctrine of party autonomy parties are free to select themselves
the law to govern their relations. Where a system of conflict of laws
embraces the doctrine of autonomy it recognises "the power of the parties
3
to determine for themselves the applicable law" , rather than impose upon
<
the parties a law which following the connecting, factors of that system of
conflict of laws is deemed applicable to govern an international contract.
This is to prefer a law subjectively ascertained by the parties themselves
in each case, to a law objectively determined for the type of case in
question. Autonomy is thus accompanied by an initial removal of the responsibility
4from the judge or arbitrator to the parties .
So a contract with connections to more than one legal system will be governed
prima facie by "the law which the parties have chosen"^- Within the principal
contract, the choice of law provision^ becomes a contract per se, subsidiary^
to, though independant of the main contract . The effect of the doctrine
of autonomy is to concede to the parties the power to determine the portent
• , 9
of the law over thexr contract .
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2. The Origins and the Development of Part^'' Autonomy
88; It is a matter of doubt quite when the doctrine of party autonomy was
born. Most contemporary writers attribute the idea to Dumoulin '^. However some
credit ought perhaps also to be given to Robertius Curtius who in the 15th
century explained the support for the lex loci actus in the area of contracts
on the basis that "les parties ont implicitement consenti ^1*application de
2
cette loi" .
Prior to Dumoulin the lex loci contractus formula had an almost unopposed
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supremacy over all other possible solutions, including the lex loci solutionis .
Despite the arguments of Dumoulin 'that in certain cases other rules.xTOuld be
4
applicable "in accordance with the tacit and probable intentions of the parties" ,
the lex loci contractus remained authoritative^. This was due in large measure
to the arguments of d'Argentre who derided a choice which did not really exist^.
The 19th century saw the real development of the force of the autonomists^.
They were of course greatly aided by the favourable attitudes taken by Savigny
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and Mancini towards party autonomy . Story too added his support in the U.S.A.
By the beginning of the 20th century most authors acknowledged the special
position of autonomy in the area of contracts though perhaps not all were happy
with the development.
Acceptance of Party Autonomy in Domestic Conflict of Laws Systems:
89. Although they followed behind the academic commentators, the courts of
most developed countries adopted the doctrine, of autonomj'- in the early part of
the 20th century. The English courts led the field as far back as. 1760 when in
Robinson v. Bland^ the great Lord Chief Justice of the time. Lord Mansfield
2
said:
"The general rule established ex comitat and jure gentium is, that the
place where the contract is made, and not where the action is brought,
is to be considered, in expounding and enforcing the contract. But
this rule admits of an exception, where the parties (at the time of
making the contract) had a view to a different kingdom"^
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Two further cases one hundred years later, The Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company v. Shand^ and Lloyd v. Guibert"', both in 1865, put the question
beyond doubt. In the latter case Wiles J. said:
"It is necessary to consider by what general law the parties intended
that the transaction should be governed, or rather to what general
law it is just to presume that they have submitted themselves in the
matter"^.
One reason which has been given for the very early adoption of party autonomy
in England was the supremacy of the "laisser-faire" philosophy which prevailed
even then in that country^. \
In Italy party 'autonomy was adopted by the Italian Civil Code in 1865 and
9decisions of the Court of Appeal in Trieste in 1937 and the Court of Appeal
in Rome^*^ gave effect to the law expressly chosen by the parties.
In Holland the influence of Voet favouring party autonomy was given effect
by the Court of Amsterdam in 1908^^ and was put beyond doubt by the "Hooge Raad"
12
in 1927 .
13Party autonomy was adopted by the French Cour de Cassation in 1910 in the most
emphatic terms. The court stated:
"La loi applicable aux contrats, soit en ce qui concerne leur formation,
soit quant & leurs effets et conditions, est celle que les parties ont
Vadoptee".
Asimilar judgment was rendered by the Belgian Cour de Cassation in 1938^^.
The courts of Switzerland too have also recognised the right of the parties to
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express a choice of the law they wish to govern .
In Germany, although there appear to have been many cases favouring party
autonomy since the late 19th century,it was not until 1952 that the Federal
Supreme Court of the German Federal Republic applied a choice of law and stated
clearly that a choice of a law other than German law does not violate German
public policy^^.
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The courts of Denmark, Norway and Sweden have also recognised the right of
parties to select the' law to govern their relations and have given effect to
such chosen law^^.
Most surprising of all was that in the United States of America it was not
until after the second World War that autonomy began to obtain a following. This
was due to a great extent to the influence of Professor Beale who was greatly
19 . . .
opposed to the doctrine and was responsible for its exclusion from the American
' . , 20 . 21 'Law Institute's Restatement, Conflict of Laws in 1934 . But in 1953 and
22
again in 1955 the U.S.Supreme Court gave favourable recognition to the law
which the parties had chosen. The acceptance of the doctrine of party autonomy
23has been clearly affirmed by the Restatement Second
90.. The purpose of the foregoing discussion was not to determine what conflict
of laws rules are followed with respect to international contracts by the major
western European trading nations - that is beyond the scope of this study - but
rather to show how extensively the doctrine of party autonomy has been accepted.
This doctrine has received a similar reception in the socialist countries^ and in
.2
many developing countries . What can be clearly deduced from our brief and
superficial study is that, despite their differences,common law, civil law and
• socialist countries have all equally been affected by the movement towards the
rule allowing the parties, to choose the law to govern their contractual relations.
This development has come about independently in every country and with out any
concerted effort by the nations of the world; it is the result of separate,
contemporaneous and pragmatic evolutions within the various national systems
3
of conflict of laws.
3. The Objections to Party Autonomy
91. The almost universal acceptance of the doctrine of party autonomy in
national systems of private international law has only come about after a
long and hard fought doctrinal battle.^
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One major argument which was frequently raised and levelled against
autonomy was that to allow parties the right to choose'the law to govern their
contract "practically makes a legislative' body of any two parties who choose to
get together and contract..."^ Lorenzen similarly argued that "allowing the
parties to choose their law in this regard, involves a delegation of sovereign
powers to private individuals".^ This argument foundered due to the fact that
most sovereign States do recognise and give effect to a choice of law by the
parties. They do so as a manifestation of State sovereignty rather than to
recognise a limitation thereof. Walter Wheeler Cook argued that as parties were
allowed to "legislate" in many other areas (e.g. by making a contract containing
a clause which excludes the application of conditions and warranties, or making
f _ , '
& contract without mentioning the law to govern but stipulating that the contract
shall be determined in accordance with specified rules), it is "hypocritical" to
deny them the right in the case of an international contract.^ It must be
recognised that unlike legislation which governs all to whom it is directed, the
parties choice of law governs relations inter se and only in respect of the
particular contract and the rights and obligations arising therefrom.
92. A similar objection to party autonomy was advanced in the European civil
law countries. It was argued that every action to have legal effect must be_
.given such by a particular law recognised as having authority. Thus the_German
von Bar stated:
" before allowing effect to the intention of the parties, (we must)
know from what territorial law the limits of this intention are to be
extracted. If the intention of the parties could prescribe the territorial
law to be applied in the law of obligations, they might simply_declare that
any foreign law you please should govern a contract concluded in this
country, to be implemented in this country, and belonging altogether
to this country, and in this way withdraw at their pleasure such contracts
. from all the rules of law recognised in ^his country. No one will venture '
to say that that is a sound conclusion."
Batiffol expressed this in his epic 1938 monograph as follows: ' L'objection
fondamentale, d'ou decoulent toutes les'autres, a la loi d'autonomie, est qu il
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n'appartient pas aux parties de choisir la loi par laquelle ^Hes acceptent de
se laisser gouverner, mais a la loi de determiner elle-meme quelles personnes.
quels biens, quels acts ou quels faits elle regit."^ Achoice of law can only
have effect if so authorised by some national law as for "rights being created
by law alone it is necessary in every case to determine the law by which a right
created."^ This argument has sometimes been described as a "cercle vicieux"^is
It is conceded that a national court, can only recognise a choice of law to the
I • ' • .
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extent allowed by its (the forum) conflict of laws rules. , However, as already
seen, most national systems of conflict of laws do allow parties to choos.e the
law to govern their contractual relations. But the real argument which supports
the recognition of the law chosen is that the contract is a creation of the
parties' free and independent volition.^ Provided it does .not infringe the
public policy of the national court seized or violate the imperative laws of
the place of performance the choice must be respected.
The von Bar contention that only the law can determine who, what and the extent
to which it governs, ignores the fact that in practice most contracts are made
and perfoinned independant of and without reference to the "applicable" law.
If the contract is voluntarily performed there is no need to invoke the law.^
Only where there is disagreement as to the meaning of the contract terms or
where one party requests some assistance in enforcing rights and obligations
alledgedly created under the contract is it necessary to determine the applicable
law and even then, it is only necessary to determine the law to the extent
g
necessary to answer the questions raised by the parties-. The intentions
expressed by the parties as to the performance of the contract, will however
prevail over all but the maildatory provisions of the applicable law and
9 . . .international public policy. TTor any court - national or international -
to refuse to apply the law chosen by the parties would result in great
confusion and uncertainty in international business circles.
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93. Another objection to party autonomy is that the weaker party has
invariably to accede to the wishes of the stronger party with the latter
insisting on a choice of law most favourable to him. This it is argued,
is particularly apparent where the contractual need of one party is very much
greater than that of the other. This particular objection has been voiced by
socialist lawyers^ , arguing that the shortage of technological know-how in the
socialist countries often gives to the party from a technologically developed
"capitalist" country an unfair advantage. However, this ignores not only the
fact that the size, financial resources and power of the large foreign trade
corporations in the socialist countries are far greater than that of most
"capitalist" corporations, but also that in many areas the socialist States
are technologically as far advanced, and sometimes even more advanced, than
2
their western business partners.
This argument has some merit when voiced oh behalf of the developing third
world countries. Not only are the developing countries short of technological
knoT^-how, but they often also need training for their workers and financial
credit to enable them to entertain certain types of contract. As for them
many contracts are basic to the country's path to development, it is alleged
.they are faced with take it or leave it terms - including the choice of law
3
clause. Despite the undesirable truth behind this argument two factors are
ignored. Firstly, from a specific point of view, many developing countries
whilst short of technological and financial resources, are very rich in raw
materials - some very urgently needed by developed countries. Indeed, has
this raw material wealth not enabled some developing countries to force their
will - both economic and political - on the rest of the world?
Secondly, from a more general view point, contracting parties from developing
countries are free to negotiate with other prospective contracting partners;
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they can choose to negotiate for technological know-how with parties froBi
developed countries in the capitalist and the socialist blocks, as well as
from certain non-aligned but developed countries.
In contractual relations, it is submitted, until this world takes on a Utopian
character, there will always be a stronger and a weaker party. Even were
governments to take responsibility for all international commercial relations.
can it really be envisaged that a stronger government would not use its political
and economic (and perhaps even military) power to influence the weaker government?
In the present egalitarian age, the only solution to a blatant and unconscionable
use of strength by a contracting party, is for weaker parties to rely on emerging
moral standards, and to hope that threats of adverse and embarrassing publicity
will restrain the stronger parties in their contractual relations.
'94* A further and still existing objection to party autonomy concerns the
possibility and the right of the parties to select a non-existent or inappropriate
or irrelevant or incompetent law to govern their relations.^ This brings up
• the question of the fre,e.d-Qm of choice which contracting parties may ..eni oy. It
is clear that parties are entitled to choose the law to govern their relationship;
but- the extent of the parties' choice is not quite so clear. Must there be some
connection, substantial or tenuous, between the law chosen and the parties, or are
they free to choose any legal system however distant from the parties and the
contract? Must they choose an existing legal system, or can they resort to an
ancient and no longer autonomous system of law e.g. Roman or Jewish law? Can
they choose a non-legal body of rules-e.g. the EEC draft rules, or an amorphous
body of rules e.g. the "principles generally accepted in international trade",
or an "alegal" body of rules e.g. principles of equity?
We shall not here consider the objections levelled against contracting parties
enjoying total freedom in their choice of applicable law. Rather, when looking
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at decided arbitration awards we will consider the various degrees of party
. • j , . ,
autonomy and .see the extent to which such freedom in choice of law is actually
recognised. •
4. The Advantages of Party Autonomy;
95. • The principle of party autonomy is today accepted for simple and logical
reasons. An important requirement of all legal rules, whether substantive or'
' choice of law, is that they should provide "certainty, predictability and
uniformityoThese three factors, for long revered by private international
2
lawyers in every country, have in the last century lost much of their support to
logic, justice and reason. But whilst justice and reason are strong arguments
when dealing with personal rights and status,, the arguments are far weaker with
respect to commercial relations. It is now clear - and few will still argue
otherwise - that for international trade relations certainty is essential,
uniformity is desirable and predictability an absolute necessity. As inter
national commercial contracts have increased in value, complexity and duration,
•the importance of these three criteria has increased commensurately.
96. Whilst party autonomy will not guarantee uniform or predictable solutions
for like type cases, it does guarantee certainty, uniformity and predictability
for the-parties. Party autonomy enables the' parties to be certain which law •
will be applied to their contract, the effect and the interpretation of the
contract becomes predictable, and in turn ensures a uniform solution to the
particular dispute whatever the nature of the trUbufiaL, wherever it may be
.situated and whoever the. judges. As Rabel ^wr.ote: . • •
"Autonomy .... endeavours to obviate the unpredictable findings of
unforeseeable tribunals and to consolidate the contract under one
law while negotiation is in course".^
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Furthermore, recognising the right to choose the applicable law, provides
contracting parties v/ith the mechanism by which to avoid the contract being
• regulated by an ambiguous or unfavourable law, or being given an undesired effect.
This deprives the parties from alleging, .subsequent to the judgment or award, .
that the court or arbitration tribunal applied to their contract a law-which was
unjust or unfair or inappropriate and due only to the application of some fixed,
rigid and irrational choice of law rule. The effect given to the contract and
the ensuant rights and duties between the parties are therefore due entirely to
the expressed will of the parties.
5. Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration
97. Hitherto our discussion has been concernef^ in the main with the acceptance
of party autonomy in national systems of private international law. The
arguments in favour of party autonomy are even stronger when considered in
the light of a contractual dispute submitted to arbitration. This is due in
large measure to the major differences between national courts and international
arbitration tribunals : their allegiance and the source; of their authority.
The international arbitrator has no duty to any sovereign State or any national
law; empowered by the parties his duties are to them and to international
trade in general.
98. Logic, simplicity and common sense all favour recogn^ party
autonomy by the arbitrators. They do not have their own substantive law or
confli^ of laws_ system. By applying the law chosen by the parties, arbitrators
are alleviated from the difficult task of determining the^appUcable^la^^^
can give effect to the expectations of the parti^es.
The arbitrator need only look to see simply whether the parties are agreed as to
the law to govern: this will be found either in an express choice of law clause
or in an agreement before the judge or arbitrator at the time of the hearing.
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The application of conflict of laws rules is itself problematic; to explain
such a choice is even more difficult. Hence arbitrators are anxious wherever
possible to avoid having to make a positive choice of lawc This they can do
where the parties are agreed or have selected what law shall apply.
99. The fact that party autonomy is recognised in most national private
international law systems gives to the rule a.special "transnational"
character. Invariably the national conflict systems of the countries with
which the parties and the arbitrators are connected, as well as that of the
place of arbitration will allow the parties to choose the law to govern their
relations. In such situations it is superfluous for the arbitrators to further
consider the law to apply. "Rules which hold good in the same or a very
similar way for a given concrete legal situation in two or more spheres of
national jurisdiction"^ have been defined as comprising rules of the
"transnational commercial law". Extending this idea to the field of conflict
of laws, could it not be argued that party autonomy is a "transnational conflict
of laws rule" applicable in all non-national tribunals?
100. By submitting to arbitration, the parties remove their contract from
falling within the jurisdiction 'of any one country. They manifest an intention
to avoid all national courts of law and to place their relations on an .
international or non-national level.. With no national conflict of laws system
and no forum lavj on which to fall back, on what basis should the arbitrators
determine the rights, obligations and duties of the parties? Presumably on
the basis of some non—national conflict of laws system. What could be more
non-national than the will of the parties?
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This is a view given expression to by Professor Fragistas of Greece, when acting
as arbitrator in a dispute between an Italian agent and his Jordanian principal,^
The 'arbitrator needed to determine the proper law and reasoned as follows:
l '^Consid^rant que 1'insertion dans un contrat, ayant deg liens de
I', fait avec plusieurs Etats, d'lme clause compromissoire confiant
la solution des differends qui auraient r^sulte dudit contrat ^
1'arbitrage d'une Institution Internationale telle que le CCI,
exprime la volonte des parties de placer leur.litige sur un plan
international et de le faire trancher par un arbitrage vraiment
international, se deroulant au dessus de tout ordre juridique .
national; qu'en pareil cas I'arbitre, pour resoudre le probl^me
de conflits de lois, inherent a cette sorte de Iftige, et pour
determiner le droit substantiel applicable au contrat en cause,
doit, tout d'abord, rechercher la volonte, expres^ ou tacite, des
partles; que faute d'une pareille volonte, I'arbitre doit, statuant
ex bono et aequo, declarer applicable la loi qui, compte tenu des
^l^ments objectifs et des circonstances particuliferes du cas
litigieux, convient mieux au contrat".^ (Emphasis added).
Professor Fragistas has elsewhere recognised that "1'arbitrage priv^ supra-
national est un faite social". Such tribunals are increasingly being
resorted to where "la volonte des parties de d^border toute cadre ^tatique
et de soumettre 1'arbitrage directement &un ordre supra-national".^ To
determine the law to govern the substance of the dispute by means of any
national system of private international law would be to ignore the very nature
of international arbitration and its function in the international business
community. Being on a non-national plane a non-national private international
law system must be applied: hence party autonomy. ,
101. Arbitrators are in fact obliged to recognise and give effect to the wishes
of the parties. This is due entirely to the nature of arbitration and the source
of the arbitrators', authority. The basis of the arbitration proceedings is the
will of the parties. The arbitrators are seized by virtue of the parties'
agreement, for the purposes and on the conditions agreed by the parties. They
are subject to the agreed instructions of the parties and can be disseized by
the agreement of the parties. Should the arbitrators refuse or fail to comply
*
•with those instructions, their award could subsequently be refused recognition
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under*the major international arbitration agreements by the courts of the State
in which enforcement is sought.'
So where parties are agreed that their contractual relations should be governed
by or their dispute determinec? in accordance with a p-articular law or non-legal
yardstick, the arbitrators are obliged to respect and act in accordance with
that agreement. Failure and/or refusal to do so could not only lead to the
possibility of the arbitrators being disseized, but could also leave the
successful party somewhat impotent should the losing party refuse to
3
carry out the award.
voluntarily
102. There is neither neednor justification for the parties' choice of law
to have the backing of any system of private international law. It has become
an accepted fact that in international trade contracts choice of law is not
only acceptable but is generally also desirable and advisable.^ Tt would not
be practical and would negative the intention of the parties if arbitrators
were to look to find whether the parties' choice was allowed'by some applicable
body of private international law. Although it might be necessary where the
parties have not expressed a choice of law to determine the conflict of laws
rules in accordance with which the law to govern the contract can be determined,
where parties have expressly selected a law or body of rules to govern their
contract, that choice is recognised per se and v/ill be given ceffect. It is a
so generally accepted practice amongst trading nations that parties may choose
the law (subject to certain and differing limitations) to govern their contractual
relations that party autonomy can be said to be justified and authorised by the
\ ;
law of international commerce=
Maitre Jean Robert has followed a similar line when arguing that "I'arbitre
consacrera au premier chef, -la volonte expresse des parties quant ^ la loi
applicable." The reasons for this view he explained in the following
passage: • •
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"Tout d'abord il convientde laisser aux parties le droit
entier & la manifestation, expresse du choix de la loi
applicable. Et ce serait une erreur I. notre sens que de
subordonner cette autonomie a son admission par les regies
de rattachement d'une autre loi. Le ckract^re contractuel
domine tellemenfla mati^re de 1'arbitrage, ' specialement inter-
'national, qu'il faut' tenirla'^lbl^d'autbriomie comme la r^gle
'superieure de cette institution, qui ne pourra jamais trouver
sa limite qne dans I'ordre piiblic. II faudrait done (|ue I'ordre
public international de la loi de 1'arbitrage interdise aux
parties d'exprimer leur choix quant & la loi de fond qui leur
sera applicable, pour qu'il en soit autrement. Or, dans aucun
des systemes legislatifs normalement applicables n'existe, &
notre connaissance, une semblable interdiction. En consequence,
I'on considerera que la liberte d'expression de choix par les
parties constitue la premiere et essentielle r&gle, Et cette
liberte d'expression pourra notamment conduire les parties ^
adopter une loi de fond differente de la loi de procedure,
J^japabsis.. addedX^
iOSi The international recognition of the doctrine of party autonomy
can be seen in almost every major treaty or uniform law affecting international
contracts or arbitration in the past thirty years. The Hague Convention on the Law
Applicable to International Sales of Goods, 1955^ provides in Article 2 that:
"A sale shall be governed by the domestic law of the country designated
by the contracting Parties".
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' Article 3 of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods made in
the Hague in 1964 provides that although the uniform law was itself to govern
international sales, the parties to a contract are free to exclude the
application of the uniform law. Furthermore, it is provided in Article 9
that "the parties shall be bound by any usage which they have expressly or
impliedly made applicable to their contract
Similarly, the Benelux Uniform Law Relating to Private^International law
provides in Article 13 (1): "Les contrats sont regis par la loi choisie par les
parties tant en ce qui concerne les dispositions imperatives que les dispositions
suppletives"
The Draft EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual.
Obligations simply proposes in Article 2: "A contract shaH be governed by the
law chosen by the parties".
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i04 . With respect to international arbitration, the right of parties to indicate •
' the law to govern their contractual relations vjas indirectly recognised in the
1958 UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
That'Convention provided in Article V (1)(a) that the recognition and enforcement
of a foreign arbitration award may be refused if the. arbitration "agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it".
The 1951 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration was quite
emphatic. It stated in Article VII that "the parties shall be free to determine,
by agreement, the law to be applied by the arbitrators to the substance of the
dispute". Autonomy was again accepted in the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States,' Article .42, of
which provided that the "tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as"'may be agreed by the parties".
The arbitration rules developed through the United Nations Economic Commissions
for Europe (UNECE) and for Asia and the Far East (UNECAFE) both contained
provisions entitling parties to determine themselves the law to be applied.
Article 38 of the UNECE Arbitration Rules • provided that "the arbitrators' award
shall be based upon the law as determined by the parties for the substance of
the dispute". Article VII (4) (a) of the UNECAFE Arbitration Rules similarly
provided: "The award shall be based upon the law determined by the parties to
be applicable to the substance of the dispute". And m.ost recently, the
UNCITRAL Rules for Optional Use in Ad Hoc Arbitration provided in Article
33 (1):
"The arbitrators shall apply the law designated by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute."
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B. PRACTICE
105. In considering the principle and the extent of-party autonomy through a
review of arbitration, awards, it will be easiest to consider the principle first
and then to look at the varying degrees of party autonomy, starting with the
most restrictive view-points and working outwards to the most liberal.
1. The Principle of Party Autonomy . ..• ;•
(a) Adoption of Party Autonomy . .
106. This almost universal acceptance of party autonomy was clearly explained
by Professor Pierre Lalive in 1971 when sitting in Geneva as the sole arbitrator
in a dispute between an Indian corporation md a Pakist^i nati^^ corporation^.
The contract out of which the dispute arose contained an express choice of Indian
law. Accepting the validity of the choice of law clause. Professor Lalive said:
"There-are few principles more universally admitted in private
intem.ational law than that referred to by the standard terms
of the "proper law of the contract" - according to which the
law governing the contract is that which has been chosen by the
parties, whether expressly or (with certain differences or
variations according to the various systems) tacitly.
"The differences which may be observed here between different
national systems relate only to the possible limits of the parties'
power to choose the applicable law or to certain special questions
or to modalities, but not to the principle itself, which is
universally accepted".
Although the arbitrator did consider the validity of the choice of law in all
the possibly applicable private international law systems - i.e. the Indian,
Pakistani and Swiss systems - he did so more to cover every avenue of argument
rather than because it was legally necessary. Indian law was applicable by
virtue of the contract clause which was enforceable as a "principle ....
universally admitted in private international law", i.e. the law of international
commerce.
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ICC Awards
107,. The choice by the parties of a particular law to govern their contract
has been upheld by arbitrators in innumerable awards. Whether the parties'
choice needs to be supported by some law is a matter 'of dispute. However,
many awards, particularly ICC awards, have given effect to the autonomy of the
parties without aiiy discussion as to the validity of the choice or V7hat law
authorises it. The arbitrators appear to have considered the law chosen as
applicable per se, justified only by the generally accepted principle of party
autonomy.
Thus in a dispute involving a licence agreement between Swiss and French
corporations the arbitrators held: "La d(^cisim au fond doit intervenir selon
le droit suisse dont les parties ont convenue de faire application par 1'article XVI
du contrat de licence intervenu entre elles",^ In an exclusive sales agreement
between Austrian and Federal German corporations, it was held that "les deux
2
parties reconnaissent que le litige doit etre tranche -selon le droit allemand".
In an award between a Swedish manufacturer and a Phillipine buyer the arbitrator
found:
"In clause 13 of the contract of January 26 1963, the parties agreed
that disputes arising from the contract should be dealt with according
to Sxredish law. As from the legal point of view, there is no
obj ection to such an agreement, the arbitrator is bound to apply
Swedi^ law".'^
Although the arbitrator here acknowledged that there could be some legal
objection to the parties' choice, he did not discuss or indicate what those
objections are or their source.
In another case a private European organisation situated in Brussels (but not
part of the EEC) employed the Italian plaintiff as an accountant. They
terminated his employment after 4 years. The arbitrator decided the question
of compensation for wrongful dismissal on the basis of Belgian law because that
I.,:
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was expressly chosen by the parties.^ In an award^ between an English
plaintiff company and three Spanish defendant corporations the Swedish arbitrator
held:
"As the agreement expressly states that it -shall be governed by
the laws of England, I find that only English law is applicable
on the dispute".
So overwhelming is the existence of an express choice of law by the parties that
it has even been held to over-ride the law deemed applicable in accordance with
the private international law rules considered appropriate. Thus i I an ICC
award^ concerning a dispute arising out of an agency agreement the arbitrator
held Swiss law to be the law applicable in accordance with Swiss private
international law rules, such being applicable because the arbitration was
taking place in Switzerland and he, the arbitrator, V7as a Swiss national.
However he then rejected what he considered the proper law in favour of the law
chosen by the parties. The arbitrator stated:
"Dans le cas qui nous occupe, ce Serait done le droit suisse qui
devrait etre applique. Cependant, les parties ont invoque "k
differentes reprises le droit Ybugoslave. ... II ne -serait done
pas admissible d'appliquer le droit suisse si les parties elles-memes
veulent voir appliquer le droit Yougoslave. Celui-ci est du reste,
en effet applicable comme droit du lieu d'execution des contratsdes
parties".
Although in this case the arbitrator considered his personal connection to
Switzerland to oblige him to follovj Swiss private international law rules, he
felt he was over-ruled by the parties' exercise of their autonomy. Of course
it is not universally' accepted that an arbitrator is subject to the private
8
international law rules of his "si&ge".
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Eastern European Awards
108. Despite the formal application of their national systems of private
international law^, the arbitration tribunals in the socialist countries all
recognise the right of parties to choose the law to govern their relations and
2 ... . . 3give effect to such a choice. ' Thus e.g. the Romanian Arbitration Commission
4in Bucarest upheld the choice of Romanian law in a 1970 award. Despite the
absence of any definite provision in their private international law allov^ing
5 6 ' .party autonomy , the Bulgarian Court of Arbitration similarly recognised a
choice of the defendant's law despite the parties' adoption of "un syst&me de
rattachement complique".^ However^ the arbitrators declined to apply the law
chosen to determine the competence of the tribunal stating:
"Les parties ont convenue que le demandeur aura le droit de s'adresser
^ son choix soit ^ la Gour arbitrale de Sofia, soit S. celle de Prague
ou de Moscou, et que celle qu'il aura choisie, appliquera la loi du
d^fendeur. Les contractants ont de cette facon nettement delimite
le champ d'application du droit choisi. Il-n'est a appliquer que.
pour ce qui est du fond du litige".®
The Court of Arbitration in Poland has also given effect to the expressed
g
intention of the parties. In a dispute between Polish and Yugoslav
corporations Yugoslav law was applied because it was so chosenagain German
law was applied as provided in a contract between the GDR plaintiff and a Polish
defendantPolish law was similarly applied to a dispute between a Polish
12plaintiff and a (West) German defendant. It is also noteworthy that the rules
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of the Courts of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber, the Gdynia Cotton
Association '^^ and the Gdynia International Arbitration Court for Maritime
Disputes^^ expressly instruct the arbitrators to apply the substantive law
chosen by the parties.
Similarly in Czechoslovakia, the arbitration commission applied Czechoslovak
law to a dispute arising out of a sales contract betweem a Czechoslovak
enterprise and a U.K. firm, on the grounds that:
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"Both parties have signed the General Conditions of Sale and
Payment, and thus they have concluded an agreement that the
Czechoslovak law shall apply to all legal relations between the
parties which have arisen from their business activities".
In another award, the Czechoslovak plaintiff brought an action against the
Turkish defendant for 333,215 Czechoslovak Crowns, as the loss he had suffered
as a consequence of the defendant's failure to deliver the 650 tons of lemons as
agreed under the contract. The defendant argued his obligations were
extinguished by his inability to obtain an export licence. The arbitrators
held this defence without merit "under Czechoslovak law, whose application has
been agreed between the parties under article 16 of the said General Terms of
Sale of the Plaintiffs".
Again, when a dispute arose out of an agreement between a Czechoslovak foreign
trade enterprise and a Federal German firm for the construction of a building,
the arbitrators applied Czechoslovak law because;
"Les deux parties ont convenu- de ce que le litige doit etre juge
conformement ^ la loi tchecoslovaque".18
The Soviet FTAC^^ which also allows parties to choose the law applicable^*^ has
recognised a procedure whereby the parties can get round the strict application
of Soviet private international law. rules. A dispute arose between an English
firm and a Soviet exporting corporation in respect of short-delivery of wood-
goods by the Soviet defendant to the English plaintiff. The contract contained
no express choice of law. The arbitrators thus applied the appropriate Soviet
private international law rule - the lex loci contractus. English law was thus
held to apply. The Soviet party brought evidence that in many contracts between
themselves and the plaintiffs, they had expressly stated that the place of
contracting be Moscow despite England being the place of actual signature.
Although in this case the defendants failed to prove to the arbitrators'
satisfaction that with respect to the contracts in dispute the parties had
agreed to Moscow as the place of contracting, the arbitrators acknowledged that
where such manifestation is clear, the intention of the parties would be
' respected.^^ The tribunal heldi
In mdcing.contracts the parties are entitled to stipulate to the
effect that a place different from that of the actual signing of the
contract should be deemed as the place of the conclusion thereofIn the course of the proceedings in the present case the Obiedineniie
presented to the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission the origina"'
of a number of its contracts for the sale of wood goods to
thfSL'of'' "r"' ^he indicatL" ^ffinds thafthrnb ]-''' Arbitration Commission
the.r Objedinenije has thereby proved that as a matter ofi usual practic th buyer in England an Objedinenije stipulate
to consider Moscow as the place of the conclusion of their contract
for the delivery of wood goods. contracts
"The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission finds, however, that in
the present case the Objedinenije has not proved that in concLdL
contract. Mos. M8009 a.d M8085 the parties intended to "LiLr ®
Moscow to be the place of their conclusion. Unlike the other
contracts presentedby the Objedinenije to the Foreign Trade
contracts do not contain at the
th indication of the date. As fort e woid Moscow typed near the signatures of the Objedinenije's
representatives, it is held to be merely an indication of the
Objedinenije s place of business, just as the word 'Grimsby' written
'near the signatures of the Firm's representatives is an indication of
the place of business of the buying firm.
"Proceeding from the aforesaid, the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
recognises that England is the place of the conclusion of contracts
Nos. M8009 and M8085_and that English law as lex loci contractus
must be applied in deciding on the issue of the period of limitation"
Autonomy is^also recognised by the law of the People's Republic of China,^^
the G.D.R. , Hungary^^ and Yugoslavia.^^
109. This discussion of part autonomy .is limited to trading contracts
and socialist parties: it does not apply to trading
relations between enterprises from the countries' members of the Council
for Mutual- Economic Assistance (CMEA) . The CMEA countries have adopted
"General Conditions''_^to_gove_rn_ their relations between their foreign
trade enterprises. These "General Conditions" apply in deference to
all the national systems of law and to this extent can be termed CMEA
2laws. So in inter-CMEA trade, such CMEA laws apply; if there be no
appropriate' provision in the CI^IEA law, the "General Condition" itself
provides the choice of law rule to be follovje.^ In inter-CMEA comm
ercial relations there is consequently no place for autonomy. In this
way the CMEA member countries have greatly reduced the problem of a
conflict of laws in contracts between their nationals.
In commercial contracts with non-CMEA countries, these CMEA laws
are irrelevant: the domestic laws of the CMEA countries will be applied
4if the law of such country is found to be applicable.
(b) Recognition of Party Autonomy as Point of Departure
110. Further evidence of the general acceptance of the principle of party
autonomy can be seen from the many awards in which arbitrators of different
nationalities have, when determining the law to govern a dispute before them,
started by looking first for any express choice of the parties. Only after
finding that the parties have not made- a valid choice of law will the arbitrators
begin to look for some other means to determine the applicable law. In one
dispute^, the Belgian (third) arbitrator conceded the pre-eminence of the law
chosen when he said:
"Attendu qu'il y a lieu de rechercher ici quelle loi doit etre
appliquee au contrat des parties, en raison du fait que la nationalite
4es socii^tes en cause est differente : la societe demandresse est de
nationality suisse, tandis que la societe defendresse est de
nationalite francaise;
( i>
"Attendu que le regime de la loi nationale applicable depend de la
volonte des parties".
The arbitrator then found French law to be applicable to the dispute and noted
that "interrogdes sur ce point Si la premiere audience, les parties ont marque
leur accord pour reconnaitre que le droit francais r^gissait leurs rapports
contractuels".
ICC Awards
111. There are many awards in_-which the arbitrators just note the absence of
any choice,by the partis. So under the heading "Sur la legislation qui doit
&tre appliquee", the three French arbitrators seized of a dispute between Swiss
and Iranian parties stated:
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"Les conventions litigieuses ne contiennent aucune indication sur la
legislation "h appliquer en cas de contestation".^
Similarly a Federal German arbitrator in a dispute between Swiss and Spanish
corporations began his discussion on the applicable law with the statement:
"La convention passee entre les parties ne precise pas le droit qui doit-
etre declare applicable en I'espece".^
In a dispute between three French co-plaintiffs (two of- whom were naturalised
Hungarian citizens) and a Swedish defendant, the Belgian arbitrator noted:
"Les parties n'ont pas indiqu^ dans leurs conventions ou dans leur
correspondance le droit national qu'elles entendaient eventuellement
I appliquer a leurs relations ou a leurs differends".
• ' .
Another Belgian arbitrator seized of an arbitration between a French agent and /
his Italian principal, when discussing the question of the legal provisions
applicable to the dispute stated that:
parties sont restees silencieuses dans leur convention et
' ' ..•• correspondance quant aii droit national eventuellement appliquable
a leurs relations et a la solution.de leur differends,
Eastern European Awards
: .:112. This process is equally evident in the deliberations of Socialist
arbitration tribunals. In an award of the Polish Foreign Arbitration Commission,
the tribunal held "qu'en I'absence d'un choi:x exprfes - ce qui dtait le cas - de
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la loi competente pour apprecier le compromis The Soviet FTAC similarly
began in an award between Italian and Swiss parties that "en I'absence d'entente
3entre les parties quant au choix du systeme juridique applicable . ../^
4
A particularly illustrative'award is one of the Czechoslovak arbitration court.
The dispute arose out of a contract between a Czechoslovak purchaser and a
Sudanese seller under which the latter agreed to deliver to the former 170
tons of Sudanese ground-nuts. The Czechoslovak purchaser claimed damages
on the grounds that the ground-nuts were not fit for human consumption. The
arbitrators began their discussion as to the law applicable in the following
way:
"As "far as the applicable law" is'^concerned, the contract does not _
contain an explicit provision concerning the choice of law governing
the contract. Therefore the arbitrators in accordance with the
provisions of (Czechoslovak private international law) ..."
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Here, iDefore resorting to their own private international law, the Czechoslovak
arbitrators looked to see if there was an expression of intention by^ the parties
That, they recognised, would over-ride all and any local provisions as to ..the
applicable law and even though it would lead to a result different from and
perhaps even contrary to the "otherwise applicable law".
Ad Hoc Award
. 113 . Similarly in the arbitration award between the Royal Hellenic Government.
v. the British" Government in the matter of the "Diverted Cargoes",^" the
arbitrator when looking to the applicable law started his discussion:
"In the absence in the agreement to submit to arbitration of any
special provisions establishing the law upon which the decision of
the arbitrator is to be based, or authorising him to effect an
amicable settlement...."^
Being a dispute between sovereign States, this award was in fact decided on
the basis of public international law.'
2. • The Justification of Party Autonomy
114. It is of particular interest that in most of the awards discussed above,
the applicable law was determined purely and simply from the expressed intention
of the parties. Where parties had^manifested a choice of. the applicable body
of legal rules the arbitrators gave effect to the choice per se, without looking
for any system of private international law to justify or support the validity
of that choice. In contrast to the practice in national courts, in international
arbitration party autonomy is invariably given immediate and direct effect
irrespective of any authorisation or recognition" by some private international
.law system. ' -
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115. However5 arbitrators do in practice often try to show that the appli
cation of the la^vf chosen by the parties is valid in accordance with some system
of private international law.^ Invariably arbitrators will try to show, if they
can, that whichever private international law system they look to the law to
2 . • .
apply will be the same. By doing this, arbitrators aim to cover themselves and
their award from every angle of attack, and to prevent any accusations of arbitrari-
3
ness. " In the Indian-Pakistani case discussed above , Professor Lalive looked at
. . . • . » 4
the various possible private international law systems which could be: applied
and came to the Conclusion that they.would all - in any case - lead to the same
result. The arbitrator said:
the three or four solutions just mentioned with regard to
the various systems of private international law to be applied
by the Arbitrator, would, in the present case, lead to the same
practical result in all likelihood, since there exists a large
measure of agreement and concordance, on the question of appli
cable law to contracts, not only between the various systems
deriving from English conflict of laws, but also more generally
between the main systems of conflict of laws in the world. In
the field of contract, it is possible to speak, to a large extent,
of a common or universal private."international law, at least
whenever the question is that of the law governing the contract
when there is an expressed choice by the parties." (Emphasis added).
Further in his award, the arbitrator talking of the meaning and extent of party
autonomy said:' ' •
"It is however irrelevant in this case and need not be discussed
further since it is beyond discussion' that all legal systems
(including those of India, Pakistan, England, Switzerland etc.)
accept this fundamental principle, sometimes called that of
".autonomy of the will" in private international law." CEmphasis
added).
116-. A similar approach was adopted by a Belgian arbitrator in a dispute
concerning the grant of an exclusive license by the Federal German ;o.iTiers ;of •a
trade mark to the French claimant, entitling the latter to exploit their trade
mark in France.^ Determining the law to apply th^- arjyi:ti-ator sai,d:
"Attendu que les parties sont d'accord sur 1'application de
la loi allemande au contrat .,.;
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"Attendu qu'il incombe ^ I'arbitre de respecter la legitime
autonomie. de la volonte des parties sur ce point; que quel
qiie soit le droit applicable, soit le "droit alleraand, soit
le droit francais, soit a titre de "lex fori", la primaute
de cette reference a la volonte des parties est a sauve-
garder". -
Despite the fact that the contract was to be performed totally in France, the
arbitrator upheld the parties' choice of German law. Indeed he was obliged
to respect the choice of the parties: if he wished to avoid the law chosen
none of those private international law systems to which he could look for
assistance, i.e. France, Germany, or Belgium, would have helped him.
i 2 ' ' 'In another award , Gunnar Largregren, President of the Appeal Court of
Western Sweden, sitting as an ICC arbitrator, held a choice of law to be appli
cable per se and then, almost as an after-thought, implied that even if the law
jihosen was not applicable per se, it"would have been applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law. (The arbitrator did not identify which
system of private international law he would-have applied). The dispute was
between an Argentinian national, resident in the German Federal Republic, and a
U.K. corporation, in relation to a contract made and performed in the,Argentine.
The parties agreed that the law of Argentine should govern their relations. '
President Largregren said:
"The. parties have agreed that Argentine law is the proper law
• of the commission agreement (or agreements), and should their
choice of law, which was only made during the course of arbitration
procedure^, not by itself be binding upon me, I have no doubts
about the correctness of their conclusion in that respect."
• A- • • •A similar thought process was evident in an award made by a Swiss arbitrator
in a dispute between a FederalGerman plaintiff and an Austrian defendant, in
connecticu with the, defendant's sole.right to represent the plaintiff in Austria.
Their agreement contained an express choice of German law. Thus the arbitrator
stated:
"En ce qui conceme le droit applicable, les parties sont d'accord
pour estimer que le contrat. de representation est rdgi, en tant
que tel, par le droit allemand."
Then to further.justify and explain his recognition of the parties' choice, the
arbitrator continued:
UUUUV4
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"Avant toutj, il faut se rappeler que 1'opinion dominante en Allemagnej
en Autriche et en Suisse, reconnait. aux parties le droit de clioisir
le droit applicable,. Quant a savoir quel compte il y aurait a
tenir d'une volonte des parties simplement hypothetiquej cela ne
nous touche pas ici puisque les parties ont clairement exprime leur
volonte en cours d'instance,^ sinon au moment de'la conclusion du
contrat."
Again, in a'dispute between French and English" parties, the Belgian arbitrator
in a partial award on the applicable law first recognised and applied the law
chosen by the parties,^ and then tried to illustrate that the choice was valid
by both of the two conflicting laws. The contract contained the clause that
"this agreement shall for all purposes be subject to and shall be construed under
I
and be governed by the laws of Englandc" The French plaintiff however argued
that the express choice of law was only an element in the determination of the
applicable law and was not in itself automatically applicable.^ The plaintiff
I ' . . •
, i •
'argued that the contract was more closely and substantially connected with France
than with England, and consequently French law should apply in preference to the
law chosen. The arbitrator began by noting:
"II n'appartient pas au juge du fond de rechercher d'apres I'economie
de la convention et les circonstances de la cause quelle loi doit
regir les rapports des -contractants, qu'a defaut de declaration
expresse de la loi choisie par ceux-ci; qu'en I'espece, cette
declaration expresse a ete formulee et comporte election de la loi
Vanglaise".
The arbitrator found for the defendant, stating that the' plaintiff "ne fait gtat
d'aucun motif permettant d'ecarter I'execution de la, volontd des parties." The
choice of English law was valid by both English and French private international
law rules. The choice was not "fantaisiste, contraire h la bonne foi ou corres-
pondrait k 1'accomplissement d'une fraude" and was therefore not avoidable under
English private international law rules. French private international law
"exclut 1'application de la loi francaise au fond et comporte le recours "h la
loi anglaise." The arbitrators, it is clear from the award, only considered'the
effect of applying the English and French private international law systems
8
because the validity of the choice of English law was challenged.
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Ad Hoc Award
117. In the Alsing Case/ the Umpire similarly looked to both the private
international law rules of Greece,, which the umpire held applicable, and the •
private international law rules of Switzerland, where-the umpire was actually
sitting/"
118. It is submitted, reference by the arbitrators to a particular or any
system of private international law to uphold a choice by the parties is .
unnecessary and even undesirable it could have the effect of negating the
intention of the parties. This is without any mention of the complications
involved in determining which system.of private international law to apply.'
The undesirability and impracticability of look^^ng to private international law
rules to justify and uphold a choice of law by the parties are illustrated by
the following examples.
119 . Assume a contract is made in Warsaw between a New York firm and a Polish
\
foreign trade corporation. The contract contains provisions providing
that it be construed and governed by English law and that any dispute arising
concerning the contract be resolved by arbitration ad hoc in Sweden. Neither
1 2 . .
•New York (America) nor Polish private international law recognise the parties'
right to choose a law which has no connection with the transaction or the parties;
.... .O .... . . . _
in Sweden however, the choice of English lav7 would be upheld . Both theNexjYork and
Polish courts would recognise and enforce an arbitration award by the .Swedish'tri-
4 . .bunal. If the arbitrators were to apply either New York or Polish (as opposed
to Swedish) choice of law rules to determine the validity of the parties' choice,
English law would have been /ound inapplicable, and some other law objectively
determined applied. . In such a case however the award would not have been
enforceable - the arbitrators not acting in accordance with the parties' instruc
tions - and the intentions of the parties would have been avoided.
U U U U V b
If however, on the same facts, the arbitration was to take place e.g. in Italy,
the choice of English law may not be recognised^ - as being too remote from the
transaction - and the proper law would be objectively ascertained in accordance
with the conflict rules of the lex'fori - Italy,i.e. the lex loci solutionis.
This would result in New York or Polish law being held to apply - the very thing ,
which the parties were aiming to avoid!
\
. . - ... - - • - \
120. This situation is again well illustrated by the following facl^ situation.
Assume a contract between English and French corporations providing for any
disputes between the parties to be resolved by arbitration in London in accor
dance with either "the general principles of international trade law" or "ex
aeauo et bono". If the arbitrators apply English private international law
rules they would hold both choices to be void and would so refuse to give
effect to the intention of the parties.^ If however the arbitration was to
take place in France (or even ICC arbitration), and French private international
3
law rules were to apply, both choices would' be upheld and any decision rendered
4
accordingly would be recognised and if necessary enforced in England,
« • .
121 The interests of international commerce requires that party autonomy be
recognised per se, provided it is not fraudulent, nor aimed to avoxd a
mandatorily applicable rule of a directly interested State, nor contrary to
international public policy.^ As most laws today allow parties to choose the
law to govern their relations, and as -submitted above, this is today an
accepted rule of the law of international commerce, there is no good reason
j.uridical, commercial or for that matter political - to refuse to recognise a
choice of law merely because the extent allowed by one national system differs
from that allowed by another system. Until a uniform law dealing with the
extent of party autonomy is developed which has the support of and is .ratified
and adopted by the majority of trading nations, only by an unfettered recog
nition of .autonomy in arbitration can the intentions of the pa-rties be protected.
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Perhaps as evidence of the need for certainty which this guarantees in inter
national trading relations is the fact - albeit not publicised - that arbitrators
do recognise and give effect to an unlimited choice by the parties (subject to
the normal restrictions and the need for the award to be enforceable) and such
awards are recognised and enforced by national courts even though those courts
would not themselves have upheld the choice of law. It is this characteristic
which gives to party autonomy its character as an international conflict of laws
rule.
The Limitations to.Party Autonomy
122. In those av^ards already discussed, the law chosen was in each case the law
of the country in which one of the parties was domiciled or had his habitual
residence. But could the parties have chosen some other law? Some authors
1 .2 .
argue and some national laws provide that the parties can only select a law
which is directly connected with the parties or the contract. They concede
that where the factors are equally divided between two conflicting systems of
law, that conflict can be resolved,by the parties, but only by a choice of one
or other of the conflicting laws. The laws which will normally be in conflict
will be those of the places where the parties are domiciled or have their
habitual residence, the place where the contract was made, the lex loci
contractus. and the place where the contract is to be performed, the lex loci
solutions. The basic reasoning which justifies such a restrictive doctrine of
autonomy is that parties can only choose a law which they know and understand
3
and hence prefer to the otherwise applicable.law. . . . . ...
123. As we have seen the lex loci contractus and the lex loci solutionis
presumptions gained favour during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries on
the basis of their respectively being the law which the parties naturally
thought of or had in mind when contracting and therefore expected to apply.
After all, it was argued, you cannot contract to do something illegal or contrary
to the public policy of either the place of contracting qr the place of acting.
'•0 0 0 0 7 8
In consequencej as the desirability of party autonomy increased during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so too the view restricting the
parties' choice to a law V7hich did not violate the laws of the places of con
tracting or of performanceo
124. Fundamental to the concepts of intention and expectation is one basic
legal presumption extended from the domestic to the international scene:
\
I
"everyone is presumed to know the.law and to act in accordance with it." Thus
contracting parties are assumed to have considered and understood the legal
provisions applicable to their contract and to appreciate the legal implications
of their agreement. It is -argued that it is only possible for the parties to
know and understand or to determine the relevant provisions of a legal system with-
which they are connected; the parties could not know or be expected to know the
relevant provisions of some unconnected or third, neutral law. • They can only
choose a law they know and understand. But this argument ignores that there is
no reason to believe one party will know and understand the "other party's law"
anymore than a third or neutral law. Furthermore, a party will often not even
know or have attempted to understand his "oto" law, particularly where that law
be unclear, ambiguous or complicated. If knowledge and comprehension are the
pre-requisites of choice, it is surely equally possible for a contracting party
to research into the relevant provisions of any chosen legal system.
125. Most reservations to the doctrine of party autonomy arose out of concern ,
for the logical extent of autonomy, If parties are entitled to choose the law
to govern their relations, could they not choose a law which made legal and
enforceable their contract which' by both the lex loci contractus and the lex
loci solutionis was without effect?' What if they were to inadvertently choose
a law which had the effect of making void an otherwise valid contract.^ Could the
parties choose a law for the sole purpose- of avoiding the strictures or even an
.2imperative regulation of a law which might otherwise be applied? l«niat if the
U U U U / H
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parties submitted their relations to- a non-existent or incompetent law? Need
they choose a law at all: could they not choose some non-legal standard t6 govern
their relations?
All the reservations which have arisen on this subject and the comments of the
many writers are, like the limitations in particular national systems of law,
irrelevant to international arbitration^ These reservations are based on the
view that the parties' choice may be influenced by a desire to avoid the appli
cation of a particular law rather than because of a more positive preference £or
the chosen law. They presume the existence of a forum law and a forum public
policy.
The limitations advocated arise out of and are ^imed to uphold the, supremacy
of the lex fori, the law of the State; but an international arbitration tribunal
has no lex fori and is not responsible to uphold the lax^ of any State. The
international arbitration tribunal has a duty to uphold the law of inter.^
national .'commerce, and • to control the actions of contracting parties in
accordance with the prevailing standards of international business morality.
•But the lien between the international arbitration tribunal and the law of internation
al commerce is not comparable to that existing between a State court and its lex
fori. Like many aspects of international law, the law of international commerce has an
amorphous character.: its content is difficult enough-to determine,let alone enforce. - The
international arbitrator, cannot be limited by any national law.
Tlie mere fact that the choice of law aims to avoid an inconvenient or
restrictive national law is not in itself reason for an arbitrator to
refuse to give effect to the "loi d'antonomie". However, an arbitrator
may refuse to recognise an.d apply a chosen law in the very unlikely
situation vihere the content or effect of that chosen law violates
li-international public policy.'
uuuy^o .
For the reasons just given, party autonomy in arbitration is quit^
unlimited. IVhatever restrictions different legal systems may place on the
right of parties to choose the law to govern their relations, those limitations
can only bind the courts of that legal sj^stem. Arbitrators, as already pointed
out, are not bound to respect the restrictive provisions contained . in national
private international law rules ;on the contrary, by virtue of the origin of their authori
and the nature of arbitration, they are free - and indeed obliged - to recognise and
give effect to a choice of law by the parties.
This contention can only be supported by the somewhat negative evidence that
no awards have been found in which arbitrators have declined or refused to ^ .
apply the law chosen. In the majority of cases where the facts are equally
divided betv^een the parties the arbitrators gracefully accept the choice of
the national law of one of the parties. Here there can be little argument
that the law chosen is too remote.
127. There are further awards in which the factors did not divide equally
(e.g. where performance was exclusive or almost entirely to take place in one
country) and yet the choice of the law less closely connected to the factors
has been upheld. Thus arbitrators recognised a choice of French law when the
• principal in an exclusive sales agreement was French, despite the fact that the
contract was totally to be performed in Switzerland and the.contract was more
closely connected with Switzerland.,^
2 • 'Again in respect of a 20 year license agreement under which the French defendant
was granted the exclusive right to manufacture and promote the American plaintiff's
patented mattress in France, the expressly chosen law of Maryland - the State in'
3
which the licensor had his main place of business - was applied.
In neither of these two cases was the preponderent connection'with Switzerland
and France respectively considered sufficient to exclude the lav7 expressly
chosen by the parties.
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128. In the foregoing situations there was at least some connection between
the chos.en law and the contract„ What of a choice of a third and neutral
law? • Here again no awards have been found in vjhich the choice of a laxj with
no connection with the contract has been rejected. . On the otherhand, again
negative evidence, there are awards in which effect has been given to the law
chosen X'jhen that law was connected to the arbitrators or- the place of arbitration.
So in a dispute arising out of a license agreement under which a Nex<r York
\
corporation had granted a French firm the exclusive right to exploit their
patent in France and Germany the arbitrators applied Swiss law because "les
parties ont convenu d'appliquer le droit suisse au fond du litige."
Similarly, a choice of Swiss law was upheld as the lex loci arbitri in an award
involving a Federal German firm and a Phillipine corporation, there being no
2
other connection between the contract and Switzerland.
Particularly telling is the reasoning whereby three arbitrators justified the
application of Swiss law, the lex loci arbitri, in a dispute between a Danish
plaintiff and two joint defendants, a Bulgarian state enterprise and an
3
Ethiopian corporation. The arbitration arose out of a contract for the
construction of a fish processing plant and a refrigeration warehouse in
Asmara, Ethiopia. The arbitrators stated:
"En 1'occurrence, il convient de tenir compte du fait que les
parties ressortissent a des pays dont les syst&mes sociaux
sont differents et que les objets: du contrat dtaient destines
& un pays du Tiers Monde. Elles ont dvite les conflits
susceptibles de se presenter dans ces circonstances, en
stipulant 1'application du droit suisse. Comme le siege du
tribunal arbitral se trouve en Suisse, le choix ainsi fait se
justifiait par un intergt legitime. Dans ces conditions,j 1'application du droit suisse ne soul&ve aucune objection."
Of course in these cases the place of arbitration did provide a connection
4
between the contract and the law chosen.
Regrettably no awards have been found in which a totally disinterested law has
been chosen; nevertheless, it is submitted such a choice would be upheld.
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129«• Eastern European awards
In the socialist countries there appears also a tendency to allow the
parties some degree of freedom when choosing the applicable law. In the
Soviet Union there is no legislative provision stating what limits there are
1 ^
to party autonomy; however, the USSR is party to certain bilateral agreements
~ 2 . , ' . . '
which allow unlimited choice of law. In practice the-Soviet arbitration courts
will uphold the law chosen by the parties provided the contract is in respect of
3 • •
a foreign trade transaction, and that the choice is neither aimed at avoiding
Soviet imperative legislation,^ nor is contrary to Soviet "policy anc integrity,"^
nor 'tontravenes the fundamental principles of the Soviet system."
This liberal limitation can be well seen from an award of the Soviet Maritime
Arbitration Commission (MAC). A dispute rose out of a shipping contract between
a Cuban exporting enterprise and a Soviet shipper.^ The contract contained an
express choice of Canadian law to govern the carriage of goods by sea. The
8 9
Merchant Shipping Code of the USSR recognises party autonomy but only "en
ce sens que 1'accord des parties sur le choix d'une loi etrangere ne peut
cependant ecarter 1'application des regies les plus essentielles et les plus
„10
imperatives, mais peu nombreuses, auxquelles il est impossible de deroger.
When considering the validity of the parties' choice, the MAC held that:
"lors de I'examen de 1'affaire en question il est necessaire, selon
la condition incluse dans le S.l des connaissements, de se soumettre
aux dispositions de la loi canadienne de 1936, sauf les exceptions
qui pourraient ressortir de 1'Article 15 du Code, mais qui, de I'avis
de la (MAC), n'ont aucune incidence sur I'affaire en cause..
12
The Czechoslovak law on private-international law . is silent as to the
extent allowed to - party autonomy. Thus Lunts- comments;
"The choice of the law of the contract is not restricted^by imperative
legislation of the forum or any other legislation. It is limited by
the general principles of public policy (the ordre public, the
Vorbehaltsklausel) of the forum.
Skapski goes further and maintains that since the 1963 law on private international
law in Czechoslovakia "on admet en principe un choix illimite de la loi en laissant
aux parties I'entiere liberte de designer la loi applicable a leur contract."
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The Czechoslovak' enactment thus does not preclude the parties from choosing
a third or neutral legal system.It would now seem that the decision of
the Czechoslovak arbitration tribunal in refusing to recognise a choice of English
law in a contract for the sale and, purchase of jute between a Czechoslovak buyer
and a Pakistani seller is unlikely to be followed.In that case the jute was
to be delivered and payment was to be made in Czechoslovakia.. There was no
connection whatever with England, other than the choice of law clause providing
English law to be applicable. The arbitrators preferred to apply Czechoslovak
law on the basis of it being both the law vzith which the contract was most
closely connected and on the basis of the qui elegit iudicem elegit ius principle,
the Czechoslovak arbitration tribunal having been agreed as the sole competent
authority to determine any dispute between the parties arising out of the •
contract.
Bulgaria and Romania follow similarly permissive rules. Bulgarian private
international law allows free choice but "le, droit choisi, ou les clauses con-
tractuelles qui le reproduisent, ne peuvent comporter des dispositions
contraires aux regies imperatives des lois bulgares. On se rgfSre encore ^
I'appui de cet.te these ^ 1'article 9, alinea 1 de la loi portant sur les
obligations et les contrats, en alleguant qu'il ne consacre 1'autonom.ie contrac-
tuelle que dans la mesure ou le 'contenu du contrat n'est pas contraire a la loi,
18
au plan economique national et aux regies de la communaute socialiste'."
In Romania, the Arbitration Commission of Bucarest will recognise the law chosen
by the parties as the law governing the substance of the contract "so long as it
is a valid law in force in a definite state and so long as it has a direct
connection with the contract itself. It must not, however, be contrary to
Romanian public policy
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As. concerns Hungary, the authors are divided as to the extent to which the
parties are free to choose the law applicable. Some authors^ maintain that
there must be some definite connection between the facts of the case and the
20 21 22law chosen. Others hox'/ever, maintain a "wide latitude" is allowed the
parties in choice of law. Indeed, Madl even suggests that only public policy
should restrict the choice of the parties; he does however consider "the choice
of law conflicting with so-called imperative rules should also be considered .
23
one defeating public policy." This would of course also cover a choice "in
0 /
fraudem legis". It is submitted that Hungary's accession to both the 1958
\ I
New York and the 1961 Geneva Conventions, as well as the generally accepted
practices in the socialist countries, would give some weight to the contention
that a Hungarian arbitration-tribunal will take a liberal rather than a restric
tive approach to an express choice of law by the parties.
Poland also appears to have contradictory authority. Article 25 of the 1965
Polish Law of Private International Law provides clearly that:
"Les parties peuvent soumettre leur rapport juridique a la loi de
leur choix, pourvu qu'elle ait une relation avec ledit rapport,
It is unclear what is meant by "a connection." The Polish Private International
Law of 1926 restricted choice to the law, of the parties' nationality, the place
of the parties' domicile, the place of performance, the place where the contract
was made or the place where the contractual subject matter is situated.^ It is
27 ...probable the 1965 law would be interpreted similarly. Although this prima
facie appears a wide choice, it does preclude the choice of a neutral or parti
cularly developed legal system.
28As has already been pointed out the Rules of the Polish Chamber of Arbitration
as well as that of the Gdynia Cotton Association both provide expressly that
arbitrators shall apply that law chosen by the parties. Both are silent as to
the extent of the choice. As a statute must over-ride the rules of a State
institution it would appear that choice must be of the law of a country -
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substantially connected to the contract. However vjhere a third and neutral
law is chosen, it will be recognised where the neutrality or desirability of
that law is clear from the facts of the particular case. Thus talking of the
law applicable by the Gdynia International•Arbitration Court for Maritime
Disputes, one recent commentator stated, the chosen law of a third State would
apply moins qu'il ne soit Evident qu'elles ont choisi la legislation d'un
29
^tat tiers pour des raisons inavouables."
It is submitted in Poland too a choice will be recognised provided the choice 'is
made in good faith, is not aimed at avoiding a mandatory Polish law (with a
public policy content) and is not in itself against public policy. It is
further submitted a choice of a third and neutral law would be recognised and
upheld provided there were good reasons for such choice. Only Poland's rati
fication of the major international arbitration conventions and'the general
practice of nations, capitalist and socialist, supports this last contention.
Finally, in Yugoslavia whilst there is no private international law legislation,
30
the two Yugoslav enactments which pertain, to international contracts recognise
party autonomy and are silent as to the extent allowed. They are considered to
31be restricted only by public policy and "fraude ^ la loi." Indeed, the
.arbitration court of the Federal Economic Chamber in Belgrade has in one award
32
actually given effect to a choice of a neutral and totally unconnected law.
A dispute arose out of a contract under which the Yugoslav plaintiff was to
manufacture for and deliver to the Jederal German defendant a specified number
of children's shirts. Payment was to be immediate on delivery of the goods.
The shirts were to be made in Yugoslavia and delivered to the defendant in Federal
Germany. The contract contained clauses providing for arbitration at the
Belgrade court and an express choice of Swiss law as the law of the contract.
The defendant declined to pay the contract price claiming a set-off for
money due by virtue of an assignment to him of a debt owed by the plaintiffs
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to another Federal German firm "0". The tribunal held the effect of the
novation to be outside the arbitration agreement and consequently their juris
diction. They recognised Swiss law as the law of the contract (although no
question of law was involved) and ordered the' defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the 27,000 DM claimed^
4. The Choice of Some Other Measuring Standard
130. But need there be any limitation to the law or other yardsticl^ which_ the
parties may choose? We have seen that^arbitrators will give effect J:o any exi^ress
choice of law made by the parties. Though our awards show a connection always with
the parties, the place of performance, the place of the arbitration or the nation
ality or residence of the arbitrators, there is little doubt a choice of a totally
neutral law with no connection whatever to the contract will also be upheld^. But
can the parties choose a non-national system of law, e^g. the general, principl^es of
international trade law, or the general usages of-.a particular trade?
Or perhaps even an extra-legal standard e.g. amiable composition? _ .
The major international arbitration conventions are silent as to the extent of
party autonomy allowed.. However, as we have already seen , the first sentence of
article 42(1) of the Convention on the Settl^ent of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States, adopts a particularly liberal terminology.
It states;
"The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties".
This has been interpreted by most writers to entitle the parties not only to
select any national law they wish, to apply, but also to "delocalise or inter-
\
nationalise their legal relationships by reference to general principles of
law, principles of law common to a group of legal systems, principles of
! Iinternational law and the like." ^
This is obviously correct. Within international commercial arbitration there
can be no limitation to party autonomy. For the same reasons which support
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autonomy generally there is no legal reason to refuse recognition to a choice
of -the type of yardstick proposed above. Just as parties are free within their
contract to make a hazardous or even a reckless bargain, so too they must be
entitled to choose a legal or other yardstick which has no connection with the
contract or the parties, which is equitable, amorphous and flexible in content
and which is only chosen as a standard of measurement by the parties.
(a) Distinction Between the Law of the Contract and the Standard to be Applied by.
the Arbitrators.
ISlo It is appropriate at this stage to make a distinction between the law which
governs the existence, the validity, the effect and the performance of a contract,
and the legal or non-legal yardstick which.arbitrators apply to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties in a dispute before them. The former is
invariably a fixed standard which implies certain terms and conditions into the
contract; this standard will be used by any tribunal seized to interpret the
contract and to resolve any dispute arising therefrom. The latter is the yard
stick adopted by the parties to provide the arbitrators x^ith the criteria upon
which to measure the rights and obligations of the parties.
This distinction may be' important for while invariably these will be one and the
same, they can be (and are becoming with increasing frequency) different. Thus
although the proper law may be some national system of lav?, the parties may
specifically provide in their agreement or at the time when submitting to.arbitration
for the arbitrators to resolve their dispute in accordance with some non-legal
measuring standard. In consequence, and this follows from the foregoing, the
legal or non-legal yardstick to be resorted to by the arbitrators can - and often
xjill have to - be determined separately from the law of the contract.
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132. The negotiations of parties have no legal effect until such time as the
law which governs their relations give to their agreement a binding force. I-rtien
that magical moment is differs from legal system to legal sj^stem,^ If
negotiations were to break do™ before completion and .one party were to claim
the existence of a valid and enforceable contract, a national court seized of
the problem would have to determine the relevant legal provisions which would
apply and then, in accordance with those legal provisions, decide whether or not
a valid contract has been made. Ifliere the parties have agreed on a choice of
law to govern "he contract, the court seized of the matter might - provided this .
was allowed by its conflict of laws rules - determine whether the contract existed
under the appropriate provisions of the chosen law. This is most easily
ascertained from a vrritten contract, particularly where the parties have
expressly provided that their "contract is to be governed by and construed in
accordance'with the laws of" a particular country. This type of choice can be
made in advance when the contract is concluded or subsequently; the exact
conditions will depend on the choice of law rules of the court seized.
133 •, Where the parties select a law or a non-legal yardstick to be applied by
the arbitrators, they do so to provide the arbitrators with a measuring standard.
The effect to be given to such a choice depends not on any conflict of laws
rules but on the willingness of the arbitrators to accept the submission and,
where the submission is to an existing arbitration institution, on the rules
of that institution. In this situation the choice of measuring standard, provided
it is agreed by both or all the parties, can be made at any time, right up to the
time when the award is made. But, whether or not such a choice is made, the •
validity of the contract is a matter separate and independent. It cannot be
argued that a contract only takes effect frpm the time when the choice of
measuring ' standard is made. To hold .otherwise would mean that the nature of and
the obligations under a contract would not be.determinable until a date perhaps
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several years after the contract was concluded and even executed. The effect
of a choice of yardstick different from that which governs the contract
is simply a contract provision providing that should a dispute arise necessitating
a submission to arbitration, the rights and obligations are to be measured in
accordance with that standard. If the provision is contained in a separate
arbitration submission it forms part of a separate and independent contract
providing for specified standards to be applied by the arbitrators.l ^Vhilst a
national court which may become seized of the contract would have to determine
the validity of such a provision in accordance with its forum private international
law rules, an arbitrator is obliged to respect the choice of the parties because
his authority is based on their "volonte" and as stated above, failure to respect
their "volonte" could lead to his either being disseized or to his award being
subsequently refused enforcement.^
134, This type of.choice is well illustrated by the many contracts in which it
is provided that the arbitrators will decide in accordance with the "general
principles of international trade law" or "good faith and business ethics". But
more common than this are provisions for a choice.of arbitration "ex aequo et
bono" or giving the arbitrators power to act as "amiables compositeurs". Whilst
perhaps there are some legal systems which do not recognise the choice of a non-
legal yardstick,^ it is quite clear that this type of choice is becoming increasingly
popular amongst both arbitrants and law^^ers.
.2
This is particularly so in contracts of long duration and great complexity.
Thus one finds in a contract made in 1962 between certain oil companies and the
demised Republic of Vietnam for the construction of an oil refinery in that
country, provision that in the event of any dispute arising out of the contract
"the arbitrators shall base their decision on equity and the principles of
3
international laxj" .
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Again, an agreement between a Swedish company and the Tunisian government for
the development of the superphosphate industry in Tunisia provided:
"When the provisions of the present Agreement or of its Appendices, which
are binding on the parties, have to be interpreted, the arbitrators shall
base their decision on the general principles of law."'^
In two decided ad hoc awards'arbitrators have been faced with particularly
ambiguous extra legal and non-legal choice of yardstick. Ironically, in the
Lena Goldfield" Arbitration^ the arbitrators had to interpret the parties agreement
"on the principles of goodwill and good faith, as well as on reasonable interpretation
of the terms of the agreement".^ In the Abu Dhabi Arbitration^ the parties
based their agreement "on goodwill and sincerity of belief and on the interpretation
g
of this agreement in a fashion consistent with reason". One recalls also the
' . ... 9provision in the Consortium agreement referred to in the Sapphire Arbitration^
- though itself never the subject of arbitration:
"In view of the diverse nationalities of the parties to this Agreement it
shall be governed by and interpreted and applied in accordance with the
principles of law common to Iran and the several nations in which the other,
parties to this Agreement are incorporated, and in the absence of such
common principles then by and in accordance with the principles of law
recognized by civilised nations in general, including such of those
principles as may have been applied by international tribunals".^^
A similar provision to that of the Abu Dhabi case was contained in a concession
agreement betxjeen the Shaikh of Kuwait and a Japanese owned corporation, the
Arabian Oil Company Limited. That agreement provided:
"The parties base their relations with regard to this Agreement on the
principle of goodwill and good faith. Taking,account • of their different
nationalities this Agreement shall be given effect and must be interpreted
and applied in conformity with the principles of laX'J common to Kuwait and
Japan and, in the absence of such common principles, then in conformity
with the principles of lav7 normally recognized by civilized states in
general, including those which have been applied by international tribunals"^
These two different types of choice will be considered here separately as
a choice of a. non-national legal standard, and
a choice of an-extra-legal standard.
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(.b) A Non-Natjpn'al Legal Standard
135 . In a desire to avoid the application of either .parties' national - or
any other national - system of law, provision is sometimes made for such
contracts to be governed by e.g. the general principles of^interna^
trade law or the general usages of a particu^ar^trade. This kind of
:' choice is a very useful means of the parties avoiding the^sticl^y^ pr^
/.Jihoosing the applicable natioMl^law. It is particularly popula^i^ e^t-^st
• trade contracts where there is both a conflict of laws and ^ conflict of
•economic and political systems. However, such a choice is objected to
because it is uncertain and unclear.^
Some writers argue only a definate and certain system of law can give an
agreement binding and legal effect, and such a system must be that-of a
2 • • •
sovereign State. This is a view which has received judicial support in
several countries^ and from the Permanent Court of International Justice. In the
Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, the PCIJ stated that:
"Any contract which is not a contract between States in their
capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal
law of some country".^
136. On the other hand, there-has developed in recent years a body ^ rules
and customs which are accepted and ^followed by most trading^nations. These
rules have developed due to expediency or directly through the efforts of the
various public ,and private international commercial organisations. Despite
the different economic systems in the world, international business practices .
2
and terminology are often given the same meaning. Thus convenience encourages
and has effected the development of rules and practices the same for all parties,
regardless of their nationality, with respect to international business. These
rules and customs form the basis of the law of international commerce
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Iflien negotiating, most businessmen have in Jiind the customs, practices, rules and
standards appropriate to their particular trade or industry, rather than the
provisions' of their or another national law. These customs, practices, etc. are
invariably of greater relevance to quality and quantity, performance and delivery,
finance and payment provisions in an agreement than individual national laws.
Consequently, as will be seen, in the absence of an express choice by the parties
of a national system of law to .govern, arbitrators often have resort to these
3
comnion and generally accepted standards. VTien the parties actually express the
desire that their rights and obligations be determined in accordance withjthe
customs, practices and standards of international commerce, arbitrators are
obliged to respect that desire.
s'L
137. The rules of several permanent arbitration courts expressly provide that ja-
arbitrators may apply relevant trade customs "as far as the recognition of these
customs has been agreed upon by the parties".^ The tribunals in Poland on the
otherhand only take into consideration the appropriate customs "in so far as
they are permitted by the proper law".^ The International Court of Arbitration
for.Marine and Inland Navigation at Gdynia similarly "follows the principles of
good faith and the commercial, marine and mariners' customs and habits concerning
the issue, inasmuch as the laws to be applied allow it".^ In consequence,
seeing all the Polish arbitration tribunals consider "above all the party will
in .determining the applicable law, so a choice of "general principles" or
"internationally accepted custom" would, it appears, be upheld provided it does
not violate the imperative laws of Poland or Polish public policy: if custom is
chosen to govern, there is no other proper law to measure its applicability. .
The application of international trade custom is favoured by the arbitration
tribunals of both the USSR and Romania. Thus Ramzaitsev, one-time President of
the Soviet FTAC.jWrote: ^
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"On pent ainsi constater d'apres les decisions de la Commission ,
que lors qu'il existe dans le contrat un concept generalement admis dans le
commerce international qui donne son sens aux clauses du_contrat, la
signification de ce concept est precisee en 1 absence_^j^i£at^s
. ••^^gci-ales dans 1'accord meme, par application des coutumes commerciales .
If international custom can be excluded or limited by the will of the parties
how much more direct must be its applicability if the parties expressly provide
it to be the standard governing their relations.
Similarly, with respect to the Romanian Arbitration Commission, Nestor and
Capatina said in a note on an award that the Commission allows ^
"les parties de soumettre leur contrat soit^aux usages commerciaux d'un
certain port maritime (lex mercatoria) . . . .
ICC Award
138. The Rules of the I.C.C. are silent in this respect. Nevertheless, in an
interim award^, arbitrators sitting in Brussels to hear a dispute between French,
and Swiss corporations held that "the principles of law and custom in force
through out the civilised world are applicable,both parties having consented
thereto". The arbitrators however neither attempted to define the content of the
pa-rties' choice nor to explain or justify (legally) the reason for upholding
the choice of the parties.
Ad Hoc Award " .
139. The third arbitrator in an ad hoc oil arbitration was faced with the problem
of having to determine a dispute on the basis of such a choice of the general
principles of law.^ The dispute arose out of a 75 year concession granted by
the Sheikh Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani, the Ruler of Qatar, in 1935, to the
plaintiff company. Under the concession agreement, the company were given "the
sole right throughout the Principality of Qatar to explore, to prospect, to
drill for and to extract and to ship and export, and the right to refine and
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sell petroleum and natural gases, ozokerites asphalt and everything which is
extracted therefrom", within the area over which the Sheikh ruled and which was
marked on a map appended to the contract.• The contract further provided that
disputes arising out of the contract were to ,be settled by arbitration, and the
arbitrators' award was to be "consistent with the legal principles familiar to
civilised nations".
In 1949 a dispute arose concerning the extent of the area subject to the concession.
This, in the main, concerned three separate areas: the sea-bed and sub-soil
beneath the territorial waters of the mainland of Qatar; the sea-bed beneath
the territorial waters of certain islands,over which the Sheikh ruled; and the .
sea-bed and sub-soil beneath the high seas of the Persian Gulf over which the
Sheikh had proclaimed his sovereignty in June 1"*49. One complication was the
fact that certain islands claimed to be within the concession were not marked on
the map. Naturally, with the post World War II rush for oil exploration concession
and the nex'/ technology enabling the sea-bed to be exploited, both the Sheikh and
the company were anxious to resolve the question. Lord Radcliffe, the third
arbitrator, together with the arbitrator nominated by the company, held the
. concession to include "islands over which His Excellency Sheikh Abdullah ruled
at the date of the Concession, whether or not they are shown on the map attached
to .the Concession". This was held to include the sea-bed and sub-soil of both
the mainland of Qatar and the Islands. However, the concession was held not to
"include the sea-bed or sub-soil or any part thereof.beneath the high seas of
the Persian Gulf contiguous with such territorial waters, which sea-bed and
sub-soil, are more particularly mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation of 8th
June 1949".
I
Regrettably, the reasoning of the arbitrator is unknovm: it is unclear whether
the question of the applicable law was brought up or even discussed; the report
is unfortunately in skeletin form. However, it would appear the arbitrator
relied on the general principle of pacta sunt servanda and purported to enforce
the agreement as he considered the parties had agreed. By interpreting the
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agreement as it must have been understood .at the time of contracting in 1935 the
arbitrator reached a conclusion "consistent with the legal principles familar to
civilised nations" - that of making the parties keep to the terms which he
considered they agreed. It is of course interesting to note that Lord Asquith
of Bishopsgate reached a very similar award and on very similar lines - though
fortunately with very much more explanation - in his award in the Abu Dhabi
2
Arbitration .
140. The sparcity of decided awards on this question is due to what appears a
reluctance of contracting parties to,submit their relations to the lex
mercatoria or the "general principles of international trade". Parties still
today prefer the choice of a determined national law which clearly enables them
to know what are the rights and obligations under their contract. Alternatively
they are prepared to authorise the arbitrators to decide ex aequo et bono or to
act as "amiables compositeurs", knowing that they would then just interpret the
terms of the contract and apply the usages of the trade concerned and the general
principles of international commercial law.
«
(c)) An Extra-Legal Standard
•141. The acceptability of the parties choosing an extra-legal standard can^^e seen
from the fact that all the major__international convention^
which deal with the law to govern the substance, of a ..dis^.pute, express
• decision to be made ex aequo et bono^ or for the a^t^oirs^tg act^,as ^lagi^j^s
composit£urs^, providejd Almys...th'e-..parties_,-s0_agree .Thus Article VII (2) of
the 1961 European Convention on International Arbitration provides:
"The arbitrators shall act as amiables compositeurs if the
parties so agree and if they may do so under the law
applicable to the arbitration".
The Arbitration Rules of the ECE 1966 provide in Article 39:
"The arbitrators shall act as "amiables compositeurs" if
the parties so decide^ and if they may do so under the
law applicable to the arbitration".
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The ECAFE Rules for International Commercial Arbitration 1966 provide similarly
in Article VIII (4) (b):
The arbitrator/s shall, .o.. decide ex aequo et bono
(amiables compositeurs) if the parties authorise the •
arbitrator/s to do so, and if. he/they may do so under
the law applicable/to the arbitration." ,
3
The ECE General Conditions for the Erection of Plant and Machinery Abroad (No.188 D)
1963 provides in paragraph 23.3: '
"If the parties expressly so agree, but not otherwise, the arljitrators
shail, in giving their ruling act as "amiables compositeurs".
Again, Article 42(3) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States provides that the requirement that
the arbitrators decide the dispute in accordance with rules of law "shall not
prejudice the powers of the Tribunal to decide a dispute ex aequo et bono if the
parties so agree".
The recent Unicitral Arbitration Rules for optional use in ad hoc arbitration,
has followed this theme. These rules provide in Article 33(2):
"The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeur or ex, aequo
et bono only if the parties have expressly authorized the arbitral tribunal
to do so and if the law applicable to the arbitral procedure permits such
•arbitration"^
It is noteworthy that all these provisions recognise the necessity that the lex
loci arbitri, the law of the place of arbitration, must recognise aiid allov7
arbitration on a non-legal yardstick.- Thus, if the arbitration is to take place
in a country which does not allow non-legal arbitration,^ a submission to arbitration
ex aequo et bono or empowering arbitrators to act as "amiables compositeur^'v7ould
be void and have no effect. This acknowledges the sovereignty of the law of the
place where the arbitration is to take place.
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142. It has for long been accepted that all forms of international adjudication
may be ex aequo et bono if the parties are so agreed. Thus the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice v/hilst stating in Article 38 the sources
from which the court was to draw internationa:i law, provided that those sources
did "not prejudice the power of the court to decide a case ex aequo et bono,
if the parties agree thereto".^
The rules of several permanent arbitration institutions make similar provisions.
Article 13(4) of' the rules of the Arbitration Court of the International Chamber
of Commerce provides that the Arbitrators "shall assume the powers of an amiable
compositeur if the parties are agreed to give him such powers." Article IX-3 of
the Arbitration Rules of the Chambre Arbitrale Maritime de Paris simply provides
that the arbitrators "may act as amiables compositeurs if the parties have expressly,
agreed".
A different wording but with similar effect is adopted by Article 28 of the
Rules of the Netherlands Arbitration Institution which provides:
2
"The arbitrators shall have power to decide on equitable grounds.
The parties may, however, agree that the arbitrator shall decide according
to rules of law".
Similarly, Article 12 of the rules of Arbitration of both the Amsterdam and the
Rotterdam Chambers of Commerce and Industry oblige arbitrators to
"conscientiously give an award in fairness, unless parties have stated at
the outset of the arbitration, that they wish the award to be issued
according to the rules of law".
The effect of these three Dutch rules ..is to give the arbitrators the right to
decide purely on the basis of equity and to place responsibility for limiting
this power in the hands of the parties. If the parties wish the arbitrators to
base themselves on the rules of lav7, the onus is on them to so instruct the
3
arbitrators.
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The rules of most socialist arbitration tribunals are silent on this matter.
Only the Rules of the Yugoslav Foreign Arbitration Chamber make any clear provision
with respect to the choice of a non-legal j^ardstick. Article 39(4) of those
rules provides:
"The arbitrators may render the award exclusively on the basis of the
principle of equity only if so authorised by the parties".
\
\
I
Article 29 of the Rules of the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of
Foreign Trade is particularly interesting. The provision provides that once the
Tribunal has determined the applicable law, it "shall take into consideration
the principles of equity and of customs in so far as they are permitted by "that
applicable law". This appears to preclude arbitration ex aequo et bono other
than to temper the application and effect of the applicable law, and then still
4
only to the extent allowed by that law. However, Poland like the other eastern
European countries do recognise non-legal arbitration, as they are party to the
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1951 and participated
in developing the ECE arbitration rules.
ICC Awards
143. It is clear that in practice arbitrators will give effect to a choice of
an extra~legal yardstick, i.e. a choice for the contract to be governed by and/or
the arbitrators to determine the dispute in accordance with, the "general principles
of equity and justice" or ex aequo et bono, or for the arbitrator to act as
"amiable compositeur"^. Whatever reservations different national systems of law
may have to a choice by the parties of an extra-legal yardstick, it is clearly
quite acceptable in international commercial arbitration: international
arbitration tribunals are not subject to the idiosyncracies of national legal
provisions. It is only in very rare circumstances that arbitrators x^ill refuse
to give effect to such a choice. An award rendered in accordance with a chosen non-
legal yardstick will invariably be recognised and enforced in most legal systems.
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Thus in a dispute between corporations from Belgium and Luxembourg the arbitrator
considered-himself appointed to act "comma amiable compositeur" in accordance
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with the agreement of the parties . In a dispute concerning liability under a
bank guarantee given in respect of a contract for the purchase and installation
of machinery in Turkey betx^een the Turkish buyer's bank and the Czech seller,
the contract expressly provided that Turkish law was to govern the contract. At
the hearing the parties invited the arbitrator, Professor Rene David, to decide
as "amiable compositeur".. Thus in the award Professor David stated:
"Tenant compte de cette circonstance et en application des pouvoirs
d'amiable'i compositeur qui m' ont e|:e donnes, il me parait equitable de
limiter I' 4% le taux des inter^ts dus par S ..
In another case, ^ despite the existence of a choice of French law in the
\
contract, the parties invited the arbitrator to "juger en amiable compositeur,
ce dont nous tenu compte". This dispute concerned the termination by the
French defendant of the Israeli plaintiff's exclusive agency for the
defendant's goods in Israel. The plaintiff had been the defendant's agent
in Israel for twelve years. Although he had to keep contact with only one
major Israeli corporation and had no duty to find other customers, the
plaipitiff claimed compensation for loss of clientele. Relying on both lav,'
and equity, the arbitrators held that although legally the defendant was
under no obligation to the plaintiff, morally, the plaintiff was entitled
to 10,000 F.Fr compensation. The arbitrator said:
"Ainsi sur le terrain du droit strict la demande d'indemnite formulee
par (M.A.) ne trouve pas de fondement, quelle que soit la qualification
que 1'on puisser donner a cette compensation.
"Cependant, les parties nous ayant donne mission de juger en amiable
compositeur nous avons recherche si, en equite, la demande-de (M.A.) '
ne trouve pas de justification".
Having examined all the facts of the contract and the dispute, the arbitrator
held; '
Ainsi, il resulte de I'examen de la convention et de 1'intention des
parties, de la situation de fait et de droit, des circonstances
particulieres de la cause de 1'equite que (M.A.) & droit a une compensation
de la part de la Societe.
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"De 1* ensemble des elments de la clause nous evaluons ex aequo et bono
cette compensation F. 10.000".
A somewhat indirect recognition of the right of parties to chose an extra-
legal yardstick was given in another award where an arbitrator held that he
"ne pent regevoir de la Cour d'Arbitrage les pouvoirs d'amiable compositeur
que si les parties sont d'accord pour lui donner ceux-ci," and "la defendresse
refusant cet accord, I'arbitre aura k statuer, en droit et non en equite".^
Ad Hoc Awards
144. A choice of this kind of amorphous and flexible measuring standard was
contained in the agreement between Lena Goldfield Limited and the Government
of the USSR^. It was provided that "the parties base their relations vrith regard
to this agreement on the principles of good will and good faith, as well as on
2
reasonable interpretation of the terms of the agreement." However, in the
actual award, although the arbitrators indicated their views of the Soviet
3
Government's conduct , they based their award on Soviet law, generally accepted
4
principles of law and international law proper .
145. An even more ambiguous choice was that in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration
between the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi'.
In January 1939 the Sheikh of Abu Dhab'i granted the exclusive rights to the
Petroleum Development Company to drill and mine oil for 75 years within
"the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler of Abu
Dhabi and its dependancies and all the islands and the sea waters
which belong to that area. And if in the future the lands which
belong to Abu Dhabi are defined by agreement with other States, then
the limits of the area shall coincide with the limits specified in
this definition".^
« •
The agreement provided that any disputes, arising under the contract were to
be referred to arbitration before two arbitrators; in the event of their
being unable to agree, to an umpire. Finally, the agreement provided in Clause
17:
1
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"The .Ruler and the Company both declare that they base their work in
this Agreement on goodwill and sincerity of belief and on the ^
interpretation of this"agreement in a fashion consistent with reason".
(Emphasis added).
Adispute arose as to the extent of the Company's concession^: were they entitled
under the 1939 agreement to exploit (i) the sea-bed-and sub-soil in the Sheikh's
territorial waters and (ii) the sea-bed and sub-soil of the continental shelf
contiguous to those territorial waters? The.question came to Lord Asquith of
Bishopstone as Umpire. He had to determine the meaning of the concession
1
agreement and for this the proper law of the agreement. The arbitrator rejected
the municipal laws of Abu Dhabi ("no such law can reasonably be said to exist")^
and of England.
"....'Clause 17 of the agreement,, repels the notion that the municipal law
of any country, as such could be appropriate. The terms of that clause
invite, indeed prescribe, the application of principles rooted in the good .
sense and common practice of the generality of civilised nations - a sort
of "modern law of nature".®
It then fell to the arbitrator to determine the content of the 'modern law of
nations'. Although he rejected English municipal law, the arbitrator held "some
of its rules (to be).... so firmly grounded in reason, as to form part of this
broad body of jurisprudence - this 'modern law of nature'."^ The arbitrator
thus relied on the maxim expressio unius est exclusi alterius favouring a ^
logical and reasonable interpretation of the wording of the agreement in
accordance with clause 17.
Lord Asquith then proceeded to consider what the Sheikh and the Company had
understood their agreement to mean when they made it. As for the sea-bed of the
territorial waters, the arbitrator had no doubt they were included in the 1939
agreement:
8
"I should have thought this expression could only have been intended to
mean the territorial maritime belt in the Persian Gulf, which is a three
. mile belt, together with its bed and sub-soil, since oil is not won from
salt water".^
This part of the award was found to be relatively straight forward. The
arbitrator applied "a si.mple and broad jurisprudence to the construction of this
contract"^^ giving "territorial waters" the meaning it was jinderstood to have in
1939, ":including but... limited to, the territorial belt and its subsoil".^"'
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The question of the continental shelf created more difficulty. Indeed it was
only during the „ar that the continental shelf became an area within the claimed
Jurisdiction of the adjacent sovereign State, and it was not until 1949 - ten
years after the concession agreement was concluded - that the Sheikh of Ahu
Dhahi declared his sovereignty over the suh-soil of the Persian Gulf contiguous
to his State„
Interpreting the contract as it was understood in 1939 Lord Asquith found the
concession agreement did not include the continental shelf. The arbitrator held
that the doctrine of the continental shelf was not established in 1939", nor
for that matter at the time of his award. Thus he said:
"I am of the opinion that there are in thic,
unfilled blanks, so much that is this field so many ragged ends and
no form can the doctSne S '^m L vefLexploratory, that in
lineaments or the definite status nf have assumed hitherto the hard
law".!'^ . ^^tablished rule of international
The arbitrator refused in this regard to read into the 19^9 agreement an
interpretation not mooted until seven years after the agreement was made^^.
H6. The international arbitration conventions! all provide for .rhitration
• -L-a-e^ or entitle parties to authorise arbitrators to act as'.miahles
compositeurs". Ihere are however other non-legal yardsticks but with amore
definate and certain content, e.g. asettled body of rules. Such rules may be
worked out by professional or trade organisations to form acode of behaviour in
S.ven types of contract or relationships. Another non-legal yardstick could he
aChoree of ano^longer "living" law (e.g. Roman law) or of areligious law
(e.g. Jewish law ).
This type Of choice is just as acceptable as a submission to arbitration
exjequo et bono: both opt out of the normal system of legal interpretation of a
contractual relationship. Surprisingly, only the rules proposed by the Institut
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de Droit International^ have actually considered such a choice of a non-legal
body of rules. Article 11(3) of those rules provided:
. "If the law of the place of the seat of the arbitral tribunal so authorises
them, the parties may give the arbitrators power to decide ex aequo et bono
or according to the rules of professional bodies". (Emphasis added).
The last phrase of the provision^ is no more than-a "logical extension of the
acceptance of arbitration ex aequo et bono. If businesmen are prepared to allow
arbitrators to decide on the basis of their feelings of right and wrong, their
"understanding" of commercial practice and'on a mere interpretation of the
agreement in accordance with the presumed bona fides of the parties, there seems
no reason why they should not allow arbitrators to decide according to generally
accepted business practices or the settled rules of some legal or commercial
organisation to which both parties submit. Similarly, there seems little
justification to deny to Jewish businessmen the right to have their commercial
disputes resolved by the Rabbi or Beit Din^ of their choice in accordance with
Jewish law.
Given the powers of "am'iables compositeur^' or asked to decide ex aequo et-bono or
faced with a somewhat ambiguous choice of the yardstick to apply, arbitrators
have little choice but to resort to their repository of general common sense,
commercial experience and legal .knowledge. In this respect they will apply the
terms of the contract, interpreted and supplemented by the "general principles
of international trade" and tempered by the customs and usages of the particular
trade.
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147. An express choice of a religious law was made in the ARAMCO case.
That award concerned an oil concession granted in .1933 by the King of Saudi
I
Arabia to an American oil company. When after the second world-war a dispute
.arose as to the extent of the concession, both parties agreed to submit to
arbitration. As .to the applicable law they provided in their arbitration agreement.
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"The Arbitration Tribunal shall decide this dispute
(a) in accordance with the Saudi Arabian law as hereinafter defined
in so far as matters vjithin the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are
concerned;
(b) in accordance with the law deemed by the arbitration Tribunal to be
•applicable> in so far as matters beyond the jurisdiction of Saudi
Arabia are concerned.
''Saudi Arabian law, as used herein, is the Muslem law
. (a) as taught by the school of Imam Ahmed ibn Hanbal;
(b) as applied in Saudi Arabi^T"^ (Emphasis added).
Despite the ambiguity, the three arbitrators, the third of whom was Professor
Sauser-Hall, upheld this choice stating:
"This agreement regarding the law to be applied is in conformity with
the rule'. •of private international law adopted in most civilised States and
it must be observed by the Arbitration Tribunal".^ . ..
The choice of law clause was construed to have excluded the law of Saudi Arabia
from general application: it only applied to matters within the jurisdiction of
Saudi Arabia. Now the concession agreement was to look for and exploit oil ,
found in the territory of Saudi Arabia; furthermore, one of the contracting
parties was the Government of Saudi A.rabia. From an objective viewpoint as vrell
Saudi Arabia was the place "where the operation was to be carried out"."^ So
the arbitrators looked to the law of Saudi Arabia to determine the character of
the oil concession. This question they held was to be resolved "according to
the principles of Moslem law, as taught by the Hanbali school".^ As "the regime
of mining concessions, and, ... of oil concessions, has remained embryonic in
Moslem law",^ the arbitrators relied on a basic principle of Moslem contract
law: "Be faithfull to your pledge to God, when you enter into a pact".^ This
the arbitrators interpreted to mean that "the rule pacta sunt servanda is fully
g
recognised in Moslem law".
This general principle was inadequate to apply to a highly sophisticated oil
concession agreement. In consequence the .arbitrators held "in the case of gaps
in the law of Saudi Arabia", they would determine "the applicable principles by
resorting to the world-wide custom and practice in the oil business and industry;
failing such custom and practice, the Tribunal v/ill be influenced b^' the solutions
•recognised by world case-law and doctrine and by pure jurisprudence".^*^
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148. However the opposite was the case in the Abu Dhabi arbitration^ where
the law of Abu Dhabi, Muslem law, was totally rejected as not being competant to
regulate a modern commercial instrument. The arbitrator stated;
"What is the "Proper Law" applicable in construing this contract?
This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi and wholly to be performed in that
country. If any municipal system of law were applicable, it would prima
facie be that of Abu Dhabi. But no such law can reasonably be said to
exist. The Sheikh administers a purely discretionary justice with the
assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to suggest that in
this very primitive region there is any body of legal principles applicable
to the construction of modern commercial instruments".-^
I
The arbitrator consequently applied "principles rooted 'in good sense and common
practice of the generality of civilised nations - a sort of 'modern law of
nature", as the yardstick in this award.
Similarly, in the award between the Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil
Company Limited^ the arbitrator despite considering the law of Qatar to be the
proper law, declined to apply it. The law in the Sheikhdom of Qatar was Islamic
law which was not only inappropriate to govern a modern oil concession but.
indeed would have considered the agreement invalid. The arbitrator clearly
explained himself as follows;^
"There is nothing in the Principal or Supplemental Agreements which
throws a clear light upon the intention of the parties on this point. If
. one considers the subject matter of the contract, it is oil to be taken out
of grounds within the jurisdiction of the Ruler. That fact, together with
the fact that the Ruler is a party to the contract- and had, in effect the
right to nominate Qatar as the place where any arbitration arising out of
the contract should sit, and the fact that the 'agreement was ^^ritten in
Arabic as well as English, points to Islamic law, that being the law
administered at Qatar, as the appropriate las-i.
On the other hand, there are at least two weighty considerations
against that view. One is that in my. opinion, after hearing the evidence
of the two experts in Islamic law, Mr. Anderson and Professor Milliot,
'there is no settled body of legal principles in Qatar applicable to the.
construction of modern commercial instruments' to quote and adapt the words
of Lord Asquith of Bisfiopstone, in his Avjard as Referee in an Arbitration
in 1951 in which the Shaikh of Abu. Dhabi, a territory immediately adjacent
to Qatar and in fact much larger than Qatar, was a party, and the Arbitration
concerned the interpretation of words in an oil concession contract. I
need not set out the evidence before me about t?ie origin, history and
development of Islamic lav; as applied in Qatar or as to the legal procedure
in that country, I have no reason to suppose that Islamic law is not
administered there- strictly, but I am satisfied that the law does
OOOlOfi
not contain any principles which would be sufficient to interpret this
particular contract.
Arising out of that reason is the second reason, which is that both
experts agreed that certain parts of the contract, if Islamic, law was
applicable, would be open to the grave criticism of being invalid.
According to Professor Milliot, the Principal Agreement was full of
irregularities from end to end according to Islamic law, as applied in
Qatar. This is a cogent reason for saying that such law does not contain a-
body of legal principles applicable to a modern commercial contract of this
kind. I cannot think that the Ruler intended Islamic law to apply to a
contract upon .which,..h,e.„i^ten^^ed__to._ent.er,^_undexjghXch^he_, w to receive
considerable sums of money, although Islamic.law-would decla that the
transaction was wholly or par'tiaily voidT^ Still less xTOuld the Ruler
so intend, and at the same time stipulate that these sums when paid were
not to be repaid under any circumstances whatever. I am sure that Sir Hugh
Weightman and Mr Allen did not intend Islamic law to applj^. In my opinion
neither party intended Islamic_J.aw to apply,^ ai^ intended that the agreement
was to be governed by 'the principles of justice, equity and good conscience'
as indeed each party pleads in Claim and Answer, alternatively to Islamic
law, in the case of the Claimant."?
149.• Whilst the different reactions to Islamic law in the various awards
considered are interesting there is no proof of any general practice. What is
clear - and it is submitted would be the same even if some developed law had
been expressly chosen - is that an involved concession, agreement must be construed,
at least in part, in accordance with general principles of law,^ customs and
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usages and an interpretation of the contract terms. No legal system is
sufficiently sophisticated and developed to have kept abreast and ahead of
technological development to be able to specifically regulate the multi-dimensional
4
character of modern international commercial contracts. This would cover those
modern phenomena of joint-venture or co-production agreements which include
obligation on parties from different countries with respect to two or more of
the following: financial loans and investments; licensing of technology;
construction of plant on site; training of workers; marketing; manufacturing;
transporting; research; exploration for and exploitation of national resources
and raw materials, etc. Not" even the efforts of international organisations
(e.g. the ECE,^ CMEA,.^) have managed to develop a body of rules capable of
regulating every aspect of such involved international contracts.
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The Eviction of Party Autonomy
150. Though they are rare, there are awards in V7hich arbitrators have refused
to respect the partiesj^hoice of law or have considered there to have been an
insufficient manifestation of their intention. It is considered these fexj
awards show no tendancy sufficient to give rise to some exception to the
general rule. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness they are considered.
ICC Award
151.. One award^ in which an arbitrator did not give effect to a choice of law
by the parties, concerned a choice of German law as the applicable law "in case
of doubt". The .facts of this case were as follows: The plaintiff, an
unincorporated family "import - export" business in Strasbourg, France,-was
appointed agent for the defendant German corporation's fridges, televisions,
radios, etc., in a defined area around the Rhine. The agency contract was made
with the head of the plaintiff firm who was also the head and father of the
family. The father died some 7 years after the agency-was first granted but the
business continued to function and to represent'and act for the defendant.
Some five months after the death of the father, the defendant notified the
plaintiff that they were terminating the agency because it has been made
personally with the father and not with the firm. The plaintiff started
arbitration proceedings pursuant to an ICC arbitration agreement and claimed a
declaration that the agency agreement was wrongfully terminated, damages for
loss of clientele and commissions earned during.the five months after the father
died and the agency being terminated.
4
T-Jhen considering the law applicable the arbitrator held:
"... il est necessaire de rechercher le droit applicable puisque la
sentence doit se fonder sur un systfeme de droit determine."
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"Les parties ont neglige de placer, expressis verbis, leur contrat sous
1'empire du droit de I'un ou de I'autre Etat. Le droit allemand, dont se
reclame la defenderesse, n'est certainement pas applicable d'emblee comme
ayant ete stipule par les parties. Pourquoi auraient-elles, sans cela,
. convenu que le droit allemand s'appliquerait "en cas de doute"? Ainsi
puisqu'en principe, les parties nVont pas fait choix d'un droit determine
I I'arbitre determine le droit applicable en fonction des principes du droit
•» international prive. G'est seulement si cet examen ne devait produire ni
clarte' ni solution acceptable, que I'arbitre serait lie par la volonte
des parties de lui vo5.r, 'dans le doute", appliquer le droit allemand,"
TKe arbitrator then proceeded on the basis of the generally accepted private
international law rules to find the applicable law - that he found to be French.
However, the arbitrator concluded his discussion as to the applicable law by
saj'-ing: ,
"Ajoutons h. cela, d'ailleurs, que la presente sentence ne se presenterait
pas autrement si elle se fondait sur le droit allemand".^
Thus the arbitrator in this case gave the choice of the parties little more
credence than as a factor, to be considered when localising the contract.
Socialist tribunals
152. Socialist tribunals have refused to give effect to the parties' choice of
law where that choice exceeded the liberty allowed by their private international
law rules. Thus the arbitration court of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce
declined to apply English law which the Pakistani and Czechoslovak parties had
expressly chosen^. Instead they applied Czechoslovak law on the grounds that
there was no sufficient connection -betv/een the law chosen and the facts as
2
required by the 1948 Czechoslovak private international law - then in force .
More recently the International Court of Arbitration for Maritime and Shipping
Matters at Gdnyia .refused to apply the US law chosen, on the grounds that such
3
choice had an insufficient connection with the facts . The plaintiff,/ a Federal
German Insurance Company, brought an action for the reimbursement of monies paid
c- • , • ' • .
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to an assured for loss caused to goods by contamination with a noxious liquid.
The contamination was allegedly the fault of the defendant, a Polish shipping
enterprise. It was expressly provided that the bill of lading issued by the
shipper was to be construed and the rights thereunder determined according to
the law of the USA : i.e. the American Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 was to
apply. The arbitration tribunal declined to give effect to this choice on the
grounds that the choice was invalid under th'e 1926 Polish private international
law statute. The USA was neither the place of contracting nor the place of
•4 ' ^ ^performance and was therefore too remote..
The Romanian Arbitration Commission^ declined to give effect to a choice of '
Romanian law where they found it to be "inapte ^ remplir le role qui lui a ete
assigneV.^ -The dispute arose out of the sale by a Greek dealer of olives,
of a certain quality; there were to be 185-200 olives per kilo. "• \«7hen delivered
there were an average of 199 olives per kilo. The buyer alleged ,the goods were
not up to quality (there should have been ah average 192.5 per kilo), and
therefore claimed a reduction in price. The seller argued it V7as not possible
to measures olives with such precision. Romanian law gave no help. Greek.law,on
the otherhand, proviSed a standard for measuring olives between two extremes. In
the circumstances the arbitration tribunal took cognisance of the Greek law
and the buyer's claim failed.
Partial application of autonomy • .
153. Despite the universal and international acceptance and recognition of an
express choice by the parties of a legal or non-legal yardstick to govern their
relations, there appear certain special circumstances where, whilst ostensibly
giving effect to the parties' choice, the arbitrators will look to or rely oh.
OOOliO
at least in part, some other yardstick. So, whilst recognising a choice of a
national body of laws, arbitrators x^ill also, where they think it appropriate,
give credence to or base their decisions -on some internationally accepted
trade or commercial custom or on their concepts of justice and fairness (i.e.
ex aequoet bono). Similarly, when arbitrators are acting as amiables compositeurs
they will often base their award on the appropriate legal provisions of the
otherwise, or some other, applicable law. This will only be done where the
arbitrators find it necessary to make an award v/hich will help to maintain good
relations between the parties - (so that future business between the parties yill ^
i
not be precluded by distrust and bad feeling) - or to render -a fair or just or
sensible commercial decision. This will be discussed in,greater detail below
when dealing with the extra-legal influences on arbitrators' choice of applicable
1 , . . • 2law . For the present, two examples will suff ^e.' A dispute concerning the
amount of commission owed arose out of an agency agreement by which the Chilian
plaintiff was to represent the French defendant in Chili. The contract .contained '
an express choice of French law. The arbitrator having found the defendant
in breach of contract, held when measuring damages for wrongly terminating the
agency agreement;
"De 1'ensemble des elements de la cause, nous evaluons ex aequo et bono
cette compensation &F.10.000."
The Plaintiff claimed entitlement to commission at 5% of the total value of
•all orders effected through the Plaintiff's agency: the defendant said the
correct percentage v/as 1%. Finding the correct percentage was "s-omewhere
between the two, the arbitrator said:
"Nous estimons, en equite, que le taux de la commission devraitetre de
2%. Ce taux applique au montant du marche (prix de base), soit F.2,183,336.00
donne une commission totale de F.43,666.72."
Similarly in an award concerning the wrongful termination -by the plaintiff
of an exclusive sales agreement and the vzrongful retention by the defendant
of moneys collected pursuant to the agreement, the arbitrators determined
OOOili
the amount of moral damages ex aequo et bono despite an express choice of •
French law by the parties. The arbitrators held:
• ""Attendu que le^dommage moral ainsi inflige au defendeur n'est guere
susceptible d'gtre mesure de fagon rigoureuse par les moyens de la
technique comptable; qu'il peut cependant etre evalue ex aequo et.bono
apr&s examen de tous les elememts de la cause; qu'estimer S. Fr.Sw. 50,000
' le dommage ainsi subi par le defendeur et, fixer ^ ce chiffre I'indemnite
qui lui revient de ce chef, apparait raisonnable".
6. The Incidence of Time on Party Autonomy
154. Txto questions which arise involving the incidence of time on party autonomy
concern a change in the law chosen between the time of choice and the time p£
the arbitration proceedings, and the question of when the parties ^ay exercise
their choice of law and to what extent they may amend that choice. We shall
consider these two questions separately under the headings ;
(a) Change in the Autonomous Law.
(b) Time for Choosing Autonomous Law.
.a) Change in the Autonomous Law
155. An interesting problem arises from the passage of time: the inter--
temporal problem. As of what date should the arbitrators determine the
content of the chosen law or extra-legal standard: when the relationship
was created, when the dispute arose or when the standard is actually to be ^
applied? So for example where a contract contains an express provision as
to the law applicable should that law be applied as it was at the time of
contracting or as it is at the -time when the arbitrators wish to apply it?
What where the.choice is made at the time the dispute is submitted to or
during the arbitration: should the arbitrators apply the law as it is then
or should they refer back to the law as it- was at the time when the
relationship; between the parties was first created?
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The writers have expressed various viexjs with respect to the effect of
a change in the law between the time a relationship is created and when a
question of law arises. These views all presume the forum seized to be a
national court which is obliged to respect its forum law and public policy.
If the effect of party autonomy is to connect the contract with a legal
system, then, in the absence of transitory provision, the new law should be
applied^; to apply the old law would be to give effect to a law which no
longer exists^. If on the other hand the parties choice of law identifies
the specific .rules to be implied into the contract, then the old law should
be applied^ except where the new law has a public policy character .
ICC Award
156, There being few awards on this matter little practical guidance is
available^ One award^ involving an intertemporal problem arose out of a contract
made in March 1948 under which the Danish plaintiff undertook to supply men and
machinery for the purpose of purchasing and processing wood in Germany. The
defendant was the Allied High Commission.in Germany after the 2nd World War.
Due" to the difficulties in obtaining the required passport visas and other
necessary legal formalities, grave delays arose. The arbitration agreement made
in September 1951 contained the following choice of law clause:
,r "La loi applicable au contrat en cause sera celle existant dans les zones
I d'occupation d'Allemagne Occidentale et notamment celle existant en zonej| fran^aise d'occupation d'Allemagne, lieu du contrat.
Giving effect to this clause the arbitrators held:
"lly a done lieu de se fonder sur le code civil allemand (BGB), dans le
mesure oil ses dispositions n'avaient pas ete abrogees par la^Puissance
occupante au moment de la conclusion de contrat et de son execution.
2
This is an award in favour of applying the law as amended .
3 ' •By contrast, in another award • an arbitrator held the content of the applicable
law should be determined as of the time when the contract was meant to be
.performed.'^ The dispute arose out of a contract for the sale and purchase of
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goods under which the Austrian buyer undertook to open irrevocable letters of
credit with a bank in Trieste, Italy. The French seller was to deliver the goods
to the defendant in Trieste. The seller alleged the buyer had failed to open
the letters of credit and was therefore in breach of contract: he claimed
damages as a consequence thereof. As to the relevant time to determine the
applicable law the Italian arbitrator held:
"il faut appliquer dans ce cas la legislation qui etait en vigueur a
Trieste dans la periode du 18 Octobre 1949 (date a laquelle la Hefendresse
devait ouvrir le credit irrevocable) au 2 novembre 1949 (date a laquelle en
cas d'ouverture r^guli&re du credit par la |defendressej , la jd'emandresse'
•1 . • . -I _• -1 1 -1 _• J ^ ^ ^devait .Ir'yrer la marchandise au consignataire de la cargaison),
c'est-^-dire, le code civil italien approuve ... 16 Mars 1942 ... et qui a
^ti. en vigueur au cours de la periode sous indiquee dans le territoire de
I'Etat libre de Trieste forraant la zone anglo-americaine". (Emphasis added)
Neither of these two awards can be considered to show a general attitude. The
approach to be taken will differ from award to award, from arbitrator to
arbitrator,., depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular dispute.
Ad Hoc Awards
157. An intertemporal problem arose after the second World War in the light
of the technology developed for exploiting the mineral resources on the sea-bed.
This posed important questions with respect to the' various oil concessions
granted by the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms to western corporations. Was an oil
concession contract to be understood in the light of the prevailing knowledge
and law at the time T^en the concession was granted or as they evolved? The
preference appeared to be for the time' when the concession was granted..
Lord Asquith,. in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration^ applied the "modern law of
nature" and public international law as they were understood in 1939 when the
agreement was concluded.- When considering whether the continental shelf fell
within the concession "the sea waters which belong in that area", the arbitrator
started his discussion:
"Placing oneself in the year 1939 and banishing from one's mind
the subsequent emergence of the doctrine of the 'shelf ..."
Furthermore he later concluded:
0 0 0114
"Directed as I apprehend I anij to apply a simple and^ broad
jurisprudence to the construction of this contract, it seems to
me that it would be a most artificial refinement to read back
into the contract the implications 'of a doctrine not mooted
till seven years later .. . ""3 (emphasis added) .
In the Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd v Ruler of Qatar^ arbitration Lord
Radcliffe appeared also to apply the contract as understood at the time of
contracting, (and that includes the implications given by law) when he held
the concession to include only the territory over which the Sheikh ruled "at the
date of concession".
I 5 . .
Similarly in the Alsing Case vjhere a dispute arose with respect to the
prolongation of an exclusive concession to supply matches to the Greek State
monopoly.. The Umpire, Monsieur Python, held that the law to be applied should,
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, be that in force in 1926, x-jhen
the contract was signed, rather than at the time of the award^.
158. This problem can be divided into whether the choice is for the law to
govern the parties' contractual relations or a standard with which the
arbitrators are to measure the parties' rights and obligations in any dispute
before them.
In the former case it is necessary to determine exactly what the parties
intended. Wlien the choice was made they will have thought of the law as it
then existed. Perhaps it was because of the very merits which they saw in the
law that they chose it to govern their contract? Indeed, it may well be that
had the parties known of the changes to be made to the law they V70uld have
chosen some other law to govern their relations. Only by applying the law as
it was at the time chosen will it be possible to give the contract the effect
which the parties intended aod expected^.
^^rhere the choice is of a measuring standard rather than a body of
regulating norms, it is equally submitted the choice must be given effect to -
as it was at the date of the parties' agreement. If one acknowledges the
right of parties to choose a standard according to which their rights and
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obligations are to be measured, there can be no reason to resort to that
standard as it existed prior or develops subsequent to the parties' choice.
^•Jhat where the changes are influenced by the national public policy of
a relevant State? This, it is submitted, shouldraake.no difference in principle.
The arbitrators are not concerned with any national public policies, except to
2 - • •
the extent relevant in the enforceability of the award . The parties' wishes
must be respected and this means applying the law or extra-legal yardstick
chosen as it was understood by the parties when chosen.
•fj) Time for Choosing Autonomous Law ••
•^59,: Aquestion which often causes vexed (albeit academic) argument is^whethe^
or not parties to a contract can choose the law to goye^i^subseqiient_
: conclusion of the contract^. Can they choose the law to govern when they submit
to arbitration or at the time of or during the arbitration proceedings? Or.must
the choice be.expressly made at the time of contracting? It is argued that if
rights and obligations arising out of the contract are to be clear and certain,
there must be some legal systeir^which determiners whether the contract has been made
and which governs the contract from_;_the very moment of conclusion. Thus the
4 " . ^ ^
Czechoslovak Arbitration Commission stated:
"Determination of the applicable law must however be done precisely
when the contractual relation arises. It is impossible for the
parties to remain uncertain about thg applicable lavj until such time
as legal proceedings may be brought.
So, if the law of country X governs (as the' law applicable in the absence of an
express choice), parties cannot subsequently, even perhaps some years after the
contract was made, choose another legal system to govern. After all, the chosen
legal system could construe differently and give a totally different effect
(perhaps even hold them to be invalid) to the many activities which have already
taken place between the parties under the contract. Furthermore, parties cannot
contract v^ith one legal system in mind, and then when at a later date they find
it convenient choose some other legal system to apply.
'0 0 0 1 1 6
Whatever the merits of these arguments in domestic legal systems, their force as
concerns international arbitration are for two major reasons substantially weaker.
Firstly, just as the parties have the right to contract, so they have the right to
retroactively change, inter se, the legal characteristics and effect of their
contract. They are entitled to abrogate their contract and terminate their,
relationship; they may equally vary the terms of their agreement. As the
agreement of the parties is the all important characteristic in all contractual
matters,- such changes as agreed by the parties must be recognised., \ Whilst
conceding that in some national courts a retroactive choice may be refused
recognition when its. effect is contrary to the forum policy, as an international
arbitration does not have a national forum public policjr, arbitrators must recognise
and respect a choice of law unless it be made contrary to some truly international
principle of public policy (ordre public rgelment international)^ or was induced
by some universally accepted unconscionable means i.e« under duress or by fraud.
Secondly, a choice made at the time of the submission to arbitration or at the
arbitration proceedings, will invariably be more as a measuring stick for the
arbitrators, than as a body of rules to govern the relations of the parties inter
se. The arbi,tration exists and the arbitrators are seized because the parties so
wish; a decision of the parties in reverse could equally disseize the arbitrators
and terminate the proceedings.' If the parties are agreed that their dispute be
determined in accordance with a particular yardstick, be it legal or non--legal,
the arbitrators must act as instructed and failure to do so could lead to the
award being unenforceable. It is surely irrelevant when the parties actually
express their agreement. Furthermore, international arbitration is above the
strictures of any national legal system, and arbitrators, as anational adjudicators,
are not bound by the rigours of any national law (subject of course to the national
laws which must be respected for the,purposes of enforcement); they are subject
only to the will of the parties.
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ICC Awards
160. ^-Jhatever may be the case in national courts 5 where this question has arisen
in arbitration proceedings; arbitrators have not in any V7ay questioned the right
of the parties to make a choice and have given effect to the choice without any
discussion. As was alluded to in two awards already discussed^ arbitrators
conceded the right of the parties to choose the law to -govern even during the
1 2
arbitration proceedings. In -an award between an American businessman and a
French corporation concerning a licence granted to the French defendant to exploit
1 ^
the plaintiff's patent in France, the arbitrator applied French law to their
3dispute as agreed by the parties at one of the hearings. Also in an award
between a Turkish Bank and a Czech foreign trade corporations the arbitrator gave
effect to a choice at the time of the first hearing empowering him to act as
"amiable compositeur'lThat the choice could be made at the hearing was recognised
in one award,^ where, when considering the law to govern the dispute, the arbitrator
began by noting:
"Les parties n'ont convenu du droit applicable, ni h. I'origine, ni en
cours de procedure." (emphasis added).
Although there may be no express choice of law in the contract or before the
arbitrators, if the parties both base their arguments on the provisions of the
same legal system, the arbitrators can infer an express agreement between the
parties as to the law to apply.^ However, arbitrators are often reluctant to
base their decisions purely on the parties' agreement. Thus in a dispute^ arising
out of an exclusive sales agreement made between Sv/iss and German corporations,
the French arbitrator supported his findings of German law as the proper law by
stating'. "De plus, les deux parties d'un common accord se sont referees au droit
g
allemand.". Similarly, where an Italian firm gave a licence to the French
defendants to manufacture their specially'designed brazzieres and to sell them
within a defined area. As the parties did not make any express choice of law, it
fell to the Belgian arbitrator to determine the.law to apply. He considered and
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rejected what he termed "la regie classique de droit international prive," which
pointed "au droit national applicable ^ la lex loci contractus." The arbitrator
then looked to "la r&gle subsidiare <, .^0 la lex loci 'solutionis j c'est-a-dire, k
la loi francaise." To conclude his discussion and (it is submitted) to explain
his choice of French law as the proper law, the arbitrator stated:
A
"Attendu de surcroit qu'en terme de plaidoiri'e, les conseils des
parties ont expressement d^clarS s'en referer ^ 1'application de
la loi francaise."
9Similarly, in a dispute arising out of an agency contract, the Austrian and
Federal German partiefe had made no express agreement as to the law to apply.
In support of the law of the country in which the agency was to be exercised,
the arbitrator stated:
"Eu ^gard ... au que, lors de I'audience, les representants
des deux parties se sont r^feres au droit autrichien, un examen
plus detains de la question sur le plan du droit international
priv^ ne semble pas s'imposer."
Eastern European Awards
161. Asimilar approach has been taken by the socialist arbitration tribunals.^
The Soviet FTAC applied Soviet law in a dispute between a Belgian firm and a
Soviet enterprise on the basis of both parties referring to Soviet law at the ^
hearing.^ Again recently the Soviet MAC^ held Soviet law applicable to a dispute
between the Cuban export enterprise Ali-import and the Soviet Black-Sea Maritime
Corporation because:
"les deux parties se sont referees aux normes du C.N.M.C. de I'U.R.S.S.
dans leurs explications tant ecrites qu'orales."
The Romanian arbitration commission have also recognised a choice of law made at
the hearing.^ Similarly the Czechoslovak Arbitration Commission held:
"... the Defendants have agreed at the public hearing on October 17,
1968 to the application of the Czechoslovak law and the Plaintiffs
in their declarations have referred to the Czechoslovak law, so that
it is possible to consider these declarations of the parties as an
additional choice of law,"^
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Wliere parties had provided in their contract for the US Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act and the Brussels Convention 1924 to govern and subsequently at the arbitration
proceedings expressed a'choice of Polish law, the International Court of Arbitration
for Maritime and Shipping Matters at Gdynia preferred the choice made at the hearing.^
Lebedev states that the Soviet MAC has similarly recognised that "I'existance de'
la clause pr^voyant 1'application d'une loi n'exclut pas la possibilite pour les
#
parties de. modifier cette clause par accord ult^rieur pour s'en remettre ^
1' application par les arbitres d'une autre loij en 1' esp&cej, celle Mu. C.N.M.G,v de
I'U.R.S.S."^ ^.
Ad Hoc Av7ard . , • .
.162. In the ad hoc Alsing Case arbitration^, the pa:rties choice at the "hearing
was upheld - though on the grounds that it was valid' by both the private inter
national law rules applicable and the private international law rules of the '
place of arbitration. The Umpire held; ' p
. " .o. the plaintiffs agreed before the arbitration tribunal that the
case be judged according to Greek law, as requested by the defendant;
the reservations which they made-do not affect this acknowledgement.",
"The parties admit ... that in Greek private international law the
litigants may even during the trial itself agree as to the law to be
applied o... According to recent jurisprudence of•the Swiss Federal
Court the parties may choose the applicable law even during the case.
Consequently the umpire is justified in applying Greek law to the suit,
without having to state which law would have been applicable, in
default of agreement between the parties, under the rules governing
disputes laid down in Greek private international law."
163. Some arbitral institutions have a procedure whereby the arbitrators try
initially to define, before getting down to the fundamentals of the dispute,
what common ground exists and the matters of contention betv7een.the parties. This
is most notably the case with ICC arbitration. By. Article 13(1) and (2) of the
iCC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration the arbitrators are to draw up a
document defining the terms of reference (Acte de Mission) in which they, inter
alia, identify the parties, state their terms of reference, indicate the points
•at issue to be determined, and all other matters required in order that the award
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when made shall be enforceable at law. • The document should be signed by the
arbitrator and both -parties (though the refusal' of one of the, parties to sign does
not deprive the statement of its effect or disseize the arbitrators). Where
possible the statement will describe any and all commonly agreed points, including
the law to govern, even though the choice may only have been made when the
arbitrators were drawing up the statement of their terms of reference.
So, in one award^ made in respect of a dispute between a French Government
I • * '
Ministry and a Swiss trader, it was held that as both parties had agreed and
signed the Acte de Mission providing for the application of French law the tribunal
was obliged to apply that law. Explaining this the arbitrators said:
"Le tribunal arbitral tire de 1'action de mission, la totalite de
ses pouvoirs et de sa competence et qu'au contraire d'un tribunal
de I'ordre judiciaire, il est lie par la volonte des parties,
lorsque celles-ci s'expriment de facon concordante".
The case involved an exclusive sales - agreement made in 1949 under which the Swiss
defendant was given the exclusive right to .market and sell in Switzerland the
French plaintiff's gun powder. The defendant was to receive commission at 5%
on all civil sales and at 2% on military sales. Although the plaintiffs were
well pleased with the growth of civil sales which increased from 150,244 Sw.Fr. in
1955 to 825,333 Sw.Fr. in 1959, they were dissatisfied with very feeble military
sales. In consequence, in 1963 the plaintiff withdrew the defendants exclusive
agency and engaged another agent. The defendant refused to hand over an out
standing 150,000 Sw.Frand claimed the money as damages for wrongful termination
of his agency, including "les dommages moral", i.e. - for loss or reputation.
The plaintiff claimed the re,turn of the moneys outstanding to his account. The
2tribunal found both claims X\fell based but in doing so upheld the choice of
French law in the Acte de Mission, The arbitrators held;
«
/N
"... que malgri qu'il en ait et pour suprenant que puisse paraitre,
de prime face (abord) au regard des principes dudroit international
privfi le rattachement au droit fran(;;ais d'une cause dont les
principaux elements se situent en suisse, le tribunal (ne) peut que
declarer le droit francais applicable ^ la cause."
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The choice of French law was applied here despite the contract having a closer
lien with Switzerland and the choice only having beenmade after the arbitration
4proceedings had begun . '
In another award^ it was found that "les parties ont, dans I'Acte de Mission, ,
\
reconnu et convenu, que leurs relations rdciproques decoulant du contrat en -
causes sont regies exclusivement par le droit italien." However, the arbitrators
only upheld the validity of this choice on the grounds that:
"Le tribunal arbitral doit respecter les principes ggn^raux du droit
international prive. L& oQ il faut s'en remettre ^ des regies
concretes en matiere de conflits de lois, il convient d'appliquer
les normes du systeme juridique au lieu ou sifege le Tribunal arbitral.
Dans le cas present, c'est done sur le base des regies et de la
pratique du droit international jirive suisse que les decisions doivent •
etre prises.
Needless to say, the choice of Italian law was upheld^. '
CHAPTER II • ' IMPLIED CHOICE
164, Often parties, either for reasons of convenience or by mistake fail to
provide in clear and unambiguous terms the law to govern their relations.^ They
may fail to clearly express a choice of, law because they did not in the circum
stances think it necessary^e.g. where the,parties had been doing business together
for some time and either had never made provision as to the law applicable or they
were no longer using written contrax^. Again^ the parties may have considered
there to be no need to expressly state which law governed their contractual
relations, that law being self-evident.
A. THEORY - " "
The Principle of Implied Autonomy , •
165. The absence of an express choice confronting the desire to g^e effect, to
the intentions and expectations of the parties has led to party autonomy receiving
an extended and liberal interpretation. Thus party autonomy is today understood
to refer not only to the right of parties to expressly choose the law to govern
their contractual relations, but also to parties being entitled to indicate
what law they wish should govern their relations^. As party autonomy is based on
the will of the parties that a particular law govern their relations, it follows
that the arbitrator (or the judge) must endeavour to determine what the part^ies
did intend. So where there is no express choice, an arbitrator (or judge) must
-Ml.
look to see whether the parties have in some other way indicated which law they
2
want or expect to govern their contract. Such a choice is kno^m as an "implied ,
"infered"^, "tacite"'^ , or "implicite"^ choice. Thus the use in a written
contract of terminology exclusively comprehendable in or drafted in accordance-vjith
the formal requirements of a particular legal system may be considered an implxed
choice of the relevant substantive law rules of that legal system « Similarly, a
provision in a contract that disputes arising out of or in connection-with it be
considered exclusively either in the courts of a particular country or by arbitration
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in that country, has been construed to be an implied choice of the law of that
country^; this on the basis of the latin'maxim qui elegit iudicem elegit__^ - if
8
you choose your judge you choose your law o
The Recognition of Implied Autonomy in National Systems of Private International Law
166, This implied choice is recognised in almost every legal system which accepts
the principle of party autonomy: indeed it is an aspect^of party aut^ So
e.g. with respect to England, Dicey-Morris states: . ^
i • " ' •
"When the intention of the parties to a contract with regard to the
law governing the contract is not expressed in words, their intention
is to be inferred from the terms and, nature of the cjpntract, and from
the generaX^cixsaW^Bms of the case and such inferred intention _
determines the proper law of the contract."^ (Emphasis added).
Similarly, the reporter of the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law,
Second, Conflict of Laws, when commenting on the Restatement's provision entitling
2 .
parties to choose the law to govern their relations , stated:
"But even when the contract does not refer to any state, the forum
may nevertheless be able to conclude from its provisions that the
parties did wish to have the law of a particular state applied."
.With respect to France, Batiffol says:
f'' ...
"(La jurisprudence francaise, prenant une position qui se retrouve
genSralement dans son principe ^ I'etranger, soumet les contrats
de caract^re international k la loi express^ment, voire implicitement,
dgsignee par les parties, dite encore loi d' autonomie.(Emphasis added).
Again, with respect to the socialist legal systems, Szaszy vjrote:
"Transactions coming under the law of contracts are adjudged in all
peoples democratic countries, as in the Soviet Union, first of all
under the law which has been explicitly or implicitly chosen, by the
parties."^ (Emphasis added).
«
3. The Irrationality of Implied Autonomy
167. But what is really meant by an implied choice of law?^ Is it really possible
for an arbitrator faced with contentious parties to determine with any certain.ty,-
from the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case, exactly what the
parties intended? Even an arbitrator conversant with the usages and customs of
0 0 012 4
a particular trade or area of business cannot be absolutely' certain that the parties
did actually intend a particular law to govern. Though the evidence may point in
a particular direction, to draw any conclusions from that evidence presumes a
normal situation, the parties being reasonable, cautious businessmen. It does not
take into account the idiosyncratic and eccentric characters of many businessmen,
invariably prudent though sometimes prepared to take a risk, invariably experienced
and realistic though sometimes naive and reckless. . It also ignores the different
aims and vie\^7points of and pressures on businessmen when contracting, such
differences having their origin in the background of the individual businessman,
the system from which he comes and the particular problems he faces.
168. The theory of "implied choice" is based on the "volonte" of the parties
being "distinctly characterised."^ "The parties are not presumed but positively
— ^ 2
assumed to have agreed' on, not only thought of, the legal system to be applied."
But the theory is "fallacious" : it ignores the unpredictability of man and the
very diverse outside factors which may influence his behaviour. It is never
possible to know what exactly was the intention of a person at a particular time -
especially when he is arguing against the conclusion not in his favour. Never-
theless, despite these criticisms, the theory of implied choice has developed
through the application of certain presumptions which have been and are assumed
... 4
to imply to the parties a particular intention .
B. PRACTICE
1. The Recognition of Implied Autonomy
The principle of implied autonomy has been recognised in many awards
although in recent years they have become more and moire rare. For example, in
one award^ a dispute arose out of a contract under vzhich the Swiss inventor
granted to a Swiss export company the exclusive right to market his patent through
out the world except (Federal) Germany. The Swiss arbitrator, sitting in Zurich,
2
when looking for the applicable law stated:
0()Ui2b
"Lors de la conclusion du contrat, les parties n'ont convenu ni
expressement ni tacitement du droit applicable.
3 .
Similarly one remembers the award of Professor Fragistas discussed above m
whi ch.he s ai d:
" ... pour determiner le droit substantial applicable au contrat en
cause, (I'arbitre) doit, tout d'abord, rechercher la volontg
expresse ou tacite des parties."
2. The Forms of Implied Autonomy
As already noted, implied autonomy is considered to have three forms.
Most general is to apply the law which from an objective review of the contract,
its terms and the surrounding circumstances, clearly shows that the parties
intended and expected to govern their relations. Secondly, is the presumption
that the use of terminology or language only comprehendable in one legal system
manifests a desire that the relevant provisions of that legal system be applied.
Thirdly, and this is the most controversial, the presumption that a provision for
any subsequent dispute to be exclusively dealt with by the courts of^or an
arbitration tribunal in, a particular country, implied a choice of the law of
that country.
To consider the extent to which each of these three forms of implied autonomy
have been adopted by international commercial arbitrators, we shall divide our
discussion as follows;
(a) Implied autonomy on the basis of the surrounding facts.
(b) Implied autonomy on the basis of the language used.
(c) Implied autonomy on the basis of the presumption qui elegit
iudicem elegit ius.
e-
Implied autonomy on the basis of the surrounding facts
There are few examples of awards in which arbitrators have actually
purported, by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, to state what the
parties actually intended.. However, in one case,^ the doctrine, of party autonoirij'
vjas extended by the arbitrator who implied from the facts that the parties had
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chosen a particular law to govern. That case concerned an agreement under which
the plaintiff a (Federal) German manufacturer of sheet-metal for the graphic
industry, 'granted to the defendant in France (almost) exclusive sales rights of
their good's. The defendant -was engaged in the sale and distribution of machinery
and equipment for use in the printing industry. The plaintiff claimed 7371 DM
from the defendant for money laid out for and not re]3aid by, the defendant.
There being no express choice of law, the arbitrator began by trying to determine
the proper law. The arbitrator said:
"La demanderesse a son si&ge en Allemagne alors que la d^fenderesse a
le sien en France. Aussi, en premier lieu, la question du droit
applicable ^ leurs relations contractuelles doit-elle.gtre posge.
•V;i que le litige porte sur la question de savoir si I'acheteur s'est
conform^ ^ ses obligations contractuelles et que dans les formules
employees par la demanderesse pour les confirmations de commandes -
que la defenderesse a toujours accept^es sans objection - les
dispositions sous chiffre 7 fixent le lieu^ d'execution pour les
obligations de part et d'autre au lipu du domicile de la demanderesse,
I'arbitre doit s'en tenir k 1'accord rgalisg par les parties dans le
cadre de leur autonomie de volontg et juger le litige qui lui est
soumis selon les dispositions du droit allemand, en particulier celle's
V du Code de Commerce allemand sur la vente commerciale." (Emphasis added).
Thus having considered the factors surrounding the relations between the plaintiff
and the defendant, including their past relations, the Swiss arbitrators held
German law to have been impliedly chosen by the parties to govern their contract.
One questions whether it vjould not have been more realistic and accurate for the
arbitrator to have said on the ^ame findings - that the contract was localised
in Germany, or that the contract had its closest connection with German law,
rather than to fictitiously imply a choice of law by the parties?
172. An intriguing determination of an implied choice of law. took place in an
award^ between a Swedish manufacturer of rayon and three French citizens - two of
whom were naturalised Hungarians. 'The Swedish defendant granted the plaintiffs
exclusive sales rights for their products in France and agreed to pay a 10%
commission on all contracts introduced by the plaintiffs. During 1966 the plaintiffs
introduced contracts worth just under 2 million French francs. The defendant
failed to pay the agreed commission and the plaintiffs came to arbitration to claim
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735780 French francs. The initial question for the arbitrators concerned their
competence to deal with the matter. The arbitrators found that as the parties
were of diverse nationalities and backgrounds, the contract had been made in English
and German - the mother tongue of none of the parties - there was an implied choice
for the application by the arbitrators of international commercial usage and
general principles of law. To explain the non-nationality or inter-nationality
of the contract, the arbitrator, a Belgian citizen, held:
"Attendu que d&s le ddbut de leurs relations, celles-ci, q'ui sont de
nationality dif ferente. ont entendu souligner le caractere international
de. leur accord; que si le contrat est etabli & Paris, il (ist redig^
en la langue" allemande, qui n'est la langue nationale d'aucun des
contractants."
Having set the scene, the arbitrator then discussed the question of the applicable
law stating;
"Les parties n'ont pas indiqu^ dans leurs conventions ou dans leur
correspondance le droit national qu'elles entendaient ^ventuellement
appliquer k leurs relations ou ^ leurs diff^rends;"
"Elles ont ainsi implicitement laisse ^ I'arbitre la faculty et le
pouvoir d'appliquer, pour 1'interpretation de leurs obligations, les
normes du droit, et ^ d^faut, les usages commerciaux."
(b) Implied autonomy on the basis of the language used
173. Although it would appear that use of a language exclusively referable to
one legal system, could in itself be a sufficient manifestation of the parties'
intentions, there is to the knowledge of this writer no award where_ this has
formed the reason for the arbitrators' choice of applicaMe law. It is clear
that the mere fact that a contract be negotiated or even drafted in a particular
language can have no effect whatever. As Niboyet said: "Le fait, en particulier,
de I'emploi de la langue britannique dans un contrat de transport outre-Atlantique,
ne peut-avoir, a lui seul, la moindre signification".^
2 . • . . . •So in one award arbitrators rejected as an implied choice of American law the
fact that the contract was written in English. In that case all the factors,
including the nationality of the defendant, pointed to French law; only the
language of the contract and the nationality of the plaintiffs pointed to American
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law. There was no express choice of law: the plaintiffs argued for the
'applications of American law; the defendant for French law. The plaintiffs' two,
major arguments in favour of American law were rejected in the following way:
"The applicability of French law is suggested in the first place by
the fact that the contract was concluded in France. It is true that
the signing took place at the United States' Embassy; but if (the
plaintiffs) had intended this to have the consequence that American
law would be applicable, he should have made an express stipulation
to that effect, since K could certainly not be expected to understand
it automatically. ..The argument that the contract was drawn up
in the English language does not carry sufficient weight, particularly
since the American parties understood French only very imperfectly
while the French party did not understand English."3 ,
In another award^, concerned with a sale and purchase contract between
Austrian and New York parties,, the arbitrators rejected various single
connecting factors, including the language of the contract, as carrying
exclusive weight. The3' helds
"The use of a language understood throughout the world and of
a currency of international repute, in a contract between parties
of different countries, is no longer a decisive argument with
regard to the applicable law",
174. On the other hand there are awards in which the use of a particular
language or terminology has been considered an extra consideration to be used
by the arbitrators in determining the applicable"law. In one award^, between
a French plaintiff and an Italian defendant, both parties argued for the
application of the other's law. The dispute concerned the commission payable
under an exclusive agency contract by which each party appointed the other the
exclusive agent for his products in -the other's country. Minimum sales were
provided. Deciding in favour of French law the arbitrator held:
"Attendu que les parties ne sont pas d'accord sur le droit applicable
h la cause, la demanderesse invoquant le droit francais et la
defendresse le droit italien;
"Attendu que la contrat du 11 juillet 1964 se prgsente globalement
comme un contrat d'adhesion, rgdigg en francais, par un ressortissant
francais et-dont la traduction italienne est parsemge de galllcismes
flagrantsj
"Attendu que les obligations principales_resultant^de ce contrat et
premierement la livraison du material doivent s'executer en France;
"Attendu surtout que I'article 16 du contrat definissant les normes
; de qualitg a respecter, le fait par rif^rence "aux-r&gles gouverne-
mentales francaises et aux indications du Bureau Securitas ,
institution francaise;
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"Attendu enfin, alors que tout indiquait que le contrat referait
implicitement au droit francais ^ que la diifeiidresse n'a assorti sa
signature d'aucune observation ru reserve & I'egard de la legislation
applicable au contrat;
"Attendu que ces divers (;l(^ments concordants sont autant d'indices
que les parties ont tacitement choisi ou accepte que le contrat soit
• regi par le droit francais;
"Attendu par consequent que le droit francais doit etre d^clar^
applicable ^ la caused'
In another award^, an arbitrator considered the use of the German language and
German legal style to be a supporting criterion to those other factors which
pointed to German law. That award concerned an agency contract under which
the Canadian plaintiff was to represent and sell the Federal German defendant's
product in the USA and Canada . When considering the question of the applicable-
laWs Monsieur Ernst'Mezger, the sole arbitrator^gave several reasons to justify
his reliance on German law to govern the 'contract. Considering the language
of the contract, the arbitrator stated;
"The original contract, ... while v/ritten in English, is not at all
drafted in the English or Canadian legal style. It reads more like
a translation into English qJ a German model".
(c) Implied autonomy on the basis of the presumption qui elegit iudicem
elegit ius.
175. But the most widely accepted form of implied choice follows the qui elegit
iudicem elegit ius maxim. Not only did this principle have a degree of acceptance
in many legal systems but it was easy to impose and was for long considered quite
logical. As Batiffol stated:
"si les parties ont voulu §tre jug^es par les juges de tel pays, il y
a 1^ la pr^somption la plus s^rieuse qu'elles ont envisage, 1'application
par ces juges de leur propre loi,"}
More pertinently^, Professor Alexander Goldstajn, writing about the Foreign Trade
Arbitration Tribunal in Yugoslavia said;
"If a dispute has been submitted to the FTA in Belgrade and if there
is no specific stipulation on the choice of law it can be assumed,
by virtue of generally accepted practice, that the agreement of the
parties to submit the case to the standing arbitration tribunal in
Yugoslavia, justifies the assumption that it was their will to accept
the Yugoslav legal system as competent for the settlement of their
relationship .... i.e. tying up of the arbitration award to a specific
legal system,"2
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The presumption has enjoyed declining favour in recent years as the basis on which
it is founded has been seen to be irrational and inaccurate. We shall consequently
see how after being generally accepted in international commercial arbitration, the
qui elegit iudicem presumption has become less acceptable as a choice of law rule
per se. Today it. is merely another general connecting factor which may be of
relevance in the circumstances of the particular case.
(i) Litteral application of the qui elegit iudicem presumption
Eastern European Awards .
176. This solution was clearly adopted by the Czechoslovak arbitration tribunal
in the case of a Germany company, M,N, v Koospolji a Czechoslovak foreign trade
enterprise^. The dispute arose out of a sales contract, the German buyer
alleging that the goods were defective. The contract made no provision as to
the law applicable; there was however an express provision that the parties would
accept the competence of the Czechoslovak arbitration court for any and all disputes
arising out of the contract. The report states:
"The arbitrators were of the opinion that the parties have, by reserving
the matter for the Czechoslovak Arbitration Court, tacitly subjected
their relations to Czechoslovak law. This signification of the
arbitration clause should be clear even to the plaintiff, an experienced
businessman, for similar clauses are interpreted in the same way both
by international doctrine and legal decision ....•(Emphasis added).
The Czechoslovak arbitration tribunal again adopted the qui elegit iudicem
presumption in the case of the Czechoslovak enterprise Centrotex v M.K. Company,
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a. Pakistan corporation . The report of the award describes the arbitrators
reasoning on choice of law as follows:
"The arbitrators had to determine whether the parties had not tacitly
adopted, a legal system and X'7hether this intention did not result from
rte tenor of the contract. They examined separately the facts from
which such an intention may be inferred. They found:
(a) that the parties had accepted the Arbitration Court of the
Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce to settle, in accordance
with the rules of that Court, any difference arising out
of the contract;
•(b) - that the parties chose Prague as the place of payment;
(c) that they did not agree expressly on the place of execution
of the contract;
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(d) that the seller company has its head office in Pakistan.
Some of these criteria designate Czechoslovak law, and another Pakistan
law. By their design, they preferred application of Czechoslovak law
because, by accepting the competence of the Court of Arbitration, the
parties chose Czechoslovak fawV"^ (Emphasis added).
ICC Awards
Y]-], A similar approach has been taken in several ICC arbitrations. So in an
award^ on a contract between an Austrian seller and a Yugoslav buyer, the Swiss
arbitrator held "en application des principes ggn^ralement reconnus du droit
suisse, I'arbitre a consid^r^ comme droit applicable cel^i si&ge du tribunal
arbitral." This was despite the fact that Switzerland and Swiss lav/ had no
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connection whatever with the contract «
A similar attitude, but from a slightly different stand point, was taken in another
3ICC Award, . The arbitrator, a Swiss national sitting in Basle, had to determa.ne
the law to govern an agency contract between a French motor-car manufacturer and
a Yugoslav enterprise. The arbitrator stated that following the principles of
private international law both a judge and an arbitrator should always apply
his own law unless he is pursuaded some foreign law is applicable in the
particular case. The arbitrator stated:
"D'aprfes les principes du droit international priv^, il incombe aux
parties de soumettre au juge les dispositions du droit Stranger. Si
tel n'est pas le cas, le juge doit appliquer son droit .... "
This is very much the old lex fori theory but in the particular circumstances was
a straight application-of the qui elegit iudicem principle. Thus despite the fact
that Switzerland and Swiss law had little connection with the contract, other than
it was a neutral forum and yardstick, equidistant (more or less) betvjeen Paris and
Zagreb (the respective domiciles of the parties).
4 . .
In another award , a Sv7iss arbitrator held Svjiss laxv applicable because in the
absence of an express choice of law and with the connecting factors being equally
divided, he could assume the choice of a Swiss arbitrator sitting in Switzerland
as an indication of the parties understanding that Swiss law should be applied^.
The arbitrator stated:
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Dans le presente esp^-ce, les contractants sont convenus d'une clause
compromissoire. et ils ont localise 1'arbitrage en Suisse. Mais il
faut se demander encore si cet indice cons.erverait sa signification
• si cette localisation de 1'arbitrage n'avait aucun lien avec les
autres elements du contrat. Selon la doctrine,, la rdponse sera
affirmative si le choix du lieu se justifie par une consideration
objective; elle sera negative si ce choix ne manifeste que le desir
d'echapper & des dispositions imperatives d'une autre legislation....
Dans le contrat du 11 fevrier 1952, le choix d'un arbitre suisse
s'explique objectivement par I'interet que les deux parties - I'une
allemande, 1'autre bolivienne - avaient de soumettre leur litige ^
un arbitre d'un tiers pays, d'autant plus qu'elles pouvaient aisement
connaitre la legislation de ce pays. Leur choix se justifie aussi
par la necessite de supprimer toute equivoque touchant 1'interpretation
d'indices contradictoires quant au droit applicable...: la Bolivie
etant le pays d'origine et de domicile des defendeurs et de plus le
litd de conclusion du contrat, mais I'Allemagne dtant le pays d'origine
et surtout de domicile de la demanderesse dont la prestation caracterise
le contrat.
- - Les parties sont done librement convenues de soumettre leur contrat
k la loi suisse." (Emphasis added).
Ad Hoc Award . -
178, A strict application of the qui elegit iudicem presumption occurred in an
ad hoc arbitration award held in Norway^. The dispute arose out of a charter-party
made in the Baltime standard form with respect to an Norwegian ship. The ship's
engine broke down during the voyage necessitating extensive and expensive repairs.
The ship was taken to New York rather than Palermo for repairs mainly because of
tHe former's shorter repair-time. The question arose as to the liability of the
shipowner to pay the higher cost of repairs incurred by taking the ship to New York.
The charter-party contained a clause providing for arbitration to take place in
London, but for reasons of convenience the parties agreed after the dispute arose
to the .appointment of a Norxregian sole arbitrator and for the arbitration to be held
in Oslo. The arbitrator had to.determine what law governed the charter-party
and hence the obligations arising under it - Norwegian or English lav;. The
arbitrator held;
"Both parties must, as well at ,the time of the making of the contract
as the time thereafter, be aware of the fact that the charter-party had
an effective clause of arbitration to be held in London, and that this
clause would have meant that the English Arbitration Court would decide
the charterparty according to English law, English lav7 would therefore
in fact, according to the arbitration clause come to be the competant
law. Under these circumstances, it is natural to interpret the
arbitration clause as a clause also deciding the choice of law."
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The use o£ the Baltime charterparty with its provision for arbitration in England
was considered here to outweigh the fact that all else pointed to the application
of Norwegian law. It is presumed that it is the special nature of maritime
arbitration which persuaded the arbitrator to imply a choice of English law.
Afterall, most charter-parties based on the Baltime (and several other similar)
Standard-form are understood to imply the application of English law. Secondly,
and perhaps of even greater influence, was the fact that most shipping arbitration
takes place in London and in accordance with English law. That practical and
convenience reasons induced the parties in this case to agree to the arbitration
actually being conducted in Norway did not amount to the parties having changed
their view as to the law applicable . Hence the arbitrator was bound to the
•originally implied choice of law. . , _ -.
. . 2
A similar approach was taken by the Rotterdam Cotton Arbitration Association ,
A contract for the sale of cotton contained a provision that any dispute arising
therefrom was to be dealt with by arbitration under the rules of the Liverpool
Cotton Association,
Article 300, by-law 3 of the Liverpool Cotton Association arbitration rules
provides:
"Every contract made subject to the By-Laws and/or Rules of the
Association, or subject to Liverpool Arbitration, or containing
words to a similar effect, is to be construed and take effect as •.
a contract made in England and in accordance with the Laws of
England,.•." .
l-Jhen a dispute arose as to whether the contract price should be revalued following
the devaluation of the English pound, the parties agreed for their dispute to
be dealt with by the Rotterdam Cotton Arbitration Association. The arbitration
tribunal found English law to be the "proper law" of the contract. By providing
for arbitration at the Liverpool Cotton Association the arbitrators assumed,
following the rules of that Association, that the parties intended English law
to govern their contract. The subsequent transfer of the arbitration•to
Rotterdam did not affect the contract conditions.
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(ii) Inaccuracy in applying the qui elegit iudicem presumption»
179. However, with time and experience the inadequacies of the,qui elegit
iudicem elegis ius presumption became apparent. The logic which appeared to,,
support the presumption was not always that profound and the results of strictly
applying the rule were frequently quite illogical and untenable. , Of, course, for
those who favoured a fixed and easily applicable rule the presumption was ideal and
it gave the parties the right to indicate, by the choice of the country of
arbitration, the law to govern. It certainly alleviated the arbitrator from having
\
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to decide this sensitive question. But in practice it became cleat that the
presumption, if applied strictly and without any exception, offered fev7 if any
advantages over the lex loci r.ontractus and lex loci solutionis presumptions.
It had all of the weaknesses of those presumptions and its alleged advantages were
based on very questionable premises. Whilst it might frequently mirror the
intentions of the parties, the qui elegit iudicem principle was subject to too
many flaws and weaknesses and could not be supported by "commercial reality".^
ISOo The qui elegit iudicem presumption-^'lost favour for several reasons.
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Firstly;• morq often than because of a desire that a particular law govern their
relations, parties may agree on arbitration in a particular country and/or at a
particular institution because of their confidence in that kind of arbitration.
If they provide for ad hoc arbitration by a particular well known jurist, is
for his•arbitrament that they come, not the law of the country in which he lives.
This is frequently a guiding factor in the choice of arbitration forum for "east-
west" trade contracts. The socialist party may be unwilling to submit to an
institution which he believes to be hostile to his .system and thus incapable of
objectivity: the western party may be equally reluctant to submit to a "communist"
tribunal. Bj'- way of a compromise, the parties agree on ad hoc arbitration in a
neutral forum; ^in east-west trade Sweden has become very popular.^ In such
situations it cannot be suggested that the parties intended to submit to ar^.tration
in Sweden and hence for Swedish lax-/ to govern the
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181. The "psychological"^ inability to agree to arbitration at "the other
party's tribunal" is a problem which has also been encountered in trade between
the developed and the third world. A developing country, very often acting
directly through its government, may be unwilling to agree to arbitration in the
other party's country, that being not only an effront to its sovereignty but also
2
because of the belief in a bias inherent in the old colonial mentality . This
may be even more apparent where the western partner comes from the old colonial
power. •
3 ^
This situation can be well illustrated by one ICC award which arose out of the
peremptory termination of a contract under which a central African State government
iiad granted to a Belgian citizen an exclusive concession to their gold and diamonds.
The African State was a former Belgian mandate. The contract provided for ICC
arbitration in Paris "sauf dans le domaine relevant de I'ordre public national" of
the newly independent African State. A Swiss national, sitting in Paris as
arbitrator sole, declined to infer a choice of French law. The contract was to be
performed on the territory of a foreign sovereign State; the State itself was a
party to the contract and was unlikely to agree to the application of the law of
some other State and especially not the law of the former colonial power. The
arbitrator held the choice of ICC arbitration to be merely a submission to "une
juridiction arbitrale Internationale" and the choice of such a "non-national" or
"international" tribunal could not carry with it any implication as to the
applicable law. On the contrary, the arbitrator appears to have presumed that
4
as one party was a sovereign State, the law of that State must have been intended :
the law of the African State was consequently held applicable. However, the
arbitrator then based his award on an assortment of authorities dra™ from several
different legal systems, relying "pele-mele"^ on a Belgian writer on administrative
law and a judgement of the Belgian Cour de Cassation, the case law of the Swiss
Federal court, contemporary theory and the prevailing theory and case law of France;
no African authority was cited. This reasoning appears to have made pointless
the arbitrator's clioice of the law of the African country to govern the contract.
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182. This reluctance to submit to the arbitration tribunal of a foreign country
can and does arise> though for different reasons, in trade between businessmen
from the developed world^= Again, as with the preceding examples, unless one of
the parties gives way, the parties will have to compromise either by choosing a
neutral or international forum, or by resorting to a "joint" or "double" arbitration
clause.
183. One solution frequently resorted to by parties unable to agree on the
appointment of the sole or third arbitrator (at whose domicile the arbitration
will invariably take place), is to provide for some third person (e.g. the
President of the International Court of Justice, the President of the supreme
i
court of a particular country, the President of a chosen bar association) to make
the appointment of the arbitrator. So either at the outset of the dispute or
on the parties being unable to agree on the arbitrator, such third person is
requested to make the necessary appointment^. The appointor could choose an
arbitrator from any country: there is no knowing what criteria will influence
the appointor other than the presumption that he will aim to appoint someone
competant for the particular type of dispute. Thus to apply the qui elegit iudicem
presumption where there was this type of arbitration agreement "would often lead
2
to strange results" and could result in "different and artificial solutions for
3the same facts and to the same problems."
184. Instead of agreeing to submit to a neutral arbitral forum, contracting
parties may provide for certain types of dispute to be submitted to one arbitration
tribunal and other types of disputes to "another tribunal^. Alternatively, the
contract may give the parties the right to submit any dispute to a choice of
arbitral tribunals . Or again, and this is particularly common in eastern
European trade, provision may be made for the arbitration tribunal in the country
in which the defendant is domiciled or carries on his business to have jurisdiction.
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Can it be suggested in the first hypothesis, that the law of one State should
apply to certain aspects of the contract and the law of another to such other
aspects? Can it be suggested^ with respect to the second proposition that, the
law to govern shall depend on the tribunal the plaintiff chooses? Can it be
even contemplated that the law to. govern shall depend on which party should first
bring an action in the tribunal of the other .
The application of the qui elegit iudicem elegit ius presumption to any of these
types of joint or double arbitration agreements would have the effect that the
applicable law ~ or non-legal yardstick for that matter ~ would be contingent-on
the determination of the tribunal which is to deal with the dispute. Taken
further, this could lead to the situation that an aggrieved party, before commencing
arbitration proceedings, would have to consider which law would most favour him.
He could then begin his claim in the arbitration tribunal most in his favour -
leading to the undesirable but practical practice of forum shopping. Alternatively,
where it is the arbitration tribunal in the defendant's country which has
jurisdiction, a prospective arbitrant considering "his" national law to favour him
might act in a way to induce the other party to commence proceedings against
him in "his" national arbitration tribunal. Then;, on a. counterclaim, he could
benefit from the law which was most in his favour. This is an objectionable
situation which would defeat all and every principle of international commercial
law-, except perhaps the desire for certainty.
... 4
The third problem actually arose in an award of Yugoslav Arbitration Court . A
contract was made for the sale and purchase over a period of years of building •
materials between a Bulgarian seller and a Yugoslav purchaser, provision for
payment having been made by means of letters of credit. The contract provided
that disputes were to be dealt with by arbitration at the arbitration court
«
attached to the Chamber of Commerce, in the defendant's country, A dispute
arose out of the alleged failure of the Yugoslav party to open letters of credit
as undertaken. ^vTien discussing the applicable law, Professor Kozuharov of Sophia,
Bulgaria, in a dissenting opinion, rejected Yugoslav law as the law to govern the
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substance of the dispute on the grounds, inter alia„ that the arbitration clause
provided two possible fori. The arbitrator argued that as the parties expected
one law to apply but tx^o tribimals had jurisdiction> the parties could not have
intended the law of the place of arbitration to govern^.
This same problem can be even more clearly seen from an award of the Czechoslovak
arbitration tribunal^ at a time when the qui elegit iudicem presumption was part
of Czechoslovak private international law . The dispute arose out of a contract
for compensation trading requiring the Czechoslovak defendant to deliver lorries,
in accordance with the contract^to Morocco. The connecting factors were diverse;
one party, a Czechoslovak foreign trade enterprise, the other a Tangiers firm but
acting through its Paris office; the contract was made in Prague, though its
object was in Paris; performance was to be, inter alia, in Morocco» The
arbitrators began by looking to see if the applicable law had been chosen
expressis verbis or tacitly. The arbitrators
"considered that the contract of 1950 did not contain explicit
provisions on the applicable law and that the special letter signed
by the parties, when the contract was concluded, and dealing with
the competent jurisdiction in case of a difference arising, did not
either contain provision which might be considered as an implicit
choice. This letter contains the sentence "the jurisdiction to be
applied shall be that of the Court entertaining the difference."
But the same letter provides for the competence of the "Prague Court"
in case an action is brought against one of the parties and, in the
event'of the second contracting party bringing an action against the
first, it offers a choice between "the Paris Court and that of Tangiers",
The arbitrators were unable to consider this agreement as entailing
determination of the applicable law, for wheii the obligation arose,
the parties did not know whether a court and what court would try
the case. Determination of the applicable law must however be
done precisely when the contractual relation arises. It is impossible
for the parties to remain uncertain about the applicable law until
such time as legal proceedings may be brought: in this case, no
applicable law had been agreed to eliminate this uncertainty from the
outset"J
The ambiguous selection of an arbitration tribunal in more than one county left
the arbitrators little choice but to fall back on the Czechoslovak private
international law, No. 41/1948. The arbitrators thus classified the contract
as to the separate sales contract and, on the particular facts, applied the law
of the place of'the seller's head office, Czechoslovak law.
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185. In the case of a submission to a permanent arbitral institution, it again
cannot be irrebuttably implied that, the parties intended the law of the place where
the institution is situate to apply. With respect to the ICC or the ICSID, parties
come to these institutions because of their international and impartial character.
It cannot surely be suggested that a submission to ICC arbitration carries with it
a choice of French law to govern the substance of the dispute, merely because the
ICC headquarters are i.n Paris. As already noted^, although the wishes of the
parties as to the place of arbitration will always be respected, the ICC secretariat
will decide the question on the basis of administrative convenience and the
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convenience of the parties . Thus the Guide to ICC arbitration clearly states:
"Le lieu de 1'arbitrage est absolument independant du fait que le
si&ge de la Cour d'arbitrage est h. Paris. L'arbitre peut etre
appelg ^ sidger dans n'importe quelle ville et dans n'iiiporte quel
pays. "3
This must be so. The alternative could result in some totally irrelevant law
depriving the contract of effect. Assume the contract was illegal by the lav7 of
France, but perfectly lawful and unobjectionable by the law of the countries in
which the parties have their places of business, the "proper" law and (if it should
differ) the lex loci solutionis. Surely an arbitrator under the rules of the ICC
could not justifiably hold the contract invalid as contrary.to French law merely
on the basis of qui elegit iudicem elegit iusJ
• • AThis can be well illustrated from one ICC award in which a Dutch arbitrator
seized of a dispute between French and (Federal) German parties held the fact that
one of the parties '"a fait valoir, que le lieu de 1'arbitrage est Paris" to give
rise to no presumption whatever. Rejecting any inference from the place of
arbitration, the arbitrator stated:
"C'.est un indice auquel l'arbitre ne saurait attacher d' importance,
etant donne que la clause arbitrale ne pr^voit aucune lieu determine
de I'arbitrage, et que c'est la C9ur d'Arbitrage qui a fix^ le lieu
de 1' arbitrage."
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AFrench third arbitrator, sitting in Paris to hear an arbitration^ betx^een
Swiss and Spanish corporations arising out of a licence agreement, refused to
infer a choice of French law because "le lieu ou doit sieger le tribunal arbitral
gtant fixer par le CCI...."
In another award^ the arbitrator stated at the outset:
"qu'il convient tout d'abord d'eliminer la loi du for, lieu de
rattachement qui serait purement fortuit vu les dispositions des^
articles 7 alinga 3, et 18 du Riglement de Conciliation et d'Arbitrage."
Similarly, a Swiss arbitrator refused to treat a provision for arbitration in
Switzerland under the rules of the ICC "conime une professio juris." The contract,
made between an American citizen, resident and working in Paris, and a Panamanian
corporation, was for the former to be employed as President of the latter. Talking
of the law the parties intended to apply, the arbitrator found:
"qu'en signant, ^ I'ouverture d'un gtablissement commercial h Paris,
les parties, ressortissant du continent amdricain, n'entendaient pas
que I'activite du (demandeur) et ses rapports avec (le d^fendeur) fussent
rggis par le droit suisse, droit qu'elles ignoraient vraisemblement et
auquel elles n'ont pas pensg, ''L'election de for en Suisse avait pour
seul but de garantir que les contestations eventuelles seraient
dans un tiers pays par un arbitre Stranger aux Etats en cause"."^
(Emphasis added).
The arbitrator then resorted to the private international law rules of the
to determine the applicable law.
The importance of the place of the arbitration, as already pointed out,is that it
provides the possible.legal framework for the arbitration procedure . But as also
noted this procedure is primarily dependent on the agreement of the parties , It
may be that even after the place of the arbitration has been determined, whether by
the parties or by the ICC secretariat, the agreement of the parties can always
change the place of arbitration. ' Such a change could be made both for practical
as well as reasons of convenience. It must of course be recognised that the place
of arbitration (lieu d'arbitrage) does not necessarily correspond to the place where
8the' arbitration is actually being held.
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186, A choice of a national permanent arbitration institution may carry more
weight in support of the qui elegit iudicem presumption.' This could particularly
be argued xjith respect to the arbitration tribunals in the socialist countries,
or such similar institutions in the west which are restricted to conducting
the arbitration proceedings in one country (e.g. La-chambre arbitrale de Parisj
the London Court of Arbitration). But even this does not invariably mean the
parties are agreed or desire the law of that country to govern their relations.
The parties may have chosen the particular tribunal because of its experience,
its reputation or its neutrality. Thus in a dispute arising out of a contract
i ' ' ' "
.between a Italian and Swiss parties, the.FTAC in Moscow which had been expressly
i chosen by the parties did not even consider applying Soviet law to govern the
•substance of the dispute.^ Appreciating that it was chosen for its neutrality,
the Soviet FTAC applied its own private international law rules to determine
Italian law.as the applicable law. The inferences to-be drawn from every
submission can only be considered in the light of the circumstances in each
particular case. "
187. ' Another factor which decreases the persuasiveness of any choice of forum
presumption, is that the stipulated tribunal will often be seized due to the
stronger bargaining power of one party. Such extra bargaining strength may be
due to the size, financial resources, experience in the international business
. market, the greater needs of one of the parties or perhaps even the weaker
character or lesser negotiating skills of the parties' representatives. So when
arbitrators come to consider the applicable law to govern the basis of the dispute,
the fact that one of the parties used their superior "strength" to obtain the
particular arbitration clause may deprive that clause of any influence based on an
agreement between equals.
•
188. A similar situation exists where the contract is based on the "contract-type"
of one party and the contract-type contains an arbitration clause. Here the
arguments against the presumption are of course far weaker. One thinks here in
particular of charter-party contracts which invariably follow a similar pattern
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including a provision for arbitration in London, In the light of the special
place of London as a centre for maritime arbitration^ the presumption that the
parties intend English law to apply whilst strong is not irresistable, It is
presumed the "adhering" party has agreed to the terms of the contract. But even
so, what imputation the arbitration clause carries will differ from case to case.
Again it will be necessary to try to determine what the parties actually intended.
However, where one party has agreed to all the terms of the "contract-type", he
will have a heavy burden to show that he did not intend to agree to the inference
carried by the arbitration clause with respect to the law applicabl^e.
189. Furthermore, the arbitration provision may be the clause a.n tie contract to
which one party will agree with a minimum of argumentj saving his bargaining card
and retaining good-will - for the more constructive and important terms of the
contract. The businessman negotiating a contract is very much,more concerned
that there be provisions guaranteeing a fixed price, defining the respeci-ive
obligations of the parties, protecting him from the default of the other party,
and making provision for any unexpected occurrence i.e. force majeure^than the
existence of an arbitration clause. The arbitration agreement, at the time of
contracting, is certainly of very minor importance; Batiffol called it "un
Sl^ment purement eventuel." So where the parties have completed their
negotiations to their mutual' satisfaction and the contract is all but concluded,
the businessman is very reluctant to allow a provision for what he considers a
very unlikely eventuality to vitiate or even slow dovm the concluding of the
contract.
. .1(iil) Rational application of the qui elegit ludicem presumption
190, As the foregoing weaknesses in the application of qui elegit iudicem eiegit
ius have become apparent, the presumption has lost m.uch of its persuasive force.
Today the presumption is rarely relied on per se; what authority it retains is
only when combined with other factors. Of course it may be that the parties will
choose the arbitration forum and intend its law to apply-?- but then again that
intention might equally not exist. Where such an intention does exist the parties
are free :to and should indicate by means of a clear and unambiguous express choice
. .. ^ uuui4:j.
of law clause what that intention is. Where there is no express manifestation of
intention, the arbitrators will be left either to decide in the particular
circumstances of each case what the actual intention of the parties V7as\ or
alternatively5 to determine the "proper law" of the contract, treating the choice
of law forum as just another relevant factor to be considered for this purpose.
Eastern European Awards .
191, This change in emphasis with respect to qui elegit iudicem elegit ius is
clear from the doctrinal writings and the awards of the past few years. Thus
the Czechoslovak arbitration tribunal which had so completely resorted to the qui
elegit iudicem principle in the 1950's has more recently taken a very different
approach. , In one recent case^j a Czechoslovak buyer cam.e before the Prague
tribunal claiming damages from the Ethiopian seller, alleging the latter had
failed to deliver the agreed quality or quantity of linseed and niggerseed. When
discussing the question of the applicable law the arbitrators posed for themselves
the question "whether the submission to the jurisdiction of the arbitration court
of the Chamber of Commerce of Czechoslovakia in Prague entered into under the
respective contract is to be construed as a. choice of law done tacitly?"
The arbitrators refused to apply Czechoslovak law: rather they held Ethiopian
e
law to apply on the ground that the, contract was to be performed "without the
territory of the Czechoslovak Republic", the object of the contract was expressly
stated to be Ethiopian linseed and niggerseed and the purchase price was payable
2in pounds sterling . The award states:
"In the opinion of the arbitrators it is not possible to conclud'e under
these circumstances that the submission to the jurisdiction of the •
institutional arbitration court of the Chamber of Comm.erce of
Czechoslovakia could be regarded as a choice of the Czechoslovak law
done tacitly as it is impossible to maintain that in view of the
circumstances there is no doubt as to the. manifest will of the parties^
In these circumstances the arbitrator could not but determine the
governing law in accordance with the provisions of S. 10,of the Act
No. 37/1963', Conflict of Laws. ' The latter provisions refer to the
Ethiopian law as the law of the country where the seller has his
seat (domicile)".
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The arbitrator here based the choice of the applicable law on the 1963 Czechoslovak
law. As the parties intention was not clearly manifest, the arbitrators were
bound to weigh up all the relevant factors and on this basis found Ethiopian law
3
to be applicable.
192. ' The situation in the other socialist countries is much the, same. Lebedev
stated without any reservation "que la jurisprudence des tribunaux et des organes
arbitraux ne s'en tiennent pas au principe selon.lequel 'qui legit judices elegit
jus."^ The attitude of the Soviet arbitration tribunal in Oscar Meyer v .Cogis
is conclusive proof of this.
With respect to Romania, the choice of the place of arbitration will be considered
' . 3 . '
"of importance where it is supported by some other connecting factor . This can
be clearly seen from the award of the.Romanian arbitration tribunal in a dispute
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arising over the delivery of pig-iron by the Romanian seller to the Italian buyer .
The dispute arose out of the failure on the part of the buyer to open letters of
credit as agreed. Applying their own private international law rules to determine
the applicable law the arbitrators stated:
"La Commission estime qu'il existe des motifs sgrieux pour decider que
les parties ont entendu soumettre leurs rapports juridiques plutot h
la loi roumaine - qui correspond tant au lieu d'ex^cution qu'au si&ge
de la juridiction arbitrale - qu'^ la loi itali'enne qui ne correspond
qu'au lieu de la conclusion du contrat."^
The Bulgarian arbitration tribunal again will only consider the choice of arbitration
in Bulgaria if it is supported by other factors. One case^ concerned a contract
for the sale by a Lebanese seller of several thousand tons of cotton to a Bulgarian
buyer. The cotton was from the region of Izmir and delivery was to take place
in Izmir. The Bulgarian buyer failed to open letters of credit within the time
agreed and the seller resiled on the contract. The buyer brought his action for
damages. With respect to the law applicable the arbitrators stated;
U U U i ^ J
"Considgrant ces figments internationaux bien contradictoires> qui
rattachent le contrat h. diff^rents pays (soit la Bulgarie, la Turquie,
le Liban) 5 la Cour arbitrale estj.me qu'il ne sera tenu compte de la
volont^ des parties qua si I'on attribue un rfile preponderant
certains de ces indices h savoir: (1) le lieu de la conclusion du
contrat, (2) celui de la destination de la marchandise, (3) celui enfin,
• ou il a ete convenu que les litiges eventuels devront etre tranche^.
La Cour retient ces indices et le contrat s'av^re par consequent
rattache au droit materiel bulgarco. Pour c&nclure en ce sens, la Cour
a ggalement retenu que la modification du contrat est intervenue elle
aussi ^ Sofia, lieu de sa conclusiouo Elle constate encore que les
obligations r^ciproques (celle de livrer la marchandise et celle d'en ,
payer le prix) devaient en effet §tre execut^es h des lieux differents
(la livraison ^ Izmir, le payement. k Beyrouth)".^
The International Court of Arbitration for Maritime and Shipping Matters at
Gdyniaj Poland, alsp counted in the chosen place for arbitration when determining
8
the law which the parties would have wanted to govern their relations. The
arbitrators held Polish law applicable
"compte Stant tenu du fait que la procedure se deroule en Pologne, que
I'armateur en tant qu'entrepreneur est un sujet de droit polonais, et
qu'il a son sifege en Pologne et enfin que la navire bat pavillion
polonaiso"^
Finally, despite the claims of Goldstajn^^ and Lunz^^,there is only one reported
1? ,
case " in which the Yugoslav arbitration tribunal has resorted to the qui elegit
iudicem presumption. On the basis of that 1960 award alone, it cannot be
suggested that the presumption forms any rigid or definite rule in the choice of
law practice of the Yugoslav tribunal; it is like elsewhere just another factor
to be considered.
Professor Skapski in his Hague lectures summed up the contemporary standing in
the socialist countries of the qui elegit iudicem presumption in the following
words;
"II en est de m§me avec le principe connu du droit anglais qui elegit
iudicem elegit ius, qui n'est pa^s reconnu dans les pays socialistes.
Le choix de la juridiction n'est pas automatiquement considere- comme
Equivalent au choix de la loi en viguer au siSge du tribunal ou de
I'arbitrage. Tout au plus il peut servir d'indice, ^ c6te d'autres
circonstances, ^ la reconnaissance du choix tacite de la lex fori."
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ICC Awards -
193. The same development is clear in the awards of the ICC. In an award^
between New York and French corporations concerning an exclusive licensing
concession granted for France, the Dutch arbitrator applied French law as the
proper law because "the agreement was in the first place to be executed in France,
and ..... differences between the parties have to be decided by arbitration in
Paris."
' 2 • . . ' 'Again, in another case >the two French plaintiffs granted to the Swiss defendant
the exclusive right to use their patent, including the right to sub-licence. The
defendant was to pay an agreed percentage of the profit to the plaintiffs, but
such payments were always to amount to a minimum of $10,000 per annum. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had not sufficiently exploited the patent
and claimed damages amounting to $50,000. The plaintiffs requested an award ex
aequo et bono; the defendant wanted the award based'on law. Having stated his
inability to act as an "amiable compositeur^in the absence of the agreement of the
3parties the arbitrator continued:
"Attendu que, en effet, que le contrat, donnant lieu au present
arbitrage a et^ signi ^ Paris et que les parties ont fait Election
au si&ge de CGI a Paris;
"Attendu que, il doit, dans ces conditions, Stre presume qu'elles
ont voulu se soumettre ^ la loi ffancaise."
X
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An interesting case was one where the arbitrators, (one French, one Italian and
one Belgian), had to determine the law to govern a contract for the importation
of goods into France, made between an Italian- seller and a French importer. All
the factors were equally divided between Italy and France. They decided finally
to apply Italian law because other than the fact that the parties had expressly
provided that the arbitration take place in Rome, there was no other more realistic
way to determine which law the parties wanted applied^.
0 n n 14 7
3. Implied Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration Today
194. What conclusions then can be assumed v/ith respect to implied choice? It
would appear that in international arbitration an implied choice of law will be
recognised and respected. However this can only be to the extent where that
implication through the facts and circumstances give a very clear indication of
the parties' intention. The criticism levelled above, that it is not possible in
the absence of an express choice for arbitrators to be absolutely certain what the
parties actually intended when contracting, remains. The confusion will be even
i • • ' • • '
greater where the parties are both before the arbitrators, each arguing for the
application of a different system of law. For this reason, the burden of proving .
an implied choice of law is a particularly heavy one and falls on the party
illeging its existence. Only if that burden has been proved to the satisfaction
of the arbitrators v/ill they apply the law "impiedly chosen". So, if an
arbitrator feels such an implied intention does exist and has been manifested he
will no doubt give it effect. However, the level of this burden of proof and
the difficulty of satisfying it, is clear from the very few awards in which the
arbitrators have determined the applicable law on the basis of an implied choice
alone.
195. As will be seen, the recent tendancy in the international arbitration
•arena - as in domestic private international law systems - has been towards a
grouping of contacts for the choice of law. Whilst party autonomy is a choice
of law rule which has attained a sufficient degree of international acceptance
to have become an international rule , the same is not true in practice for
implied autonomy. The implied choice of law is a branch of party autonomy and
as such must also be accepted as a limb of-the international rule. Nevertheless,
not supported by the logic ajid•simplicity fundamental to express choice, the
burden of proving the existence of an implied choice is naturally a heavy one.
The preference has developed from practice and convenience to consider any factor(s)
indicating an implied choice of law into the melting pot together with all the
other factors normally considered when determining the "otherwise applicable law."
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Frequently it will be found that the factor(s) indicating an implied choice will
point to the same law as those other factors. In such cases it will not be
necessary for the arbitrators to decide which choice of laxr? rule to apply: there
will be a "false conflict"^ as the conflict rules will both (or all) lead to the
same result. Only where the "impliedly chosen law" differs from the "otherwise
applicable law" will it be necessary for the arbitrator to make a positive choice
of law.
.196» Where there is a true conflict, i.e. the implied choice and the othen^ise
applicable law differ, the arbitrators will have to decide themselves which law
to apply. It is not possible to state a general rule or even general guidelines
to apply in every such situation. There are insufficient awards dealing
exclusively with this problem for any general practice to have become apparent.
I-That does appear to emerge from the awards - and this surely must be the only
solution - is that arbitrators will in each case determine just how strong the
particular implication is, and whether it is sufficient to outweigh the "other
wise applicable law." So e.g., where all the factors point to the law of State
X, but the agreement is drafted in the language of State Y, the arbitrators may
consider the implied choice of the law of Y too remote to outweigh all the other
factors pointing to the law of X. On the other hand, where the factors point
to the law of more than one State, and there is an arbitration clause, the
arbitrator may feel in the circumstances it would be right to apply the law of
the chosen place for the arbitration^. Furthermore, and this is of great
assistance to an arbitrator, when looking at the connecting factors indicating an
implied choice of law, the arbitrators will take into consideration the usages of
a particular trade and/or the expectations of those participating in that business
or industry. Thus e.g. a clause in a shipping contract providing for arbitration
2in London will carry a stronger presumption for choice of law than a clause
providing for "arbitration at the ICC in Paris" in a general sales contract or
a clause for ICSID arbitration in an investment contract.
PART II
DETERMINATION OF Tlffi APPLICABLE LAW
- BY THE ARBITRATORS
197, However desirable it may be that the parties expressly make a provision
in their contract as to the law applicable there are many reasons why, despite
the advice of their legal advisers, they wj.Il either fail or decide to do so.
As already pointed out in many respects the choice of law clause to a
businessman is a question of minor importance. He is more concerned with the
commercial clauses dealing with the actual substance of the contract. I\liat
might appear of great importance to the lawyer is of minimal importance to the
businessman. \<Jhilst the businessman thinks of commercial certainty his lav;yer,
somewhat more negatively, thinks of possible eventualities.
For this reasons the businessman may be reluctant, having completed what he
considers a commercially sound contract, to vitiate all his v7ork merely
because of.the inability of the parties to agree on the law to govern. In
such cases businessmen may either agree to leave the question for the time-being,
or perhaps if anticipating difficulty will merely refrain from discussing it.
Rather they will leave the matter to be dealt with if and when any dispute
should arise.
198. There are in any case practical reasons why for certain types of
contract parties may be ill-advised to express a choice of law. For example,
with respect to a long term joint venture- contract, particularly in
easjt-^est tr^ade or trade with the developihg V7orld, there will often be no
one legal system sufficiently sophisticated and developed to dealjwith the
many and various intricate aspects invoIved_in_,suc.h a^.,cantract. Furthermore,
in the political instability of the present, parties may I'lOt wish to tie
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their relations to the law of any particular StatSo Instead they prefer to
draft their contract in clear and very detailed form and remain mute with
respect to the law applicable. In this situation they will know that in the
event of a dispute arising the rights and obligations, under their contract
will be construed by arbitrators who as experienced businessmen and commercial
ia\jyers, would apply the general principles of law, relevant commercial usap,
good business sense and conraiercial bona fides.^
Of course another reason, perhaps the most common, why parties may not
express a choice of law is simply that they either forgot when looking at
all the other questions, or they just did not think of it.
199„ Whatever their reasoning, if the parties have failed to indicate,
expressly or impliedly, what law (or other yardstick) they wish should govern
their contract, the arbitrators will have to decide the question.of the
applicable law themselves. Until such time as they have decided this question,
the arbitrators v/ill be unable to measure.the parties' respective legal rights
and obligations under the contract. As often the determination of the
applicable law v/ill in itself be sufficient to give an answer to the dispute,
the vital importance of how the arbitrators actually resolve a conflict of
laws is obvious^.
200o Of course it is essential, before any tribunal need attempt to resolve
a particular conflict of laws, that a conflict be established. If neither
party suggests a conflict and both argue on the basis of the same legal system,
«
or if no question of law is involved, the arbitrators will not have to determine
the law to apply. So, in an'ICG award rising out of the breach of a license,
agreement between Swiss and French companies the arbitrators held:
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"Ainsi qu'il apparattra ci-apres^ les rapports juridiques
entre les parties sont entierement r^gis par ce qui.a ete ^
convenu entre elles. Ni. I'une ni I'autre des deux parties
n'a invoqtje aucune disposition de loi susceptible de limiter
ou de comple'ter ce qui avait et^' convenu. II n'y a done
auGun motif pour d^cide^quej., est ,,le ^sys.teme_ ji^id
(suissKj frangais cu autre) qui r^git le rapport contractuel
entre les parties,"^
There being no question of law in dispute, there was no need for the arbitrators
to determine the law applicable and they decided ,the dispute entirely on the
facts.
However, it must be conceded, in certain arbitrations and particularly those
before the arbitration tribunals in the socialist countries, a determination
of the law to govern the substantive dispute will be made, even though it be
quite unnecessary and there be no question of law in dispute.
201, But where there is a genuine conflict of lax-fs the problem arises as to
how the arbitrators should determine the applicable law. Should they attempt
to subjectively determine what the parties would have chosen had they considered
the q;uestion? Should they objectively determine what reasonable businessmen in
the situation would have intended? Is there some pre-determined choice of law
presumption to which they can resort? Or is there some other way of determining
the law to apply?
202. Within a national court the solution is prima facie quite simple; ^he
judge will apply the private international law rules of the forum. Indeed,
a judge.in a national court is obliged to adhere to the conflict of laws rules
in his country. After all, the forum conflict of laws rules are just as binding
on the judge as any other forum law. National conflict of laws rules, like most
other forum rules, have been developed through the legislative and judicial
systems of each country. Thus Dr, Schmittnoff writes.
"The rules pertaining to the conflict of laws . are not of. an
international character, but form part of the national law of a
country and are enforceable in the same manner as the rules of any
other branch of lavj prevailing in that country.
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203c An international arbitration tribimalj unlike a national courts has
neither its own mandatorily applicable conflict of laws rules 5 nor any other
conflict of laws rules to direct it to the applicable law. The arbitrators
thus find themselves in the unenviable position of having to resolve a conflict
of laws problem in a vacuum. Unlike judges thej^ do not have their ovm conflict
of laws rules and yet as international arbitrators they may still have to
determine the lav? to apply.
Of courses the rules of some permanent arbitration institutions do provide
in themselves certain choice of law provisions. So for example, article 29
of the Rules of the Court of Arbitration at the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade
-provides;
"The tribunal shall apply that country's law, which has been
chosen by agreement of the partiesj. and in absence of such
choice, the law which in the opinion of the tiribunal' is most
clearly connected with the relation of parties in litigation.
The tribunal shall take into consideration the principles of
equality and of customs in so far as they are permitted by the
proper law."^
Again, article 12 of the Rules of Arbitration for the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of Amsterdam similarly provides;
"The arbitrator or the arbitrators shall conscientiously
give an award in fairness, unless parties have stated at
the outset of the arbitration, that they wish the award to ,
be issued according to the rules of law."^
In this case the basic standard is the arbitrators notion of "fairness"
except where the parties expressly indicate that they wish the award to be
based on the law. In this latter eventuality, no help is given (other than
presumably autonomy) as to how the arbitrators shoud determine the applicable
law.
1 S'S
The arbitration rules of the London and the Bradford Chairi)ers of Coraraerce
in similar terminology impose clearly on the arbitrators a duty to observe
and apply English law; however^ they do allow the escape of an expressed
alternative agreement. It is thus provided by Rule 8 (h) of the Bradford
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Bules:
"Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, in ^.ny reference to
arbitration under these Rules, the law governing the contract;,
agreement or matter in dispute and the Arbitration Agreement if
not included in the said Contract and the validity, construction
and performance thereof, shall be English lawJ'J
Similarly narrow choice of law provisions - if they can be called clioice
of lax-7 provisions at all ~ are contained in the arbitration rules of certain
coraraodity institutions in,England. So the Rules relating to Arbitration of
the Sugar Association of London provide in Article 406t
"For the purpose of all proceedings in arbitration, the contract
shall be deemed to have been made in England, any correspondence
in reference to the offer, the acceptance, the place of payment
or otherx'jise notv^ithstanding, and England shall be regarded as the
place of performance. Disputes shall be settled according to the
law of England v7herever the domicile, residence or place of business
of the parties to the contract may be or become."
Rule 194 of the Coffee Trade Federation Arbitration Rules makes identical
provision.
Regretably most arbitration tribunals do not give any indication as to th^e
law or other yardstick to be applied by their arbitrators. In the main,
those provisions which do exist are statements as to. the law or non-legal
yardstick to be applied and appear to leave little discretion to the parties
or the arbitrators. Thus, with respect to the latter standard, article 12 (1)
/
of the Arbitration Rules of the Netherlands Coffee Trade Association provides
that "arbitrators sKall give their award like good men and true". Similarly
Article 8 (4) of the Netherl'ands' Oils, Fats and Oilseeds Trade Association
Rules for Arbitration provides that "arbitrators shall give their av/ard as
,.4
good men in equity.
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204o Hov/everj where on the other hand the tribunal's rules do not contain
any provision as to the applicable law, or of course where the arbitration is
ad hoc» the arbitrators are really on their own in determining the law to
apply. Two main solutions have been advocated in this respect; the arbitrators
must resort to either some existing national conflict of lai^s system, or
alternatively can apply international conflict of laws rules. However, is it
necessary for arbitrators to apply any conflict of laws system? V7ould it not
be preferable for them to make a direct choice of the national law or other
standard which their conmon sense and commercial experience suggest to be
most appropriate for the particular circumstances?
We shall divide the ensuant discussion into three sections. In section one
we shall consider the application by arbitrators of some system of private
international lav:. Then, in section two, we will look at the various legal
and extra-legal standards directly applied by arbitrators vjithout resort to
any rules of private international law. Finally, in section three,v?e will
consider what restrictions are imposed on arbitrators b'y the doctrine of
public policy.
SECTION lo' APPLICATION BY TIE ARBCTRA.TORS OF A SYSTEM OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW
CHAPTER I. THE APPLICATION OF A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
205, Despite its origin as a "supra-national and its "notoriously
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misleading name" , private international law is not international : it
differs from country to country and is only enforceable within a given
territory to the extent that the law of that territory so provides 4 Even
with the many efforts aimed at unification and internationalisations•"every
system of private international law is a system of national law" o Hence it
is only within national law that conflict of laws rules effective and
appropriate for international cotnmerce have been developed.
206,, The problem for every arbitrator is^o which national system of conflict
of laws he should refer. Should he apply the conflict rules of the place
where the arbitration institution has its headquarters? Or the place where the
arbitration tribunal has its seat? Or the rules of the place where the
arbitration is actually held? Should the nationality or domicile or residence
of the sole or third arbitrator be relevant in determining the national
conflict of laws system to apply? Or perhaps the conflict of laws system of
the country in which one (or both) of the parties had his permanent place of
business or was a national or v/as, resident should be applied?
207. Three main proposals have been put fon-7afd as to the national private
international law system to be referred to in an international arbitration.
They are:
- that expressly, chosen by the parties;
~ that impliedly chosen by the parties; and
- that of the "loi du siege d'arbitrage".
VJe shall consider each of these in turn.
••>,156.
A. The System of Pirivate International La\. Ex-pressly Chosen by the Parties
1. THEORY
208. The simplest solution is undoubtedly for arbitrators to apply a
conflict of laws system chosen by the parties. This of course alleviates the
arbitrators from the burden of selecting themselves the conflict of laws -
system to.apply. It equally will exclude the parties subsequently alleging
that some irrelevant or partial conflict of la.ws system was appl^d.
We have seen that party autonomy is today fundamental to and "taken for
granted"^ in international arbitration. If parties can select the law to
govern the substance of their relations, they must surely also be entitled
to select the conflict of laws system which V70uld indicate to the arbitrators
the law to govern . Though somewhat indirect, the choice of conflict system
or rules to be applied manifests the intentions and expectations of the parties,
The application of the chosen conflict system is consequently little more than
a recognition of the autonomy of the parties.
Furthermore, it is today "generally admitted that the will of the parties can
arrange the arbitral procedure." The appointment of the arbitrators, the
times, place and mode of hearing, the method and time-limits for entering and
answering pleadings, the taking of evidence, the burden of proof, etc.^are all
dependant initially on the will of the parties; equally the parties may
determine the conflict of laws system to be applied. Any agreement on these
matters must be respected; failure to do so could result in the arbitrators
being disseized or the award being unenforceable.
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209. limitati^ to the right of parties to themselves select the
conflict of laws system or rules to be appliedj may arise in the arbitration
tribunals'of the socialist countries. The very strong connection betX'jeen the
arbitration institution and the State in the socialist countries^ has resulted
in the invariable practice in all those countries for arbitrators to apply
the private international law rules of the country to which the tribunal
belongs^. Thus one commentator stated, "all the arbitration commissions
" • . 3 • •
apply the conflict of law rules according to the lex foriJ'
It would coiisequently appear that a choice of conflict of laws rules, other
than those of the forum, would present a socialist arbitration tribunal with
an unenviable dilemma. Assume that the parties submit their dispute to a
socialist arbitration tribunal (e.g. the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission in Moscow), and at the same time, expressly chose a different
conflict of lax<rs system to apply (e.g. English conflict rules). The tribunal
would be faced with three alternatives; firstly, to accept jurisdiction on
the parties* conditions; secondly, to refuse absolutely to accept jurisdiction;
or thirdly, to accept jurisdiction but to refuse to give effect to the^choice
of"English conflict rules.
•' The second possibility would be the easiest and the,cowards v/ay out;
it would be to deny the parties the services of the tribunal which they
have mutually chosen and in which they have both expressed confidence.^ The
third possibility is to deny the notion that arbitration is based, organised
and run in accordance with the wishes of the parties, and in the process
would deny to the parties their right to regulate the conduct of the
arbitration.^ It would have the further effect of denying -the parties the
right recognised under Soviet lav/ to choose the lav/ to govern their
relations.^ It must be remembered that failure or refusal to adhere to
the instructions of the partie^, would subsquently be grotmds to refuse
to enforce the award.
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The first possible solution is the preferred, as iir that way the wishes of
the parties can be given effect in accordance with the flexibility funda
mental to arbitration. However, whether the' tribunal would accept the sub
mission at all, will depend on the extent to which the FTAG would consider
itself bound to the rules of Soviet private international law. There is,
however, no known case where this exact problem has been confronted.
210. Illogicality of the parties choosing the conflict of laws syst^.
Whatever the legality of the choice of conflicts system to apply,
contracting parties would be better advised to devote their energies to
J
the selection of the substantive law to be applied. If the parties are
able to agree on the substantive law to govern their contract, it is
preferable that they do so directly, with an express, clear
and unambiguous choice of the law to govern their Qontract= To indicate
the law which the parties v;ish should govern by means of or through the ,
application of a given system or a particular rule of the conflict of laws
. is both cumbersome and haphazards
Before choosing a particular national law to govern a contract, the parties
(or at least their advisers) will be, or will make "themselves, conversant
v/ith the possibly relevant provisions of that lawo Presumably, the parties
and/or their advisers will undertake- some research into the particular law
and will give much thought to the implications, arising there-from, before
proposing or agreeing to the application• of that particulsjr lav/o This
problem is particularly acute and far more complicated- where the agreement
concerns^an involved and highly technical long-term trans-national contract,
involving several parties of different nationalities, witn elements touching
several different countries axd involving several different legal problems,
perhaps with differing dimensions. If parties wish to select the conflict
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of laws rules to apply, tliey must not only research the various laws to
decide which they desire should be applied-, but they must also research v,'hich
system of conflict of laws will lead to the-application of the law they wish
to' govern their contract« The latter will often be extremely difficult bearing
in mind how frequently conflict of laws systems are uncertain or ambiguous,...
Even where the parties have' done the requisite research, the choice of
applicable law to be given effect through or via a chosen system of conflict
of laws could be aborted by 3Ji unforseen, unexpected or bizare qlassification
of; the dispute. The arbitrators may thus apply to the substantive dispute the
law designated by the chosen conflict system in accordance with their
classification though not the same law as that intended and expected by the
partieso
2. PRACTICE
211. Perhaps it is for the foregoing reasons that in this study, no '
arbitration awards have been found in which the parties have made an express
choice of the conflict of laws system or choice of law rules to be appliedc
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B.• The'System of Private Ineefhatiorial Lav?''Impliedly' Chosen By'tbe Parties
1. . ; THEORY
212, The right of parties to choose the system of conflict of laws^to,be
applied can also be considered to extend to implied choice. If the intentions
of the parties as to the law to govern their relations can be implied, there can
be little reason why a similar extension should not be given to the right of the
parties to choose the conflict of laws system to govern their relations. The
conflict of laws rules 'impliedly* chosen are determinable from the facts and
circumstance.,' of each case. Thus it is from the form and content of the
arbitration agreement that the arbitrators will determine the legal system which
the parties intended to govern the arbitration^ and naturally the conflict of
laws rules of that system as well.
213. But .what is meant by. an implied, choice of the ^nflietS_.of laws system to appj
The most obvious examples are where parties agree that the arbitration -shall
take place in a particular country and/or under a particular legal system or in
accordance with the arbitration provisions of a particular law. So, for example,
a provision that arbitration proceedings shall be held in Sweden could enable
the arbitrators to infer a desire on the part of the parties for Swedish conflict •
rules to be applied. Again a provision that the arbitration agreement be
construed and interpreted and the arbitration proceedings conducted in accordance
with English law may be considered a manifestation of the intention that English
conflict of laws rules be applied. And again, a provision for arbitration'to
take place under the rules of e.g. the Court of Arbitration at the Polish
Chamber of Foreign Trade can be thought to show a choice of Polish private
international lax'/ rules. ' • • '
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214, However, can it really be suggested that the parties 'impliedly intended'
that particular conflict of laws rules be applied ? After all, few businessmen
even know what is meant by conflict of laws rules; and those that do will .
rarely appreciate when and how such rules are applied. If the parties had
thought of it and had been so minded, no doubt they would have expressly chosen
the conflict of laws rules to be applied. They having expressed no intention as
to the applicable law there is neither logical nor sensible reason to justify an
'assumption' that the parties intended the application of a particular conflict
of laws system.^
215. Despite the foregoing there have been cases in which arbitrators have
attributed to the actual agreement of the parties an. implied choice of conflict
rules» We shall consider separately arbitration ad hoc, under the rules of the
ICC and at the national arbitration institutions.
2. PRACTICE
a) Ad Hoc Arbitration
216. A choice of the private international lavr rules to be applied was
inferred in. the Alsing Case^. The dispute arose out of a 28 year contract
made in 1926 under which the Swedish plaintiffs were granted "the exclusive
provisioning of any quantity of matches necessary for the Greek (Government)
2
Bionopoly .... and for the consumption of the country in general". This
contract was made simultaneous to and in. part consideration for a £1 million
loan to the Greek State repayable over 28 years at 82% interest. The contract
contained provision for disputes arising out of the contract to be resolved
by two arbitrators sitting in Greece; and if they were unable to agree, then
by an umpire of Swiss or Dutch nationality. At the end of the 28 year period
the loan had not been paid off. The plaintiff argued inter ^lia
i • ^I ^
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(i) that as the contracts had been suspended during the second world v;ar and
(ii) that as the two contracts were inter-linked, their concession to
supply the Greek monopoly with matches should be extended for the period of
time lost due to the war and/or until the loan was paid off.
The arbitrators were unable to agree and Monsieur Python, President of the
Swiss Federal Tribunal, was invited and agreed to act as umpire. In
determining the proper law, he looked to Greek private international law,
explaining himself in the following words;
"The arbitration proceedings having been carried out in Greece
in conformity with the arbitration clause found in Article 10
of the supply contract, it is Greek private inte-mational law,
as 'lex fori', which must be used to determine the applicable
law. It is true that the parties submitted, in case of .
disagreement between the two arbitrators appointed, to the
decision of a Swiss or Dutch umpire. But in so doing they
did not agree that, at this stage of the arbitration proceedings,
the law to be applied should be redeterrained according to the
rules followed by the judge newly called upon to settle the
dispute without appeal, and whose nationality was not yet certain.
It is not conceivable that in the same trial the law to be applied'
to the main issue could possibly change during the course of it."^
Thus the choice of Greece as the country in which the arbitration proceedings
V7ere to take place was held to be a choice of Greek private international law.
It is submitted that this implication was" unjustifiable; Greece was chosen for
reasons of convenience and not because of a desire on the part of the parties
to submit to Greek private international law. The Umpire himself sat in the
Swiss Canton of Vaud. Furthennore, the Umpire declined to apply either Swiss
or Greek law to govern the arbitration procedure« Relying on the Geneva Protocol
on Arbitration Clauses of 1923, the Umpire held Greek procedural law to be
inapplicable because the tribunal was not- sitting in Greece , and Swiss law
was subsidiary to the procedure agreed upon by the parties« Monsieur Python
stSjted:
1"o... according to the Protocol, the territorial law applies only
in a subsidiary faGhion, in the absence of pi-ovision made by the
parties and the arbitrators appointed by them« In this respect
the rules of procedure agreed upon by the parties are the only
ones valid here .... Indeed, in international arbitration under
the Protocol, even the imperative provisions of the internal law
must give way to the will of the parties ' As for the procedure
applicable to the inquiry and to the decision, the umpire, exercising
the power conferred upon him by the parties and, in view of the
fact that, in the present stage of the proceedings, the case falls
within the exclusive competence of a Swiss Federal judge exercising
his powers in Switzerland, decides to apply the federal law of
civil procedure to all questions not governed by the rules agreed
by the parties
Logically, following the Umpire's reasoning, Swiss private international law
should have been applied. Howeverj the question of the law applicable was
resolved in favour of Greek law on the basis of party autonomy. The plaintiffs
were ultimately held unable to succeed.
217. The provision in a contract for arbitration to be ad hoc in a
particular country does not manifest any intention as to the conflict of laws
rules to be applied. Whatever reasons induce parties to choose a particular
country as the place where the arbitration be hald ~ its neutrality, its
geographic or climatic conveniences or even perhaps because the arbitrator is
resident there - it is certain the merits or sophistication of the conflict
of laws system of that country will have had little if any infl,uenca. It is
highly unlikely that even the most conscientious la^^ryers would investigate the
conflict of laws system of a country before agreeing to that country being
selected as the place of arbitration. It is surely onlj'' in extremely rare
cases that the parties will actually have.thought of in advance and will intend
the conflict of laws rules of the place of arbitration to be applied.
t
S 4.
Arbitration
218, A submission to ICC arbitration is an attempt to avoid the procedural
and other restrictions in all national legal systems: this includes a desire
to avoid national conflict of laws rules. Howeverj the ICC does have its
permanent headquarters in Paris, Can a provision in a contract for ICC
arbitration be considered to imply a choice of French conflict of laws rules?
That the ICC has its permanent headquarters in Paris does not mean that the
arbitration will take place in France; indeed x^e have alreadj!" considered many
ICC awards.made elsewhere than in France. The arbitration will be held in
aplace agreed between the parties, or where they are not agreed will be fixed
by the ICC secretariat in accordance with the practicalities of the particular
case, and the convenience of the arbitrators, the parties and itself^. This
situation does not provide an adequate connection or sufficient stability for
any implication to be drawn as to the national conflict of laws rules to be
applied0 Furthermore> regardless of where the proceedings are initially heldj
subject to the agreement of the parties and/or the decision of the arbitratorsj
the place of the arbitration may be held, with the effect that different stages
of the proceedings would be held in different countries. Is it to be suggested
that the conflict of laws rules change with each move?
Nonetheless there are ICC awards in which a choice of conflict of laws rules
2
appears to have been implied .
219, In one 1958 case^ a dispute arose between four private individuals, two
joint plaintiffsj one American and one French, and two joint defendants divided
similarly as concerns nationality, parties to a contract for the manufacture and
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distribution of films, gramaphone recorcs and television shows all over the
world. The sole arbitrator appointed by the ICC was a respected and well
kno\m English Q.C. In discussing the law^to^be applied the arbitrator said
"The first question is under what system-of law must ,this'issue be decided:
' (1) Having regard to the fact that the contract was signed in France
^ and contains an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in
Paris, the law applicable in this arbitration is French law -•
being the law which the parties indicated as being the law
applicable.
(2) This raises the question of whether under French law the law of
'any other country would be applied- The two possible laws are
English and American.
(a) As to English law, the only element is that the contract is
in English. Othen^ise, the contract has no special connection
with England. Therefore, under the rules of French Private
International Law, English law does not apply to the validity
or interpretation of this contract.
(b) • As to American law there is the fact that two of the parties
one on each side, M. B and M. C are American and'there is
reference in the contract to payment in dollars. - these
are not sufficient facts as to lead to the application _
of American law further there is no such law as American
law but only the law of some State of the United States and
there is nothing in the contract to indicate one State more
than another. For these reasons "American" law is not
•applicable.
• ' (3) The law applicable is therefore internal French law because the
rules of French Private International Lav7 do not demand the
application of any foreign law in the circum-stances of the_cas^
'and all the main favors in the contract, such as the place V7here
the contract was signed and the place where the arbitration is to
be held - in both cases Paris - and reference to French currency
indicate the application of French internal law. ^ The lav/
' applicable is, as the defendants contended in a note Annex IV,
French lav/." (Emphasis added).
From a literal interpretation, of the first paragraph quoted above it would
appear that the arbitrator had decided that French law governed on the basis
of the .Mi ele.it ludlcem eUgit jus principle. However as can be seen from the
facts a proper law approach would also have been quite satisfactory and led to
tile same result. Bhat does seem a Uttle strange - and contrary to all views of
. renvoi^ - was the reading of the choice of French law as Including the French
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rules of private international law. Nevertheless, whatever the reasons, it is
clear that despite a factual situation in vjhich the contract was most closely-
connected with France, the arbitrator still felt it necessary to go through the
motions of determining the law to govern. Applying French private international
law rules on the fictional basis of their having been chosen by the parties, the
arbitrator came to conclude that French law was the law of the contract because
neither English nor American law were applicable under the rules of French, private
international lawI \
220. This concept can be further seen from an award between a Svjiss merchant •
and a Bulgarian State trading corporation^» In that case, the sole French
arbitrator held that by agreeing to ICC arbitration in France and with a
Frenchman as sole arbitrator, the parties had agreed to French law to govern
every aspect of the arbitration proceedings, and this obviously includes French
private international law rules.
"Les parties sont d'accord pour considerer que le droit frangaxs
. est applicable, tant pour la procedure que ^our le fond du droit. Les
parties se sont declarers d'accord sur la designation d'un arbitre unique
' frangais".
As this arbitration involved only the capacity of drying machines and the
defendant's obligation to pay for them, the choice of French private international
I
law rules was of no practical importance.
221. In ICC arbitration neither the place where the institution has its
permanent headquarters nor the venue of the actual proceedings can ba
considered indicative o£ any intention o£ the parties. Any inferences to be
drawn must he based on an expressed desire that the arbitration proceedings
be Jield in a given country.
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In .every case arbitrators muat thus deteraine whether the choice of a
particular city as the place of arbitration also carries with it an implied
choice of the procedural and private international law rules of that place.
The burden of proving the existence of such an intention is a heav>'- one which
should be supported by some other considerationsc One award in X'lhich an
arbitrator found the existence of such an intention was where the parties had
agreed on ICC arbitration to take place in Zurich. Andre Panchaud,'the
respected judge of the Swiss Federal Court v;as appointed the sole arbitrator.
He said when'discussing the law to apply to the parties' contractual
obligation;^
"Si I'on se refeVe a la volont^ des parties, on s'en tiendra au droit
suisse en tant que lex fori, I'arbitre ayant ete' design^^en, vertu •
d'une clause comproramissoire qui soumet la contestation a la
connaissance de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale en Suisse
(art. XVI du contrat du 11 fevrier 1952)."^
c) National Arbitration Institutions
222. These institutions not only have their permanent headquarters and
secretariat in one country but also arbitration proceedings under their rules
are invariably held in that satie country. ^iJhen submitting to such institutions
parties must accept to conform to the rules or charter of that institution. Such
rules or charter may contain specific conflict of laws provisions to regulate
1
•a conflict situation ^ or alternativelymay provide that a given system of
2
conflict rules be applied in a conflict situation « However, where there is
no help in the institutions' rules or charter arbitrators may naturally be
greatly tempted to apply those conflict rules thej' knov? best, their oxra; that
will often mean the conflict of laws rules of the place where the arbitration
proceedings are being held or where the arbitration institution is situated.
K,t surprisingly, because of the Uen between permanent arbitration Institutions
and the country where they are situate, and the natural, tendancy for arbitrators
to favour their om law, an argument akin to the qui eleglt iudicem presumption
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has developed vjith respect to the procedural and conflict of laws-rules to
apply. In this context it is contended the presumption has greater merit
than it has in the area in which it is normally considered. l"Jhere parties
submit to a permanent national arbitration institution, there is some support
for the contention that they accept and adopt all the machinery normally applied by
that institution: perhaps it was for exactly that purpose - and to avoid the
machinery of their respective national courts - that they chose to submit to
that tribunal. The machinery of the arbitration tribunal includes, where
appropriate, the local conflict of lax^s rules to which the tribunal may resort.
On the other hand hox^ever, the adoption of any rigid formula' could have the
effect of negating the parties' purpose of submitting to arbitration, i.e. to
avoid the strictures of the normal court systtm, including the rigid application
of a particular con.flict of laws system. . Whatevet the content of the rules or
charter of the particular arbitration institution seized, and whatever the lien
between the instition seized and the State in which it is situate, it is submitted-
the needs of international trade require that arbitrators treat both the rules
of the arbitration institution and of the State more as principles of
guidance rather than as fixed, rigid and mandatorily applicable rules.
It is necessary here to look separately at the choice of conflict of laws
rules to be implied in a submission to a national arbitration institution in
(i) western and in (ii) socialist countries.
(i) Western tribunals
223. As already noted, arbitration institutions in the market economy countries
are generally created by business men to serve their needs. The State in which
the'y were created and in which they normally act was neither instrumental nor
involved in the creation of the institution. The permission of the State to
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create an arbitration institution is invariably unnecessary. Such institutions
are thus private, totally independent and non-national. In consequence, there
is little, if any, lien between the local State and the arbitration tribunal;
"they 'do not have a lex fori and are not bound to the strictures of the law of
the place where they are situate. Arbitrators appointed .under the rules of such
an institution may, if they wish or need to apply some conflict of laws rules,
resort to the provisions in the institution's Rules of Procedure^, look to the
local or some other national or supra-national body of choice of law rules, or
merely apply the substantive law the arbitrator thinks necessary. For this
reason it is not a viable argument, although it may frequently be the effect,-
that a submission to an arbitration tribunal in a market economy country is a
choice of the conflict rules of the place where that tribunal is situate.
(ii) Eastern European tribunals
224. By contrast, one of the major effects of the very close lien which
exists between the State and the arbitration institutions in the socialist
countries is the reliance of arbitrators appointed by these institutions on the
private international law rules of the country in which they are situated. ^
Indeed, the Rules of the Court of Arbitration attached to the Chamber of Foreign
Trade in the Gernian Democratic Republic expressly provide that "the private
international law of the German Democratic Republic" must be applied to determine
the applicable law^.
So at the outset, to determine the law to govern the substance of the contract
"all the arbitration commissions apply the conflict of law rules according to the
lex fori"^. This will be the legislative enactment in those countries where there
is one^, or the rules which have developed through the cases where there is no
such enactment^. Certain arbitration tribunals^ however provide in their rules
particular conflict of laws provisions to be applied. In such circumstances, if the
« C
tribunal's rules differ from the national conflict of laws rules, i.e. the lex^fori.,
the tribunal's rules are generally preferred as a lex specialis . This has led one
' f •
writer to express regret that "les arbitres sovietiques donnent ainsi 1'impression
de ressembler a des juges appliqUant tout naturellement la regie de conflit de leur
for"^
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225« Tlais can be well illustrated by the reasoning of the Arbitration
Tribunal of Bucharest in an award between German and Romanian parties^,
I-Jlien wishing to determine the applicable law, the arbitrators said:
"In this respect, the Commission must take into account; that
for defining the relevant ^law to govern the relations between the
litigious parties use should be made, according to a constantly
accepted principle, of the conflict rules of the judicial authority;
"that art. 43 of the Rules of the Arbitration Commission by the
Chamber of Commerce of the Romanian People's Republic explicitly
prescribes that its provisions are supplemented with all the provisions^
of the laws of the Romanian People's Republic, a prescription which
means that the Rules are also supplemented with the conflict rules
of the Romanian private international law;
"that in the case when the Arbitration Commission was faced with
the problem of defining the relevant law to govern the substances
of juridicial relations become disputable (lex causae), use has
constantly been made of the conflict rul'. s of Romanian private
international law;
"that is keeping with these rules, the substance of the dispute
being with regard to a sale-and-purchase contract, it is a matter
where the Romanian private international law accepts the principle
according to which the contract, its effects and consequences may
be governed by the law convenanted by the parties;
"that however, in the case of point, such a covenant had been made
neither on concluding the contract nor subsequently, during the
debates, with the claimant maintaining that relevant is the German
law (art. 155, 157 and 158 of the German Civil Code) as a lav^ of
the place where the contract was concluded, while the defendant
upholding that the Romanian law should be applied as a law of the
place of performance, hence the Commission being the one to establish
the law applicable to the juridical act occurred between the parties;
"that according to the Romanian legal (arbitral) practice in the
absence of the parties concordant expressions of will at the date of
the conclusion of. the juridicial act, the latter and the relations
resulting from it are considered to be subject, generally - as the
claimant also pointed-to the law of the place where the act was
concluded, as the chief link in a matter like the one under discussion.
"Consequently, since the act was concluded in Frankfurt-am-Main, the
Commission is to resolve the dispute in keeping with the prescriptions
of the German substantial law i.e. the German Civil Code,"
A similar approach was taken by the Soviet FTAC in their award between
RomUlus Films Limited v Sovexportfilm^. That case•-arose out of a contract made
in London whereby the Soviet defendant corporation had sold "to the English
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plaintiff the exclusive right to distribute to the cinemas and television networks
in the U.K., the Republic of Ireland and on board British ships^the Soviet film
version of "Sleeping Beauty". The defendant was to provide the plaintiff v/ith the
film ready for distribution at both 70 and 35 millimetres. . Due to an accident in
the USA when a part of the negative fell off the back of a lorry and was lost,
the defendant was unable to deliver a satisfactory 35 mm version of the film.
The English plaintiff brought the arbitration proceedings claiming damages for
breach of contract. With respect to the applicable law the plaintiff argued it
was English law; the defendant maintained it was the law of the USSR. The
FTAC found for the plaintiff; what is quite clear (and was accepted by the
parties in their pleadings) was the arbitrators reliance on the conflict of laws
rules of the USSR. The arbitrators held:
conclu
^
des Principes de. droit civil de l'U.R»S.So et des Republiques fe'd^rees
>• auquel correspond 1'article 566 du code civil de la R. S.F.S^R. Dans
le cas present, le differend se rapportc a des relations n^es d'une
transaction de commerce ext^rieur faite en Angleterjre et ne contenant
pas de stipulation sur la loi applicable. En consequence, d'apres
1'article 126 des Principes de droit civil de I'U.R.S.S. et des
Republiques fecierees, la Commission d'arbitrage du commerce exterieur
doit appliquer au coritrat du 30 juin 1964 la loi du lieu de la
transaction, a savoir la loi anglaise. ' (Emphasis added).
o *
Aa award of the arbitration court of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce
concerned a contract for the purchase by the Czech plaintiff of linseed and
niggerseed from an Ethiopian seller. With respect to the applicable law, the
Czechoslovak tribunal held:
'La question da la loi applicable _au contrat du ^0 juin 1964, conc
entre la Objedinenije at la Socie'te, eat tranches par 1'article 1
"In the opinion of the arbitrators, it is not possible to conclude under
these circumstances that the submission to the jurisdiction of the
institutional arbitration court of the Chamber of Commerce of Czechoslovakia
could be regarded as a choice of the Czechoslovak law done tacitly ....
In these circumstances the arbitrators could not but determine.the governing
law in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Act No.97/1963,
Conflict of Laws. The latter provisions refer to,the Ethopian law as the law
of the country where the seller has his seat (domicile). Thus the
•arbitrators considered this case,in accordance with the Ethiopian law of- 1960."
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The practice of socialist arbitration tribunals 'applying their own rules, of
of private international law "se conforme ainsi a sa jurisprudence absolument
constant."^ It is beyond doubt that arbitrators will consider a submission'
to an arbitration tribunal in the socialist countries a tacit acceptance that
the private international law rules of the country in which the chosen tribunal
is situated will be looked to to resolve any conflict of laws question. ^
C. The System of Private International Law of- the d' arbxtrage^
1. THEORY
226. The "traditionally"^ most favoured view is that arbitrators must resort
to the private international law ruUs^ of the^ place where the arbitration is
being held or where the' arbitration tribunal has its "seat", i.e. .
tribunal arbitral"^ This view is developed.from the a^ptio^t^
and rZT^Tv be (me legal system which governs the arbitratioii. The relevant .
provision of that legal system is known as the lex (l-oci)_.art^_i or the.
"loi de 1'arbitrage".
. :
•Dr. Mann has argued "that the loi de 1'arbitrage is the law of the country in
3
.which the tribunal has its seat". Indeed, Dr. Mann emphatically stated: "The-
lex-arbitri cannot be the law of any country other than that of the arbitration
4
tribunal's seat". To have legally binding effect, any act of the .parties must
be sanctioned by the law; and only the law of the place where that act takes
place can give it effect.-^ So for arbitration, this viewpoint advocates and
intends the application of one legal system to every aspect of the proceedings.^
Thus the lex arbitri governs the right to.consider.the subject-matter of the
arbitration, the nomination, appointment and-removal of the arbitrators, the
powers of the arbitrators, the arbitration procedure, the form and validity
of the award and the conflict of laws rules to be applied. Though the parties
I
may be entitled to exercise their autonomy for most of these matters, this theory
only allows them to do so to the extent allowed by the lex arbitri*
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a) Resolution of the Institut de Droi£ International
227. This viewpoint was developed by the late Professor Sauscr-Hall as
rapporteur of the,Institut de Droit International's Commission on "1'arbitrage
'1 2
en droit international prive" . We have seen that Professor Sauser-Hall was
of the opinion that the institution of arbitration had a mixed or sui iuris
3
character .
The effect of such a classification of the juridical character of arbitration
was to • .
A , ,
"reconnaitre aux parties le pouvoir d'indiquer aux arbitres le droit selon
lequel elles entendent que la sentence soit rendue; mais ce pouvoir, elles
ne peuvent I'exercer que dans les limites permises par les regies de
rattachement de I'Etat du sifege du tribunal arbitral qui, en tant que^,^
lex foxi, delimite I'etendue de I'autonomie qu'il y a lieu de reconnaitre
aux parties dans ce domaine. Si les parties n'ont pas conclu d'accord au
sujet du droit applicable, les rSgles de rattachement des lois de I'Etat du
siege du tribunal arbitral seront appliquees par les arbitres pour resoudre
les conflits de lois souleves devant eux par les parties".
This view was adopted by the Institut de Droit International at their Amsterdam
session in 1957 and again at the Neuchatel session in 1959. Article 11 of the
Resolutions adopted at those meetings provides:
"The rules of choice in force in the state of the seat of the
arbitral tribunal must be followed to settle the law applicable
to the substance of the difference.
Within the limits of such law, arbitrators shall apply the law chosen
by the parties or, in default of any express indication by them, shall
determine what is the will of the parties in this respect having regard
to all the circumstances of the case.
If the law of the place of the seat of the arbitral tribunal so authorises
them, the parties may give the arbitrators power to decide ex aequo et bono
or according to the rules of professional bodies".^
The effect of this article is to allow the parties to choose the law or other
measuring standard, but only to the extent allowed by the lex arbitri; an
express choice of the conflict of laws rules to aPply is clearly excluded. Thus
th^ loi du siege d'arbitrage or the lex loci arbitri be.comes the- lex fori of the
arbitration tribunal. The only escape left to the parties is their right "in the
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arbitral agreement ... to, exercise their free choice and to indicate the place
where the arbitral tribunal must sit".^ In this way parties a're able to influence
the- law to govern their relations deciding themselves where the arbitration tribunal
shall have its seat; any express choice of law other than that of the siege
d'arbitrage would probably be without effect.^ An express choice of law
without any indication as to the desired sffege d'arbitrage would be considered
an agreement that the arbitration "tribunal shall sit in the territory of the
country the law of which has' been chosen"; presumably to the extent allowed
by the chosen law.
b) Meaning of-the "siege d'arbitrage"
228.. The greatest objection to Sauser-Hall*s-"theory surrounds the determination
of the "siege d'arbitrage". Professor Sauser-Hall himself and others .since have
purported to develop principles or rules to facilitate determining where the
arbitration tribunal has its "siege",. As already noted, the Resolution adopted
by the Institut de Droit International allowed the parties "to indicate'the
place V7here the tribunal must sit".^ VJhere the parties did not choose the
^ 2
"siege d'arbitrage" but have chosen the lavj to"govern the arbitration agreement,
it is implied that the parties intended the "siege d'arbitrage" to be in the
3
territory v;here the chosen lav; is sovereign . The dichotomy of an ambiguous
choice of both the law to govern the arbitration agreement and the "siege
d'arbitrage" will be resolved in favour of the "loi du sifege" when the law
in force either in that place or in the place where the chosen law is sovereign
does not admit that the "siege d'arbitrage" shall be the territory of the State
of the chosen law^. Where both systems of law (i.e. the lav? chosen and that of
the chosen "siege") admit a preference to .the territory of the State of the
chosen law, then naturally that v^ill be the "siege d'arbitrage"^.
Wheipe the parties are. silent as to the where the tribunal would have its
"siege", the Institut de Droit International gives the arbitrators the responsibility
to determine the "siege d'arbitrage".^ Tliis is to be the place where the arbitrators
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are to meet; where they expect to or may meet in different places, the place p-
first meeting will be the "sifege d'arbitrage", "unless the arbitrators expressly
decide in favour of some other place".^ Where'the arbitration proceeds by way of an
exchange of letters without a meeting, the "siSge" would be the place where the
sole arbitrator has his residence; where there is more than one arbitrator, the
place where the umpire is resident will be the "siege d'arbitrage-, where there
is no 'uiapire, the "siege" will be determined by the majority opinion of the
• . 8 ' ^ •
• arbitrators . \ .
The wording of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International is in certain
respects misleading. It does give the impression that the "siege d'arbitrage"
is where "le ou les arbitres se sont 'assis', pour, la, regevoir les plaideurs,
^jEtendre les temoins, lire les pieces et re'diger une sentence"^ But of course
in practice there is often more than one hearing: the parties often produce
evidence at more than one hearing, and such hearing are held at different places.
To apply the same law, the lex arbitri, at each hearing (presuming such to be in a
different country), negates the jurisdictional theory of arbitration; the
alternative, to apply the law of each place of the hearing could work'greatly
-to the advantage or disadvantage of the parties, if e.g. certain evidence was
admissible in one place buf inadmissible in another.
Sauser-Hall's proposals further ignored the increasing popularity of both
international and national arbitration institutions. VThere an arbitration is
organised under the auspices of such institutions there is a presumption in
favour of the place where that institution has its headquarters to be the
"siege d'arbitrage". So, e.g., a choice of arbitration at the court of
arbitration of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce would-result in Czechoslovakia
being the "siege d'arbitrage"^*^. Similarly with the choice of an arbitration
under the rules of any other national institution or by a trade organisation
situated in a given place.
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On the other hand a choice of international institutional arbitration, e.g.
under the rules of the ICCj presents far greater complication. We have already
adequately considered the method whereby the place where an arbitration is to
be held is determined under the ruleg of the ICC. As, also seen, the place of
the arbitration may, and frequently will, be changed to suit the convenience of
the parties^^o If the theory of Sauser-Hall is to have any merit the "siege
12d'arbitrage" must be stable and cannot be changed every now and then . The
alternative would be to have a different lex arbitri every time the parties
were to change the substance of the arbitration agreement.
229. Although both Sauser~Hall and more.recently other writers have purported to
argue their thesis to have the support of the international conventions^, this
theory fails above all to recognise the over-riding importance of party autonomy
in arbitration. The arbitration exists because of the parties agreement and its
conduct is thus subject to their direction. Failure to recognise and respect
the desires of the parties would, as already pointed out, either entitle the
parties' to disseize the arbitrators or alternatively to subsequently refuse to
give effect to their award: in the latter case enforcement would be denied
2 .pursuant to the relevant international conventions . This was perhaps a major
influence on Judge Panchaud to describe the "loi du siege d'arbitrage as the
"procedure subsidiare" or "I'autorit^ judiciaire d'appui". However the learned
judge expressed the view,, different from that of the Institut de Droit International,
that this secondary law would only be applicable when either some problem arose -
not provided for in the rules of the arbitration institution seized, or where
4
the parties were unable to agree on some aspect of the procedure.
Because of the foregoing. Judge Panchaud developed his arguments in a far more
flexible way. T-Jhilst he unreservedly preferred a jurisdictional character for
arbitration,^ he acknowledged that arbitrators were primarily meant to follow
the procedure agreed upon by the parties or provided for in the ,rules of the
' arbitration institution seized.^ As most arbitrations passed-ofi. without any
difficulty, the need to determine the "siege d'arbitrage" is only "pour assurer
, ' • 1-7 7
quoi qu'il arrive la protection du faible contre un-abus de force" . Thus he
continued and explained the importance of the "si^ge" in the following terms:
"II est pour la, partie menacee' une sauvegarde de dernier ressort,
au moment d'introduire 1'arbitrage oil au cours de celui-ci; le si^ge,
tout a la fois, lui procure I'adresse de ce juge que nous avons appele
juge « d'appui » et il identifie la procedure que nous avons appelee
procedure subsidiaire ». Ainsi cette partie menacee d'un arbitrage
injuste trouve-t-elle les moyens de parer au d&ii de justice."®
Judge, Panchaud took the view that the "siege d'arbitrage" would be where the
parties wanted it to be^. In the absence of any expression of their intentions, the
Trbitrators had the right - which the learned Judge urged every arbitrator to
exercise as.early as possible^*^ - to fix themselves the "siege" of the arbitration,
in accordance with the facts of the case.
Finally, in passings it is interesting to note how Judge Panchaud defined the
"sifege d'arbitrage". He said:
En definitive I'on peut dire que le siege de 1'arbitrage est dans le pays
que les parties ont designe, soit expressement, elles-memes ou par I'organe
des arbitres, soit implicitement, par des faits concluants qui leur sont
imputables h, ellGS~TTieines ou h leurs mandataires les arbitres»
This definition xTOuld appear to fit equally the division we have made earlier in
this chapter by applying the private international law rules,chosen or-impliedly
^ a
chosen by the parties. Of course, in those cases, they were based on the
14
theory that arbitration has a "contractual" character.
c) TI\e ma.ior international arbitration conventions^
230. Of the four major international conventions which relate to commercial
arbitration only the 1961 European Convention on Internatj^nal_J^mm^
Arbitration refers directly to the conflict of laws rules to be applied. Article
VII of that Convention provides for the application of "the rule of conflict
that the arbitrators deem applicable".^ This of course does not oblige the
arbitrators to apply the conflict of.•laws rules of the "siege d'arbitrage." Indeed,
it is generally considered to allow the arbitrators to look to some internatxonal
or non-national system of conflict of laws. But we shall consider the meaning
' . ?
of this provision later."
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As for the three earlier Conventions, though they are silent in this regard,
they do contain provisions as to the procedural law to be applied. It is note
worthy that txTO of the three conventions give prime consideration to the "will
of the parties". They provide for the application of the procedural law of the
"siege d'arbitrage" only in the event of the parties having failed to agree on
the rules to be followed.
Thus one finds paragraph 2(1) of the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses provides:
"The arbitral procedure, ... shall be governed by the will of the
parti iS and by the lav^ of the country in. whose territory the
"arbTtra^ion takes place". (Emphasis added).
The two Conventions relating to the recognition and enforcement of awards
provide sirailarly. The Geneva Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1927 states in Article 1(c) that for an award to be enforced it must
be shown "that the award has been made by the Arbitral Tribunal provided
for in the submission to arbitration or constituted in the manner agreed upon
by the parties and in conformity with the law governing the arbitration
procedure" (emphasis added). Koweverj it does not indicate what that law is.
Again, and in far wider terms, Article V(l)(d) of the New York Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 provides that
enforcement of a foreign award can be refused if it is proved that: ,
"The composition of the arbitral authority, or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or failing such
agreement, v/as not in accordance with the law of the country where the
arbitration took place".^ (Emphasis added).
Provisions as to the procedural law to govern do not indicate what private
international law rules should apply. ^N^hilst generally the system of private
international law applicable may well follow the procedural law applied, no
.general rule can be assumed. Private international lavj rules are not rules of
procedure: they are rules of private international law.• A manifestation, whether
express or otherwise, as to the procedural law to be followed at the arbitration.
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does not show that the parties intend the private international law of that same
system to apply, ^sTiilst the Institut de Droit International was clearly of the
opinion that both the procedural and the private international law applicable to
international arbitration should be determined by the "siege d'arbitrage", their
provisions were distinct and separate in respect of each matter. Thus there
I
appears to be no justification for any claim that the international Conventions
either support or favour, the application of the private international law rules
, of the "siege d'arbitrage", or that the failure to apply the private international
law rules of the "siege d'arbitrage", would give grounds to refuse to recognise
or enforce the award.
d)fcri^^^of the "siege d'arbitrage" theory
231. Despite the respect which exists all round the vjorld for the Institut de
Droit Internationals the theory adopted in their 1957 and 1959 Resolutions has
never attained particularly wide support. The application of the conflict
of laws provisions of the."siege d'arbitrage" followed logically from the
jurisdictional theory as to the nature of arbitration and provided the arbitrators
with clear and simple directions." However, the failure of the theory of the "•
"siege d'arbitrage" to appreciate the very basic facts of life of international
commercial arbitration is undoubtedly a major explanation for the theory never
being universally accepted. Furthermore, though the theory may often be easy
to .apply, it's rigidity could lead to bizarre results by the application of a
» <
conflict of laws system which was often fortuitously determined and which had
no real connection whatever'with the parties, the arbitration or the dispute.
Whilst it is conceded that there may be a need for a "procedure subsidiare"
to which the arbitrator can resort when the parties are unable to agree or .the
institution's rules are silent on the•procedure to be followed, it is a matter
of some conjecture whether the "designation ex officio'" of the ' loi au siege
du tribunal arbitral" is the best solution.'^ However the arbitrary application
of the conflict of laws system of the "siege d'arbitrage" has been widely
criticised. These criticisms are of two kinds: one based on the effect-of
the theory itself and the second being against the effect of the conflict of
laws rules of the "siege d'arbitrage",
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232. Firstly, despite the protestations of Dr. Mann,^ there are international
arbitrations separated by both fact and desire from any national system of law.
These are-"extra-national" arbitrations which have been sometimes described,as
2 '
"f lottantes-". Whilst naturally in theory every sovereign legal system can
enact provisions making it illegal or undesirable or impractical or impossible
for arbitration proceedings to be held in the territory over which it governs -
and to this extent one must admit some merit in the jurisdictibnal theory as to
the juridical character of arbitration - one cannot ignore that almost every
trading nation does recognise and encourage arbitration, and interferes with
arbitration taking place within its territory to a very minimal extent. The
effect of Sauser-Hall's. theory, is to give an inter-national or non-national
arbitration a national character, such nationality being determined purely
on the fortuitous basis of the "siege d'arbitrage". Thus by some' factor
often beyond the control of the parties the arbitration becomes an internal
3
arbitration and the proceedings internal proceedings.
To allow this "geographic localisation"^ rather than the juridical and factual
character of arbitration to determine the private international law rules to
be applied the arbitrators could have the eff ect,...CLf--ne.ga.t.i.ng-the intentions
of the parties and would ignore the practical organization of international
commercial arbitration. The international business community have through
their needs and practice developed international arbitration without any
connection to a national system of law. It is both pointless and misleading to
create a lien between the arbitration and some national system of law just
in case the arbitrators may have need for guidance or one of the parties wishes
to resort to the courts. Afterall, in the absence of agreement between the
parties as to the procedural rules to apply, the arbitrator has the power to
decide himself the procedure to follow: indeed that is a part of his responsibility.
Furthermore, an aggrieved party could either challenge the arbitration in the
courts where the defendant is resident, or can challenge the ultimate award
at the time of enforcement.
\
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233. The second and in the present contex': the most serious^ objection to the
"siege d'arbitrage" theory, is the absence of any real connection betv/een the
"siege d'arbitrage", and the parties, the arbitrators, the contract and the
dispute. The effect of applying' the conflict of laws rules' of the siege
d'arbitrage" will often mean the applicable law will be determined by a system
of conflict of laws neither kno^ra nor even considered by the parties. The
desire of parties to submit to arbitration in a neutral country, or in a '
geographically or socially convenient country, does not in any way indicate a
desire or an acceptance by the parties that the conflict of laws system of that
3
country should govern the arbitration. Afterall, as we have already noted
parties are highly unlikely to even understand - let alone think of - the need
or desirability to choose the conflict of laws system to be applied; they are
equally unlikely to understand or expect the conflict,of laws system of the
"si6ge d'arbitrage" to be applied.^ Furthermore, the conflict of laws system of
the "sifege d'arbitrage" may well be incapable of dealing with the conflict in
question. .
The effect of applying such a fortuitously determined conflict of laws system is
that the law deemed applicable may often be inappropriate or incompetant to
regulate the contract in question or could even consider the contract as illegal
or null and void. The possibility of the contract being turned on its head can
be. well illustrated by a few examples.
Assume parties to an east-west trade contract agree that any disputes arising
out of their contract shall be resolved by arbitration by a named Swedish or •
Swiss arbitrator, but make no provision as to the "siege d'arbitrage". It v/ill
in consequence fall to the arbitrator to himself decide where the arbitration
shall have its "siSge". For reasons of convenience or politic or comfort the
parties may agree or the arbitrator decide that the arbitration be held in a"
country relatively equidistant between the residences of arbitrators and parties
i.e. Greece or Yugoslavia.^ Can there, in these circumstances, be any
IS 2
logical or legal justification for a Swedish or Swiss arbitrator to resort to
the conflict of l.ivs rules of Greece or Yugoslavia?
Again, if there be an institutional arbitration between e..g. 'French and English
parties, the secretariat of the institution seized may themselves appoint a
Dutch arbitrator and nominate Holland as the "si^e d' arbitrage". What relevance
here have the rules of Dutch private international law?
The irrationality of the arbitrators applying the conflict of laws rules of the
"siege d'arbitrage" can be seen by the possibility of those rules pointing to a
substantive law to be applied different from that which would be applied if the
conflict of laws system of both parties - or either of them - were followed.
This could arise out of the simple-situation of the parties coming from countries
which embrace the lex loci contractus rule, whilst the "siege d'arbitrage"
follows the lex loci solutionis rule. Similarly, the conflict of laws rules of
the "siege d'arbitrage" may, like those of many countries, be lex fori orientated.
This would result in the arbitrators applying the domestic law of the "sifege
d'arbitrage"5 with the ensuant embroilment'in the imperative legislation and
public policy principles of that legal system, to a contractual relationship
which has little, if anything, to do with the "siege d'arbitrage".^
These type of situations are what will bring international arbitration into
disrepute and which are very much against the interests of international business.
In the words of one commentator, this "surprising and dangerous"^ situation
"risquerait de nuire au developpement de ces arbitrages internationaux de type
8
'neutre' pourtant fort commodes dans les circonstances presentes". Whilst the
application of the conflict of laws rules of the "sifege d'arbitrage" cannot be
totally rejected and might often be of some use to arbitrators, they should not
always be mecanically applied. Rather they should be considered at best rules
of guidance which can be resorted to x^rhen their application will not only enable
the arbitrators to reach "la meilleure solution de fond",^*^
but also
commerce
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will be consistent with good legal sense and the needs of international
2. PRACTICE • •
234. Despite the foregoing criticisms which we have directed at the theory of
the "siege d'arbitrage"s there are awards in which the arbitrators have resorted
to the principles advocated by Sauser-Hall. ' This is perhaps natural bearing
in mind the eminence of Sauser-Hall himself and the prestige of the Institut
de Droit International. Any arbitrator who is to determine either the
•procedural law he should follow or the private international law rules to
•apply will naturally be influenced by the persuasiveness of Sauser-Hall and
the .Institut's Resolution.'
As very often the arbitration will be held and have its "si^ge" in the country
where the sole or third arbitrator has his normal residence, the tendancy has
developed for the,arbitrator just to look to the system he knows well or, at
• least,, best. Should the application of that law be challenged, then of course
in any interpretation there would be an understandable inclination towards
I.
the arbitrators' own law.
Of course that is not always the case. As we will see laterj many arbitrators
: are inclined to try to avoid the application of private international law
rules, or to apply a selection of private international law rules, or even to
just apply the substantive standard which appears appropriate in the given case.
a) The arbitrators' dilemma . '
235. i Faced with a genuine conflict of laws and the need to find the most
• appropriate system of law to govern the case before them, the difficulty of the
arbitrators is obvious. In the absence of an existing conflict of laws system
.—
ready and competent to indicate whi^ law they should apply, the arbitrato^rs
8 4
find thsriiselves in a vacuum, without any cc''e or even guidelines on which to
• 1 .lean. This problem is clearly illustrated in an award by a Svjiss arbitrator
sitting in-Switzerland to resolve a dispute arising out of an exclusive
distribution contract ma^de betx<7een the plaintiff, a Federal' German corporation,
and the dafendai5,t, a Yugoslav State trading corporation. When discussing the
question of the law to govern the parties relations, the arbitrator stated:
"Les co-contractants, parties ^ la pr^sente instance, domicilies
respectiveraent en Allemagne Federale et en Yougoslavie, n'ont
rien convenu en ce qui concerne le droit applicable quant au
fond, s", bien qu'il appartient &I'arbitre de determiner.
"II n'existe pas de r&gles de conflit des lois en puissance
"qui^'indiqueraient ^ I'arbitre d'un pays tiers, sans lien aucun
avec le rapport de droit existant entre les parties, selon le
droit international privs de quel pays il devrait determiner .
la loi applicable au fond. II n'y a-pas non plus de crit&re^^
"susceptible"de faire pencher la balance en faveur soit du droit
international privd alleiriand, soit de celui de la Yougoslavie,
une telle recherche ne resisterait pas h. la critique et le
resultat aurait toujours 1'apparence d'une preference arbitraire.
A.ussi la solution pratiquement la plus accessible, d ailleurs
reconnue comme telle par la doctrine la plus rgcente. . . .
consiste a se refgrer aux regies de conflit des lois du for.
(Emphasis added),
The arbitrator here clearly expressed his problem: how does he determine the
applicable law? As the arbitrator in non-national proceedings he had no conflict
of laws rules to guide him. The application of the national system of conflict of
laws of one or other of the parties would be arbitrarj' and could subsequently be
attacked on that basis. The only other national system of conflict of laws
which he could look to was that of the place of arbitration. This was quite
natural: as the arbitrator pointed out himself, in the circumstances, the
conflict of laws rules of Switzerland were the most accessible - he was in
Sv/itzerland and understood the Swiss conflict of laws best - and were applicable
in accordance with recent doctrine. The arbitrator thus applied German lav/ as
the law of the country in which the manufacturer resided and with which the
contract had its closest connection.
b) Follow 'yesblutiori 'of ' the Iristitiit de Droit
236. In some awards arbitrators have actually relied on Sauser-Hall and the
Insitut de Droit International to justify their resort to the "loi du si^ge
d'arbitrage". In one avjard^,between an Argentinian ex-patriot living in the
Federal Republic of Germany and an English corporation concerning a contract
performable in the Argentine, the arbitrator wished to determine the "loi de
1'arbitrage" so as to be able to determine the validity of the arbitration
2
agreement and its consistency with public policy , Judge Gunnar Largregren,
President of the Appeal Court of Western Sweden, was appointed the sole arbitrator.
Despite there being no connection with France other than-the headquarters of the
ICGs President Largregren relying on the ICC Arbitration Rules looked to French
law' although he acknowledged that there were "doubts whether the question of
arbitrability is to be qualified as belonging to the Rules governing the
proceedings". Having based his discussion on French lawj the arbitrator to
justify his- conclusions added:
"In the same way as the Resolution of the Institut de Droit
International guide international tribunals in the field of
public international laWj, they are in the field of private
international law of great value to arbitrators who have to
decide international disputes".
Again in an ICG-award , the arbitrator, Monsieur Ernst Mezger, justified his
resort to French private international law because it was the .solution advocated
by the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International. The dispute arose
out of a contract made in 1954 under v/hich the Belgian plaintiff was given the
exclusive right to sell the German defendant's goods in Belgium and certain
other western European countries. When.the plaintiff discovered that one of
the defendant's subsidiary companies was placing imitation but none-the-less
competitor goods on the market., he ceased his sales of the defendant's goods
although'he still held large stocks of them. Some years later, in 1965 the
plaintiff claimed damages in arbitration for the stock he still held and was
unable'to sell, relying on the original contract provision obliging the
defendant to repurchase from the plaintiff.stock not sold. ,
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Whilst the defendant did not deny that he allowed a subsidiary to sell •
imitation goods.within the plaintiff's market, he argued that the plaintiff
«
had failed to sell the required number of his goods, that the contract had
any^^ay naturally expired in 1956 and that in consequence the plaintiff's action
was barred by lapse of time. The plaintiff based his arguments on German law -
which naturally was favourable to him -which he claimed was applicable as the
law of the seller, pursuant to the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to International Sales of Goods.
In resolving the conflict of laws and deciding which system of conflict of laws
to apply the arbitrator found:
"... que ladite Convention Internationale ne soit pas en vigueur
en Allemagne, peu importe meme la date(ler Septembre 1964) ou elle
est entree en vigueur en Belgique. Le present arbitrage ayant lieu
en France, et ce,en vertu d'une stipulation formelle de I'acte^
"^gne conformement a I'article 19 du Reglement d'arbitrage de la^
.Chambre de Commerce Internationale, il resulte des principes gene-
raux regissant la matiere que non seulement les regies de procedure,
mais aussi les regies du drolt international prive a appliquer par
1'arbitre doivent etre puisees a Ta loi franqaise. Cette doctrine
a" p.re prnfessee en particulier par la Resolution de I'Institut de
Droit International du 16 septembre 1957 sur 1'arbitrage en droit
• international prive, article II. T. Elle est reconnue aussi bien
dans la doctrine frangaise et beige que dans la doctrine allemande.
... La loi frangaise coincide sur ce point avec la loi beige : la
" . . Convention du 15 juin 1955 y est egalement entree.en.yigueur le
ler septembre 1964. La Convention n'a cependant aucun
retroactif et ne saurait changer les effetsdas contrats signes
avant son entree en vigueur.(Emphasis added).
VJhat is not quite clear from this award is the capacity in which Monsiuer
Mezger pointed to French private international law: V7as it to the law of the
place where the ICC has its headquarters and hence as the "loi du siege."?
The reason for this uncertainty is that the award was actually signed in
Brussels! It is unclear whether just the avjard was signed in Brussels but
the proceedings took place in France: if the hearings were held in Brussels
and the avjard was rendered there, then prima facie it would appear that the
"sifege d'arbitrage" was Brussels, and Belgian private international law should
have been applied. The award does not of course say anything as to whether
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the parties expressely chose France as the "siege d'arbitrage"r but if that
was the case then presumably.whilst the arbitrator could have agreed to hold
the hearings in Brussels, he would still have actually made and signed his
award in Paris. On the other hand, if the reasoii for explaining the resort
to French private international law was because it was a "neutral" system of
law and of course that of the arbitrator, then although it may be justified
in itself, it cannot be based on the Resolution of the Institut de Droit
International. Nevertheless, whether the "siege d'arbitrage" was Belgium
or France, the solution adopted by French private international law was, as
pointed out by the arbitrator himself, exactly the same as had the arbitrator
applied Belgian private international law.
c) Connection betv7een the lex arbitri and the conflict o£ laws system to be applied
237. ^^^hen looking for the conflict o'f laws system to apply or the procedural law to
follow, the arbitrators invariably begin by posing for themselves the question
of the law which governs the arbitration. Naturally,the various theories will
often lead to different laws being applied. Hence the arbitrators will be
grateful for what guidance they can get from the rules of the arbitration
institution seized. In this respect the Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation
of the ICC were until recently^ of only limited assistance as the relevant
article refered only to the law governing procedure. However it is generally
understood that subject to an express view to the contrary, the conflict of
laws rules to be applied are those of the system of law governing procedure
or at least the subsidiary procedural law.
Strictly in accordance with doctrine, the procedural law to govern the arbitration
is the rules of the institution selected by the parties. Where however that
institution has no rules, or the rules are inadequate for the particular
arbitration, or of course where the arbitration is ad hoc, the law to govern
is that chosen by the parties. Only in the absence of any choice by the parties
can arbitrators resort to the law of the country in which the proceedings are
being held.
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Article 16 of the ICC Rules on Arbitration and Conciliation of 1 June 1955
provided:
"The rules by which the arbitration proceedings shall be governed
shall be these Rules and, in the event of no. provision being made
in these Rules, those of the law of procedure chosen by the parties
or, failing such choice, those of the law of the country in which
the arbitrator holds the proceedings".
This provision has been followed in numerous awards as it was a guideline for
\
2 '
which.the arbitrators were often grateful. In one 1955 ICC award the
arbitrators (the President of the tribunal was French) sat in Paris to hear a
dispute between a Czechoslovak State enterprise and a New York corporation.
The arbitrators had to determine their competence to decide the substance of
the-dispute. The arbitrators', competence in this regard was challenged by
the American party. The initial question for the arbitrators was according
to what law were they entitled to consider their own competence. They found:
"... les arbitres recevant leur mission de la dite Cour d'Arbitrage
sont tenu5.de se conformer, en ce qui concerne la procedure, aux
dispositions du dit R&glement, qui dans son article 17(3) precise
que, dans le silence de celui-ci, ce sont les dispositions de la
loi du pays ou a lieu I'arbitrage, en I'occurrence la loi-francaise,
.' qui s ' appliquent" .
ft-
3 ...In a truly multi-national award arbitrators concerned in the main with a
factual problem were grateful, to be able to follow the ICC Arbitration Rules
with respect to the procedure to govern. The dispute arose out of a contract,
between the three plaintiffs. United Kingdom, Panamanian and Liberian ship
owners, and the defendant, a Dutch shipyard, for the repair and covers ion of a
ship. Dissatisfied with the work done, the plaintiffs' action was for
reimbursement of the amount paid. The contract provided for ICC arbitration
in Paris. Three arbitrators'were appointed: a Belgian, a Frenchman, and a
Norwegian. Following the Rules of the ICC the arbitrators held, despite the
very tenuous connection of the whole contract and the. arbitration with France,
18 9
"that the arbitration proceedings are governed by Rules of the International
4
Chamber of Commerce and in the second place by the French law".
A similar approach was taken by a Swiss arbitrator appointed to consider a
dispute arising out,- of an exclusive 'sales agreement between French and Italian
corporations^. Having to determine, the applicable law, the arbitrator said:
"Selon les principes du droit international prive, c'est la "lex
fori" qui regit la qualification.de I'acte examine'et qui dit quel
principe de rattachement determinera le droit applicable & I'acte
ainsi qualifig. Or la Cour d'Arbitrage, au Reglement de laquelle
les parties se sont soumises, a decide que la procedure devant
I'arbitre se deroulerait h Paris, ce qui a effectivement eu lieu.
La "lex fori" est done la- loi francaise".
Again, despite France being only the place where the ICC has its headquarters,
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an English arbitrator, in a preliminary award betvjeen a Spanish plaintiff, and
defendant corporations from Ohio, USA, and Venezuela, held the law governing
the arbitration to be "the Rules of^proceedings of. the International Chamber
of Commerce supplemented, as far as necessary, by the law of France". As then the
ICC Rules did not make any provision as to the conflict' of laws rules to be
applied, presumably the arbitrator here intended to "supplement" the rules with
French private international law.
But of course France is not alx^ays the place where ICC arbitrations are held.
In another aspect of the Indian Pakistan case discussed above^ Professor Lalive
made a similar finding though his wording appears to give a greater consideration
8to the autonomy of the parties. The award states: "
"Considering the absence of choice by, or agreement.between the
Parties as to a subsidiary law of procedure, the Arbitration shall
follow, in all procedural questions not regulated by the Rules of^
• Conciliation and Arbitration of the ICC, the lax^ of the country in
which the proceedings have taken place, i.e. the Code of Civil
Procedure of the Canton of Geneva, Sv/itzerland".
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d) Connection between the procedural law applicable, and the coRflict of laws
system to be applied.
238. In some awardsj arbitrators^ following the "siege d'arbitrage", theory, will
determine first the procedural law to apply on the basis that the conflict
of laws rules applicable belong to the same legal system as the procedural law,^
2In one case the Federal German plaintiff had contracted with a Bolivian State
enterprise to construct an explosives factory in Bolivia for $200,000. Payment
was to be- in instalments on fixed dates. The agreement contained a provision
for ICG arbitration. During the,currency of the agreement the State enterprise
went into liquidation and naturally money on the uncompleted contract was
/
outstanding. The plaintiff claimed in arbitration some 600^000 DM from the
/ ,
enterprise in liquidation and from the Bank responsible for the liquidation of
the enterprise and the conduct of its continuing effects. Andre Panchaudj the
respected Swiss judge, was appointed the- sole arbitrator.
The successor bank refused to participate at the arbitration, either as
successor to the enterprise or as liquidator; the bank claimed to be unable
"to submit to arbitration in accordance with Bolivian lavj and its charter. No.t
only had the arbitrator to determine the validity of the Bolivian bank's claim,
but there was also the questions of the.main contract itself. Thus the
arbitrator needed to find the applicable conflict of laws rules to apply and
for this purpose looked first to the procedural law to be applied. The
arbitrator found:
^ I- Sur la procedure arbit'rale
1. Le contrat passg, le .11 fevrier 1952, est un contrat international;
la clause compromissoire qu'il contient se refere k 1 arbitrage de la
Chambre de Commerce Internationale et situe cet arbitrage en Suisse.
II s'agit done d'un arbitrage international, qui participe du
caractfere contractuel du compromis et releVe de la loi d'autonomie du
point de vue de son rattachement.
^ La loi d'autonomie determine en particulier la procedure applicable....
Or la procedure voulue par les parties ne peut.etre que celle qu'a
institute la Chambre de Commerce Internationale dans son Reglemsnt
de conciliation et d'arbitrage.
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L'acte de mission de I'arbitre . . „. prevoit, ll titre subsidiaire,
1'application de la loi de procedure civile federale de la
• Confederation suisee3. Mais il n'y a pas eu lieu d'en faire
application^ les principes poses par le Rfeglement s'etant revel^s
suffisants dans la presente espece."
Having found Swiss law to be the laxj governing procedure, • the arbitrator
considered the substance of the dispute. The award states:
' ' Sur la loi applicable aux obligations nees du contrat
12. II s'agit premierement de savoir quelles sont les regies de
droit international prive dont on fera usage pour determiner la loi
applicable au contrat litigieux. Si I'on se refire ^ la'volontg
des parties, on s'en tiendra au droit suisse en tant que lex fori,
I'arbitre ayant ete dgsign^ en vertu d'une clause compromissoire
qui soumet la contestation ^ la connaissance de la "Chambre de
Commerce Internationale en Suisse" (art. XVI du contrat du 11
fevrier 1952). L'application du droit international prive suisse
aboutit du reste au meme resultat que celle des principes generale-
ment recus en cette mati&re. dans les differents pays".
Through his application of Swiss private international law the arbitrator found
. 4Swiss law to govern the substance of the contractual obligations of the parties ,
With respect to' the capacity of the Bolivian bank to participate in the
proceedings the arbitrator surprisingly did' not base himself on Swiss private
international law but rather held:
'Selon un principe de droit international prive generalement admis,
les questions touchant la capacity d'une societe pour s'engager
contractuellement relevant de sa loi nationale."
The arbitrator's use of Swiss private international law to one aspect of the
case and the "principles of private international law generally admitted" to
another, is quite illogical. This inconsistency can only be explained by the
arbitrator's desire that the award should be acceptable and that it should be
clear whatever private international law system was resorted to the result
would have been the same. This"is particularly so bearing in mind that the
arbitrator held that the Bolivian Bank had capacity to submit to and participate
in arbitration proceedings. Whilst the arbitrator could have resolved both
conflict of laws- question'by the application, of the "principles of private
international law generally accepted", to have done so would- have been against
Judge Panchaud's view that arbitration has a jurisdictional character^.
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239, We have already seen the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the term "siege
d'arbitrage" and the difficulty in determining it. The academic writers
favouring- the jurisdictional character or arbitration, have variously advocated
the application of the private international law rules of -the "si&ge du tribunal
arbitral", of the "seat" of the arbitration, of the place of the arbitration and
of the "lex fori" of the arbitration. In the circumstances it is not surprising
that arbitrators - many of whom have participated in the constant academic
discussion on the subject - should, when looking for the relevant private
international law rules to apply, also refer variously to the "loi du siege
d'arbitrage", the law of, the place of the arbitration and the "lex fori" of the
arbitration. Whilst perhaps regrettable, this confusion in terminology is at
least understandable: not only do many arbitrators have different views on the
problem but they also come £rom different countries and different legal systems.
Thus naturally,, their methods of explaining themselves differ, although, as will
be seen, the ultimate effect as concerns the private international law system
applied is invariably the same.
This can be illustrated by briefly considering a few awards in which the
arbitrators have applied the private international law rules of their "si&ge
d'arbitrage" or the. place where they are actually holding the arbitration
proceedings, and a few awards in which the arbitrators have looked to the
private international law of their "lex fori".
e) Private international law rules of the place of arbitration
240. The private international law rules of the place where the
arbitration v/as held were resorted to in one award^ where a licence was granted
throughout the world (except the Federal German Republic) to. exploit the
plaintiff's invention of a powdered mother's milk. The Swiss arbitrator,
holding the hearing in Switzerland looked t9 "des principes du droit
international prive suisse tels qu'ils ont Ste developp^s par le Tribunal
Federal suisse". However, as both parties were Swiss it was only the fact
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that the area of exploitation was outside Switzerland which gave the case its
I
international character. Of-course, whatever the grounds, only Swiss law,
both private international and substantive lavj, could possibly have been applied.
2 ' 'In an award arising out of a dispute between Federal German and French parties,
the Dutch arbitrator "se rallie h I'opinion prevalente d'apres laquelle le^
droit applicable au fond du litige doit §tre determiniS selon. les r&gles de
3droit international prive de pays de 1'arbitrage ".
Again, in another award'^ three arbitrators sitting in Switzerland to hear a
dispute between parties from Federal Germany and Italy had to determine the
I
Iprivate international law system to apply. They held:
"L^ ou il faut s'en remettre h des r&gles concretes en matiere de
conflits de lois, il convient d'appliquer les normes du syst^me
juridique valable au lieu ou si&ge le Tribunal arbitral. Dans le
cas present, c'est done sur la base des r&gles et de la pratique
du droit international privd suisse que les decisions doivent
gtre prises".
In one other award^ an arbitrator applied the private international law rules
of the place of arbitration as if it was the obvious procedure. The Swiss
arbitrator,. who was seized of a dispute between a Yugoslav enterprise and
.three Turkish defendants, had to decide his own competence in the particular
case. The arbitrator held without any discussion "le lieu de I'arbitrage
est a Neuchatel (Suisse)", and promptly applied the private international lav7
rules normally applicable in the "canton oil le tribunal arbitral a son siege",
to determine the law to govern his competence. Though he offered no explanation
for applying the conflict rules of the "si&ge d'arbitrage", the arbitrator
hastened to add that the solution he adopted was in accordance with the 1923
Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses to which Yugoslavia and,Switzerland
(but not Turkey) had adhered.
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241. A litteral application of the Sauser-Hali theory was also applied by Monsieur
Mezger when sitting in Paris as sole arbitrator in a dispute between the
plaintiff, a Canadian company, and the defendant, a Federal German partnership .
Under the contract the plaintiff has been licensed to register to his own
benefit the defendant's trademarked hedge-shears, and was also appointed the
defendant's sole agent for the sale and promotion of those shears in Canada and
the USA. The defendant's hopes for the sale of his hedge-shears were not
achieved and on investigation he learnt that the plaintiff was also the agent
for a competitor Japanese hedge-shear. In consequence the defendant repudiated
the agency contract and attempted in the courts of Canada and the USA to have
cancelled the Canadian and US trademarks.
I • _ i
The contract contained a clause providing for all "differences arising from this
contract" to be referred to arbitration under the rules of the ICC. The
plaintiff came to arbitration claiming damages not only for the "wrongful"
termination of his agency, but also for the expenses he had incurred defending
the actions brought by the defendant in the Canadian and US courts to cancel
his trade-marks, contrary to the arbitration agreement in the contract.
In respect of both questions facing him, the arbitrator showed his clear
•preference for looking to French law as the "loi du siege d'arbitrage , and
thus governing both procedure and the conflict of laws.
The plaintiff claimed that, in accordance with the law of Ontario, the
German partnership was obliged to identify to whom and how many competitor
Japanese hedge-shears had been sold. The arbitrator refused the plaintiff's
claim stating:
"The law of Ontario referred to by (the plaintiff) is procedural
laWj which does not apply in a French arbitration. This would be
true, even though the substantive law governing the litigation
were Canadian law (Ontario). There is a fundamental difference
between substantive and adjective (procedural) law, which-is important
in arbitration matters, as has recently been affirmed also by the
House of Lords in the English case' WilTWORTH STREET ESTATES (MANCHESTER)
LTD. v JAMES MILLER AND PARTNERS LTD [l970j . . . . The Ontario law
referred to by (the plaintiff) clearly is predicated exclusively
upon a partnership within the strict meaning of Ontario law .... it is
unlikely that even a Canadian judge sitting in the Province of Ontario
would appl}' those statutory rules as referred to by (the plaintiff)
to a German 'Offeme Handelsgesselschaft.
As for the law to govern the agency contract, the arbitrator held that German
law applied. , This he explained as follows :
"This is an agency contract. Where there is no provision in such
a contract - and the same is true of a.distributor's contract - the
law of the country where the agent or the distributor had his
.seat normally prevails.
"This is, however, only a presumption. The parties may decide
otherwise, and even if the parties have not, provided for this
question, there may be special circumstances which give precedence
to the law of the country of the manufacturer. This is the point
of view of French private international law which this arbitrator
sitting in France in a French procedure is obliged to follow. But
this arbitrator is satisfied that the same rule prevails in German
and in Canadian private international law". (Emphasis added).
Here the distinguished arbitrator likened his role to that of a judge and so
he looked to see what attitude a French-judge would have taken.
f) Private international law rules of the lex fori
242. Adifferent approach but with the same effect follows from the searcn for
and application of the "lex fori"^. In one award arbitrators, two of whom
were Swiss, sitting in Switzerland, had to determine the effect of late
delivery on a contract between a Swedish corporation and a Federal German
public corporation. The Swedish plaintiff argued Swedish law governed the
contract; the German defendant argued German law was applicable. ^ The
arbitrator held: • ' ,
"II convient done en premier lieu de determiner quelle est
la loi applicable etant entendu que, conformement a la doctrine
dominante, les regies de rattachement doivent etre empruntees
a la lex fori, en I'espece, la loi suisse,etant donne qu'en
vertu du compromis, le tribunal arbitral siege au lieu de
domi-cile de son president a Marcbte". (Emphasis added).
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3 . . .Similarlyj arbitrators in Sv;itzerland ha i to deteiniiine the lex arbitri'
•to decide upon the lociis standi of one of the American defendants and then
the law to govern the main contract out of which the dispute arose. The
Austrian plaintiff alleged that the lav? of the State of New York should
apply; the American defendants argued the law of Austria be applied. To
both questions the arbitrators applied Swiss private international law.
With respect to the first matter the arbitrators stated:
"An agreement to submit litigation to arbitration, even when
part of a comprehensive contract of civil law, is governed
by the law of procedure and hence by the lex fori".
Again, a Federal German arbitrator had to determine the validity of the
arbitration clause in a contract under which the Svjiss plaintiff had
agreed to do certain engineering work in Spain for the Spanish defendant.
The arbitrator, holding the proceedings in Paris, held:
"La convention pass^e entre les parties ne precise pas le droit
•, qui doit §tre declare applicable en I'espece. Avant toutes choses,
il importe done de determiner le droit national au regard duquel
le contrat devra etre examine dans le cadre de la validity de sa
clause d'arbitrage.. A cet effet, le tribunal d'arbitrage a retenu,
au depart, la "lex fori", done le droit francais. Suivant le droit
international prive francais, I'ordre juridique applicable aux
contrats est determine....
And again, in an award^ rendered in Basle between a French plaintiff and two
defendants, one French and one German, the arbitrator wished to determine
the applicable law with respect to a concession agreement. The award
stated : • •
" (a) Le lieu de I'arbitrage etant a Bale, un juge ordinaire
serait tenu de se refgrer aux regies suisses de conflit de
lois comme le.x fori, pour determiner quelle est la loi
applicable au contrat liant le's parties. Selon le droit
international prive suisse, les effets d'un contrat se
jugent d'apr&s l€ droit du pays avec lequel le contrat est'
dans le rapport territorial le plus etroit, soit le pays
de la partie dontla prestation caracterise le rapport
juridique.., „ Or, dans le cas d'un contrat de representation
avec droit de vente exclusif, qui combine avec les
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obligations reciproques de vendeur et d'acheteur 1 obligation
du fournisseur de s'abstenir de vendre ou faire,vendre dans
un certain rayon et 1'obligation du reprgsentant de promouvoir
la vente dans ce rayon, c'est la prestation du repr^sentant
qui est caracteristique et ceci specialement, si le contrat
d'exclusivite a ete en vigueur de longues'annees. II se
rapproche alo'rs du contrat d'agence pour lequel I'art. 418
b CO Suisse prevoit 1'application du droit du pays dans
lequel I'agent exerce son champ d'activite....
Le si^ge de la society demanderesse A, represen-tant exclusif,
se trouvant ^ Paris, un juge ordinaire conclurait que c-'est le
droit francais qui est applicable, et un tribunal arbitral
siegeant eii Suisse sera conduit ^ la m&me conclusion, dans la
mesure ou il doit tenir compte du droit international prive
du for" . (Emphasis added).
Ad hoc award
243» Asimilar approach was taken in an adjhoc arbitration which was held in
Sweden^ The dispute arose out of a contract for the sale of a Dutch motor-
vessel, by the Dutch o\raer to a Swedish buyer. The contract provided for
arbitration to take place in Gothenberg. The Dutch sellers began a-rbitration
proceedings claiming damages from the,Swedish buyers for the latter's failure
to fulfill the contract as agreed. Wanting to determine the applicable law,
the three arbitrators - a Non^egian, a Swede and a Dutchman - held the
"question must be decided according to the lex fori, i.e. under Swedish rules
as to conflict pf laws".
g) Critique
244. In this section most of the awards discussed illustrate examples v/here the.
arbitrators have applied a neutral lex arbitri, whether as "la loi du si^ge
d'arbitrage" or as the law of the place of the arbitration, or as the "lex
fori"' of the arbitration. The concern of arbitrators to make a choice of law
on the basis of rules which neither can be accused of partiality nor have
"I'apparence d'une preference arbitraire"^ and challenged on that basis is
understandable. Though perhaps without foundation, there is a natural
tendancy to believe the law of the other party is biased against one, and
that one's own national law will be in one's favour. Hence the acknowledged
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reluctance of contracting parties to readily agree to a choice of the law of
the other party. Similarly, one sees in the organisation of an arbitration
and particularly ICC arbitration - the constant attempt to arrange and hold
the proceedings in some place other than where either of the parties are normally
resident or have their places of business. However unjustified; parties do
prefer arbitration proceedings to be conducted in a neutral forum, subject to a
neutral procedural law, a neutral private international law, and above all,
under conditions which are unfavourable to the exercise of any pressure on the
arbitrators. It is for this reason, that except where the parties 'agree
otherwise, the ICC will not arrange an arbitration-procedure in the country
where one of the parties is normally resident. Even where an arbitration is
held in a country with which one of the parties has such a close relation, the
sole or third arbitrator will invariably be a national of a third and neutral
country, who will conduct the arbitration proceedings in accordance with some
2
law different from that of either of the parties o
We have already briefly seen two awards in which the arbitrators have applied -
• as the law of the place of arbitration or as the lex fori -'the private
.3
international laws of one of the parties. We referred cursorily to an award
in which a Dutch arbitrator'applied French private international law rules as
he was sitting in Paris. That was a case brought by a Federal German plaintiff
to recover money owed by the French defendant in respect of motor vehicles
specially constructed by him in accordance with the defendant's specifications.
The provision for arbitration in accordance with the rules of the ICC was no
doubt placed in the contract more because of the character of the ICC as a
r
non-national institution, than pursuant to a desire that French procedural or
private international law should be applied. The Dutch arbitrator was
appointed because not only was he appropriately qualified, but more importantly
because he vjas of a nationality different from the parties. That the
arbitration took place in Paris was to satisfy the convenience of the parties:
one party had his place of business in Paris itself; the German party, who
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carri'ed on business in Cologne, could travel as easily to Paris as to
Amsterdam; and the arbitrator normally resident in Amsterdam, was quite
happy'^ to use the secretarial, etc. facilities available at the ICC head
quarters.
A similar analysis can be given with respect to an ICC arbitration clause
contained in a contract between the plaintiff, a French corporation, and the
defendant, an Italian manufacturer of electrical goods^. Under the contract,
the defendant had granted the plaintiff exclusive sales rights of his goods in
certain areas of France, It was agreed that the plaintiff would buy the
defendant's goods at a reduced price, and would sell them direct to the public
'offering an "after sales" service; the "after- jales" service would be provided
by the defendant. l"Jhen the contract was terminated by the defendant on the
grounds of the plaintiff's failure to sell the required number of machines
manufactured by the defendant, the plaintiff claimed damages for wrongful
termination of the contract, alleging that his failure to sell the required
number of appliances was due to his inability to guarantee delivery on time
, by virtue of the defendant's continual delay in delivering the appliances
and the defendant's failure to provide a satisfactory, or any, adequate
"after-sales" service. To resolve the dispute arising out of the contract
a distinguished Swiss professor was appointed arbitrator. Presumably the
• appointment of a Swiss national was to have a person from a third and neutral ^
country as arbitrator. Again, presumably the submission to ICC arbitration
was to benefit from the "non-national" character of that institution; if the
parties merely desired some institutionally organised arbitration in Switzerland,
they could .have submitted to the arbitration tribunal of the Zurich Chamber of
Commerce, or some other similar organisation in Switzerland. Presumably the
arbitration was actually held in Switzerland, not because of the-parties confidence
3.n the merits of Swiss' procedural and private international law, but rather
because in the circumstances, it \ms more convenient for the parties, the
arbitrator and the ICC. .
aoo
There is no criticism of the actual decision in either of these two ax^ards.
Rather it- is the application of the private international law system of one of
the parties that gives rise to some misgivings. Is the application of a system
of private international law so closely connected with one of the partiesnot E.riTna
facie likely to raise questions about the partiality of the law applied? Is
the application of a prima facie partial private international law not contrary
to the spirit of international arbitration? Will the application of private
international law rules closely connected with, the contract leave one party
feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied or give grounds for the award to be
ultimately denied recognition and enforcement? If the conflict of laws rules
referred to are not impartial, if the substantive law applied is not appropriate
to the particular casej if the award leaves one or both parties aggrieved and
is unenforceable, then' several of the advantages of submitting international
commercial disputes to arbitration will be wanting .
